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I. Introduction 
Hidden in the Net is the mystery of the Invisible Hand—control 
without authority.2
This article is a speculation – an exploration of the advisability of incorporating certain 
principles into the criminal law governing cyberspace.3  Why is such an exploration necessary?  
Why, in other words, is it necessary to consider “a criminal law for cyberspace”? 
The migration of a substantial portion of human activities into cyberspace erodes the 
efficacy of the traditional model of law enforcement – the constellation of rules, procedures and 
personnel we use to maintain “order” in discrete societies.4  Societies are but one type of system 
composed of autonomous entities; all such systems must maintain a baseline of internal order if 
they are to carry out the processes that are necessary for the system to survive.5
2Kevin Kelly, Out of Control:  The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World 26 (1994).     
3For the proposition that distinct principles of criminal law should govern cyberspace, see Susan W. Brenner, 
Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace:  Distributed Security, 10 10 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter 
Brenner, Distributed Security]; Susan W. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace:  A New Model of Law 
Enforcement?, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER  TECH. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Brenner, A New Model of Law 
Enforcement?].     
4See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3; Brenner, A New Model of Law Enforcement?, supra note 3.  See 
also World Federation of Scientists, Toward a Universal Order of Cyberspace:  Managing Threats from Cybercrime 
to Cyberwar 9 (August 2003), at http://www.unicttaskforce.org/community/  
documents/257947542_wfs_cybersecurity.pdf (proposing a criminal law for cyberspace).   
5See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3: 
Order  . . .  means that a sufficient measure of control has been established over the environment 
within which a system operates and the  . . .  entities who comprise it so that the latter can 
successfully discharge the tasks necessary for the perpetuation of the system.  If a  . . .  system is 
to survive, it must  . . .  ensure the continuity of a populace of the entities of which it is comprised.  
For biological systems, this means ensuring (a) that its constituent entities have the necessities  . . .  
they need to survive and to reproduce themselves; (b) that their offspring achieve adulthood and 
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Like all systems composed of autonomous entities, human societies are self-
organizing: They use rules to create and sustain internal order.6  Like all self-organizing systems, 
human societies employ constitutive rules for this purpose. 7 Constitutive rules – much like the 
rules of a board game – set the parameters of acceptable behavior on the part of the entities 
populating the system.8     
Human societies have also heretofore operated as bounded systems; that is, they have 
been situated in a delimited spatial area and have been composed of a defined populace (e.g., 
“the people of Rome,” “the citizens of Athens,” “the American public,” and so on).9  These 
spatial and population constraints facilitate the operation of the constitutive rules that maintain 
internal order.  Spatial and demographic isolation make it easier to socialize the individuals 
populating a specific system so that most of them accept and abide by its constitutive rules; on 
the other hand, spatial isolation also makes it easier to identify, and to suppress, those who 
violate these rules.10  The inevitability of such violations differentiates human societies from 
other self-organizing systems.  Unlike the entities that populate most biological systems and 
every artificial system heretofore created, humans are highly intelligent and, as a result, inhabit 
systems constituted by rules of their own design.11  While the need to sustain internal order 
necessitates that there be functional continuities in the rules that comprise all human systems, the 
 
are successfully incorporated into the system; and (c) that these discrete entities and the system 
itself are protected from the depredations of competitors and predators.   
6See id.  
7See id.  
8See id.  
9See id.  
10See id.  
11See id. See also Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, Society as a Human Product in Social Theory:  Multicultural 
and Classic Readings 384, 384 (Charles L. Lemert ed., 1999) (“Social order exists only as a product of human 
activity”). 
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forms these rules take can vary from system to system and can be mutable within a 
system.12  Thus, the variability and mutability of the constitutive rules employed by human 
systems can result in their being perceived as nonbinding by certain individuals who populate a 
system; this option is not available to entities, such as social insects, which are driven by 
biological imperatives.13  Ant societies, for example, employ a repertoire of constitutive rules for 
creating intricate social structures and for carrying out highly complex activities; yet, no ant is 
capable of deviance from the constitutive rules.  Ants have war, but not crime.14  Humans have 
both.   
  Along with maintaining internal order, systems must also maintain an acceptable level 
of external order.15  External order governs a system’s relationship with its environment; 
“environment” encompasses both the physical context within which a system functions and the 
“alien” entities that can threaten a system’s survival by attacking or competing with its populace 
for essential resources.16  Every system will therefore also have rules that structure its 
interactions with its environment; for example, ant colonies have rules governing war with other 
colonies and the process of relocating and founding colonies.17  The rules governing internal and 
external order do not operate independently; instead, they interact and evolve, allowing the 
system to adapt to changes in its environment.18   
The focus of this discussion, however, is on internal order.  Due to humans’ unique 
capacity to deviate, i.e., to contumaciously disregard the constitutive rules that maintain order in 
12See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3.  
13See id.  
14See id.  
15See id.  
16See id.  
17See id. See also George C. Homans, The Human Group 88-91 (1950). 
18See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3. 
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a human social system, human systems, unlike other self-organizing collective systems, 
cannot rely solely on constitutive rules to maintain internal order.19  Human systems add another 
set of rules: proscriptive rules that impose consequences upon those who violate constitutive 
rules.20  Proscriptive rules dictate that violating constitutive rules will result in the imposition of 
sanctions such as death, corporal punishment, banishment, incarceration, or the like.21  They are 
founded on the assumption that sanctioning those who violate constitutive rules maintains 
internal order by preventing such violations in the future.22  This assumption is based on two 
propositions: (i) sanctions prevent violations by presenting the populace with the simple choice 
of obeying the rules or suffering unpleasant consequences;23 and (ii) those who violate 
constitutive rules will be identified, apprehended and sanctioned. 24    
Since the efficacy of proscriptive rules depends upon apprehending and sanctioning 
violators, proscriptive rules must be accompanied by an enforcement mechanism. 25  In the 
several millennia since human social systems emerged, societies have accomplished this in 
19See id.  
20See id.  
21See id. See also infra Part II(B). 
22See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 55-60.  See also infra Part II(B). 
23See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 55-60.  This proposition incorporates the concept of deterrence, 
which has two aspects:  specific deterrence and general deterrence.  See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 2003).  Specific deterrence refers to the effect on the individual offender; “criminal 
punishment aims to deter the criminal himself  . . .  from committing further crimes, by giving him an unpleasant 
experience he will not want to endure again.”  Id. § 1.5(a)(1).  General deterrence refers to the effect on others; “the 
sufferings of the criminal for the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others from committing future 
crimes, lest they suffer the same unfortunate fate.”  Id. § 1.5(a)(4). 
24See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 55-60; Brenner, A New Model of Law Enforcement?, supra note 
3, at 14-25.        
25See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 55-60.    
4 
                                                 
different ways with varying degrees of effectiveness.  For centuries, Anglo-American 
societies relied upon citizen enforcement.  In Britain at the time of Alfred the Great, every male 
was  
required to participate in . . . the tything system.  A tything was a group of ten 
families, headed by a `tythingman.’. . .  It was each tythingman's duty to raise the 
`hue and cry’ when a crime was committed, to collect his neighbors and to pursue 
a criminal. . . .  If such a group failed to apprehend a lawbreaker, the tything could 
be required to pay a fine. . . . 26
The Normans essentially kept this system in place.27  
 In 1285, the Statute of Winchester introduced a modified approach by establishing citizen 
patrols in the large towns of England.  Men between ages fifteen and sixty were “required to 
perform watch service . . . [and were made] responsible for . . . apprehending anyone who 
committed a crime. . . .  [T]he entire community of able-bodied males was required to join in the 
pursuit of any wrongdoer.  A failure to participate . . . would result in punishment.”28  For the 
next five centuries, policing in England and in the American colonies consisted of this “watch 
and ward” system.29  Nevertheless, citizen commitment slowly weakened and it became common 
26CYRIL D. ROBINSON ET AL., POLICE IN CONTRADICTION:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICE FUNCTION IN SOCIETY 19 
(Contributions in Criminology and Penology, Series No. 44, 1994).     
27See id. at 93. 
28Id. at 20 (notes omitted).   
29Id.  See also BRUCE L. BERG, POLICING IN MODERN SOCIETY 29-32 (Butterworth-Heinemann ed., 1999).  “Law 
enforcement in the Founders’ time was a duty of every citizen.  Citizens were expected to be armed and equipped to 
chase suspects on foot, on horse, or with wagon whenever summoned.”  Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685, 692-93 (2001).   
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to hire substitutes, who were generally “too old to be of any value.”30  By the end of the 
eighteenth century crime rates were increasing steadily, exacerbated by the “vast migration to 
urban areas” resulting from the Industrial Revolution.31  The British and American publics 
opposed police forces, fearing they would infringe on individual freedom, but their opposition 
was to no avail.32  In 1829, Parliament passed Sir Robert Peel’s Metropolitan Police Act and 
created a tax-supported police force for the London area.33   
[T]he Metropolitan Police created by this legislation provided the model for 
modern policing. . . .  First, the officers were independent from the courts. . . .  
Second, the force was uniformed, and quasi-military in organization.  Patrols 
were assigned to constables, who were supervised by sergeants, who in turn 
reported to inspectors, who were under the command of superintendents, who 
reported to the commissioner.  Third, policing was a full-time occupation, and 
officers were not allowed to . . . accept . . . private payments for their work.34
Forces modeled after the Metropolitan Police spread through England and America and 
eventually around the world.35  For at least the last century, the paradigm has been a hierarchical, 
quasi-military model in which authority is centralized and orders move down a chain of 
command.36  The primary focus of these agencies has been to react to completed crimes; they 
30ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 21.  See also THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 4 (Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris eds., 1999).   
31 ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 21. 
32See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1201-07 (1999).      
33Id. at 1202.   
34Id. at 1202-1203 (notes omitted).  
35See, e.g., BERG, supra note 29, at 27-34. 
36See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 63-64.   
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apprehend offenders and work with the judicial system to ensure they are appropriately 
sanctioned.37    
As a result of shifting the responsibility for enforcing the constitutive rules to specialized 
law enforcement agencies, civilians, who were not part of these agencies, gradually surrendered 
responsibility for maintaining internal security.38  Today, in most if not all countries, citizens see 
internal security as the exclusive province of law enforcement professionals.  Citizens may lock 
their doors and install burglar alarms because they realize this is necessarily an imperfect system, 
but they generally feel no personal responsibility for reacting to, or for preventing, crime.39
Since this model of law enforcement evolved to deal with crime occurring in the real, 
physical world, it incorporates certain assumptions about the nature of crime.40  These 
assumptions reflect the nature of real-world crime with a fair degree of accuracy, making the 
model a satisfactory means for dealing with real-world violations of proscriptive rules; it 
maintains an acceptable, albeit imperfect, level of internal order within contemporary human 
37See id.  See also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY 34 (2001):  Model assumes “crime control must be a specialist, professional task of ‘law enforcement,’ 
oriented to the . . . pursuit and processing of…offenders.  No need…to encourage private action.  No need to involve 
the public . . . No need for . . . prevention.  All that was required was a framework of legal threats and a reactive 
response.”       
38See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 37.  See also Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 64.  
39See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 37, at 32: 
By the middle . . . of the twentieth century, . . . police . . . had come to occupy a dominant position 
. . . and the public’s standard response to victimization was increasingly to file a report with the 
police. . . .  [T]he crime control activities of citizens . . . tended to atrophy . . . The presence of 
professionals tended to de-skill the people and to relieve them of the sense that crime control was 
their responsibility.  Crime became something that ‘the authorities’ should do something about . . . 
. 
40See id.  
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societies.41   However, because it assumes real-world crime, this model is not a satisfactory 
means of dealing with cybercrime; the assumptions that hold for real-world crime do not hold for 
crime that occurs in or is mediated through cyberspace.42  The inapplicability of these 
assumptions and the consequent inefficacy of our current approach to law enforcement requires 
us to devise an alternative model for cybercrime, one that supplements the traditional, reactive 
approach to law enforcement.43    
Part II of this article outlines the traditional model’s assumptions about real-world crime 
and explains why these assumptions do not hold for cybercrime.  It also outlines an alternative 
model of law enforcement, one that emphasizes preventing crimes instead of reacting to them, 
and explains why this is a preferable strategy for dealing with cybercrime.44  Part III explains 
how several new principles of criminal law can be used to operationalize this model, which 
represents a non-hierarchical system of distributed security.  Finally, Part IV provides a brief 
conclusion. 
II.  CYBERCRIME, CYBERRULES 
The prevailing model of law enforcement evolved to deal with real-world crime – the 
only kind of crime societies encountered until recently – and therefore makes certain 
assumptions about crime.45  As Part II(A) explains, the model incorporates four assumptions, all 
41See id.  
42See id.  
43See id.  
44It is also a superior strategy for dealing with real-world crime; when Sir Robert Peel founded the Metropolitan 
Police, one of his goals was to have officers prevent crime.  See id. at 221 n.9.  “But this preventive function came 
to be interpreted as the deterrent effect of a police presence…and the apprehension of offenders eventually took 
operational priority.”  Id.   
45 See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 
2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 3, 56 http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf.   
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of which tend to hold for real-world crime but none of which are valid for cybercrime.  
Since these assumptions structure the model’s approach to “crime,” the model is ill-equipped to 
deal with cybercrime.  Parts II(B) and II(C) therefore outline an alternative model of law 
enforcement which can effectively be used in the fight against cybercrime.  
A.  CYBERCRIME 
Unlike a physical frontier, the Net is truly infinite.  
The more it is inhabited, the wilder it becomes. . . .46
Parts 1 and 2 below outline four characteristics of real-world crime and show how they 
shaped the traditional model of law enforcement.  The following sections explain why 
cybercrime shares none of these characteristics and why it is therefore necessary to develop a 
new approach for dealing with online crime.  
    1.  Real-world Crime  
Being situated in a physical environment, real-world crime possesses four relevant 
characteristics: proximity, scale, physical constraints, and patterns. 
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of real-world crime is that the perpetrator 
and the victim are necessarily physically proximate to each other when the offense is committed 
or attempted.  It is, for instance, impossible to rape or realistically attempt to rape someone if the 
rapist and the victim are fifty miles apart.  Likewise, in a non-technological world, it is 
physically impossible to pick someone’s pocket, or to rob or defraud someone out of his 
property, if the thief and victim are in different cities, different states, or different countries.   
Further, the scale of real-world crime is limited, as it tends to be one-to-one crime.  A 
one-to-one crime is an event that involves only one perpetrator and one victim.  During the event 
46Chris Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizen 134 (2001).  
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the perpetrator focuses all of her attention on consummating that crime.  When it is 
complete, the perpetrator can move onto another crime and another victim.  Like proximity, the 
one-to-one character of real-world crime derives from the constraints physical reality imposes 
upon human activity:  A thief cannot pick more than one pocket at a time, a forger cannot forge 
more than one document at a time, and, prior to the rise of firearms, it was exceedingly difficult 
for one to cause the simultaneous deaths of more than one person.  Real-world crime therefore 
tends to be serial crime.47
Real-world crime is also subject to the physical constraints governing activity in the real 
world.  Every crime, even street-level drug dealing or prostitution, requires a level of 
preparation, planning, and implementation if it is to succeed.  A bank robber must visit the bank 
to familiarize herself with its layout, security, and routine; this exposes her to public scrutiny, 
which can lead to her identification and apprehension after she commits the crime.  The same is 
true of the robbery itself; while in the bank, the robber leaves trace evidence and subjects herself 
to observation.  As she flees the scene of the crime, she is again exposed to public view and risks 
being identified.  In addition to these obvious risks, the robber probably needed to secure a 
weapon and some type of disguise before the robbery and would require help disposing of the 
cash afterward.  Each step takes time and effort, thereby incrementally augmenting the exertion 
required to commit the crime and increasing the risk involved in its commission.  
Finally, over time it becomes possible to identify the general contours and incidence of 
the real-world crimes committed in a society.  Victimization tends to fall into demographic and 
47The one-to-one nature of real-world crime is more a default than an absolute; exceptions occur, especially as to the 
number of perpetrators.  Many crimes can involve multiple perpetrators.  While many-to-one deviations from the 
one-to-one model have occurred for centuries, one-to-many deviations were rare prior to the use of technology. See 
Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3.    
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 geographic patterns for two reasons.  First, only a small segment of a functioning society’s 
populace will persistently engage in criminal activity.  Those who fall into this category are apt 
to be from economically-deprived backgrounds and reside in areas that share geographic and 
demographic characteristics.  They will be inclined to focus their efforts on those with whom 
they share a level of physical proximity because they are convenient victims; consequently, 
much of a society’s routine crime will be concentrated in identifiable areas.  The second reason 
crime falls into patterns is that each society has a repertoire of crimes – rules which proscribe 
behaviors ranging from more to less serious in terms of the harm each inflicts.  Theft yields a 
loss of property, rape yields nonconsensual sexual intercourse, murder yields a loss of life, and 
so on.  In a society that successfully maintains internal order, the more egregious crimes occur 
less frequently and typically less predictably than minor crimes.  For example, murder is an 
extraordinary event in any society that successfully maintains a baseline of internal order; theft, 
however, is a much less extraordinary event, as are “victimless” crimes such as public 
drunkenness or prostitution.   
             2.  Real-World Model 
 As strategies for ensuring internal order evolved, the four characteristics of real-world 
crime discussed above became embedded assumptions that shaped the traditional model of law 
enforcement.  Proximity contributed a presumed dynamic: victim-perpetrator presence in the 
same general locale; victim-perpetrator proximity and consequent victimization; perpetrator 
efforts to flee the crime scene and otherwise evade apprehension; investigation; identification; 
and apprehension of the perpetrator.  The dynamic reflects a time when crime was parochial – 
11 
                                                 
when victims and perpetrators tended to live in the same village or neighborhood.48  Even if 
a victim and perpetrator did not know each other, they were likely to share community ties.  This 
facilitated the process of apprehending perpetrators, since it was likely that a perpetrator could be 
identified by the victim, by witnesses or by reputation.49  If a perpetrator and a victim did not 
share community ties – that is, if the perpetrator was a stranger – being an alien would no doubt 
contribute to his apprehension because it would be clear he “did not belong” and was therefore 
not to be trusted.50  Law enforcement dealt effectively with this type of crime because its spatial 
limitations allowed for investigations to be limited in scope.  The real-world model still assumes 
that the investigation of a crime should focus on the physical scene of the crime. 51   
Scale added another element: The model assumes both one-to-one victimization and the 
extraordinary nature of crimes, i.e., that crime is unusual and law-abiding conduct is the norm.  
Together, these assumptions yield the proposition that the scale of crime will be limited in a 
functioning society.52  The latter assumption derives not from the physical characteristics of real-
world crime but from the need to maintain internal order.  A society’s constitutive and 
proscriptive rules work together to achieve this: The constitutive rules define encouraged 
48See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 
supra note 45.    
49See id.   
50See id.   
51See id.  See, e.g., Steven A. Egger, Linkage Blindness: A Systemic Myopia, in 8 Serial Murder: An Elusive 
Phenomenon 163, 164 (1990).  
In a stranger-to-stranger murder lacking in physical evidence or witnesses, criminal investigators are left to deal 
with a very large set of suspects, with only a small probability of this set including the offender.... [M]ost serial 
murderers are caught by chance or coincidence.... Law enforcement agencies today are simply not adept at 
identifying or apprehending the murderer who kills strangers and moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and crosses 
state lines.
52This is, of course, true.  See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2002:  Uniform 
Crime Reports 9-11 (2002), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/pdf/0front.pdf.    
12 
                                                 
behaviors while the proscriptive rules define behaviors that will not be tolerated.53  The 
members of a society are socialized to believe in and accept the constitutive rules as prescribing 
the “correct” standards of behavior; the proscriptive rules, or criminal laws, reinforce this by 
emphasizing that the behaviors they condemn are not only “bad,” but fall outside the norm – 
they are extraordinary.54  The combined effect of these rules is that crime becomes a subset of 
the total behaviors in a society; the limited incidence of criminal behavior, coupled with one-to-
one victimization as the default crime mode, permits law enforcement personnel to focus their 
efforts on a limited segment of the conduct within a given society.55  
The third characteristic – the physical constraints that apply to real-world crime --  
structures the way the model approaches the investigation of real-world crime and the way legal 
systems parse responsibility for those who commit real-world crime.  As to the former, the 
existence of physical constraints means it is appropriate to focus, at least initially, on the crime 
“scene,” in hopes of finding witnesses who can identify the perpetrator or of finding trace 
evidence that can be used to identify the perpetrator.56  As to the latter, the assumption that crime 
is subject to physical constraints underlies our conception of criminal jurisdiction; while 
jurisdiction has expanded somewhat over the centuries, the usual basis is still that the crime was 
“committed in” a specific, territorially-based jurisdiction.57 
 
Finally, the model incorporates the concept that crime falls into identifiable patterns; this 
contributes to the notion that a quantum of crime is localized.  The model assumes that crime 
53See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3.    
54See id.   
55See id.   
56See, e.g., Marilyn B. Peterson, Applications in Criminal Analysis:  A Sourcebook 90-91 (1994). 
57See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §171.0101. 
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will be limited in incidence and in the types of “harm” it inflicts; it also assumes that an 
identifiable percentage of crime will occur in geographically and demographically demarcated 
areas.  The combined effects of localized crime and the differential frequency with which various 
crimes are committed gives law enforcement agencies the ability to concentrate their resources in 
areas where crime is most likely to occur, thus enhancing their ability to react to completed 
crimes.    
3.  Cybercrime 
Cybercrime does not require physical proximity between victim and perpetrator.  
Cybercrime is unbounded crime; the victim and perpetrator can be in different cities, states, or 
countries.58  A perpetrator needs only a computer linked to the Internet to attack a victim’s 
computer, to defraud someone, or to obtain the information that will allow her to assume a 
victim’s identity and commit fraud on a grand scale.      
Nor is one-to-one victimization a viable default assumption for cybercrime.  One-to-one 
victimization is a function of the constraints that exist in the real-world; since cybercrime is not 
committed in that world, it is not subject to those constraints.  Indeed, cybercrime does not have 
to involve personal victimization.  Unlike real-world crime, cybercrime can be automated crime, 
which uses technology to carry out the commission of crimes, in whole or in part.59  Automation 
allows a perpetrator to commit thousands of crimes quickly and with little effort, making one-to-
58See, e.g., President’s Working Group On Unlawful Conduct On The Internet, The Electronic Frontier:  The 
Challenge Of Unlawful Conduct Involving The Use Of The Internet, § II(D)(2) (March, 2000), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm#CHALLENGES.   
59See, e.g., Donn Parker, Automated Crime, WindowSecurity.com (October 16, 2002), 
http://secinf.net/misc/Automated_Crime_.html/.  For an example of how automation can increase the scale of 
criminal activity, see, e.g., Kelli Arena, U.S. Targets Porn Site’s Customers, CNN.com (August 8, 2001), 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/08/08/ashcroft.childporn/ (website offering child pornography had 250,000 
subscribers around the world and took in $1.4 million in a one-month period).  
14 
                                                 
many victimization a realistic default assumption for cybercrime.60  This capacity for 
automation creates problems for law enforcement.  Under the traditional model, officers react to 
a crime by investigating, identifying, and apprehending the perpetrator, who will be convicted 
and sanctioned.  This scenario assumes real-world crime, that is, it assumes that crime is 
committed on a limited, manageable scale and can therefore be addressed by having law 
enforcement officers react to individual crimes.  Cybercrime violates this assumption in two 
ways.  First, even though cybercrime, like real-world crime, is carried out by a small percentage 
of the population of a society (or of the world, since cybercrime tends to make system 
boundaries irrelevant), this relatively small group can commit crimes on a scale far surpassing 
what is possible in the real-world, where one-to-one victimization and serial crimes are the 
norm.61  As a result, the absolute scale of cybercrime, in terms of the incidence of discrete 
crimes, exponentially exceeds that of real-world crime.  Second, cybercrime is compounded with 
60See, e.g., Bernhard Warner, Cyber Blackmail Wave Targets Office Workers, Computerworld (December 29, 2003), 
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/cybercrime/story/ 0,10801,88623,00.html:  
The extortion scam . . . targets anyone on the corporate ladder with a PC connected to the Internet.  
It  . . .  starts with a threatening e-mail in which the author claims to have the power to take over a 
worker's computer . . . .  The e-mail typically contains a demand that unless a small fee is paid  . . .  
the fraudster will attack the PC with a file-wiping program or download onto the machine images 
of child pornography.  
‘They prey on the nice secretary  . . . .  When she gets one of these e-mails, she  . . .  puts it on her 
credit card and transfers the funds  . . .  and hopes it goes away,’ a British detective specializing in 
cybercrime told Reuters  . . . .  There are scores of cases of companies . . . receiving extortion 
threats . . . .  Fraudsters also send out streams of menacing e-mails with hollow threats of cyber 
sabotage.  The scam works even if only a handful of the countless recipients pay up.  
`It's getting simpler,’ said [F-Secure’s Mikko] Hypponen.  `If you wanted to extort money from a 
small company, you would have had to hack them and convince them you have stolen their 
information. Here, you don't have to do anything but send an e-mail around.’    
61See, e.g., President’s Working Group On Unlawful Conduct On The Internet, The Electronic Frontier, supra note 
58 (“The potential to reach vast audiences easily means that the scale of unlawful conduct involving the use of the 
Internet is often much wider than . . . in the offline world”). 
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the real-world crime with which law enforcement has traditionally dealt and with which it 
must continue to deal; people will, after all, continue to rape, rob, and murder in the real-world.  
These factors combine to cause an overload for the traditional model: Law enforcement’s ability 
to react to cybercrime erodes because the resources that were barely adequate to deal with real-
world crime are totally inadequate to deal with cybercrime and with cybercrime-plus-real-world-
crime.  
Cybercrime perpetrators avoid the physical constraints that govern real-world crime.  A 
cybercrime can be committed instantaneously.  For example, a virtual bank robbery can be 
committed and the funds can be deposited into accounts in several other countries before law 
enforcement learns that the crime has been committed.  Law enforcement’s reactive strategy is 
considerably less effective in this context than in the real-world.62  For one thing, the reaction 
begins well after the crime has been successfully concluded.  Since all or substantially all of the 
conduct involved in committing the crime occurs in an electronic environment, the “physical” 
evidence, if any, is evanescent and volatile.  By the time officers react to the robbery, any 
electronic evidence that existed may well have been destroyed, advertently or inadvertently.  
Also problematic is that the perpetrator was never physically present at the crime scene; thus, 
assumptions about his having been observed in the processes of preparing for, committing, 
and/or fleeing from the crime no longer hold.  It may be impossible for officers to determine the 
identity of the perpetrator or the physical location from which he carried out this crime; unlike 
the real-world perpetrators, cybercriminals can take advantage of perfect anonymity or perfect 
62See, e.g., FBI Overwhelmed By Cybercrime, Reuters (March 20, 2002), http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-
864453.html.   
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pseudonymity.63  Even if officers can identify the perpetrator, gathering evidence and 
apprehending him can be difficult, since the country that hosts the perpetrator may not regard his 
actions as illegal.  The host country may therefore decline to extradite him, or there may be no 
extradition treaty in place that governs the conduct at issue.64
Finally, perhaps because cybercrime is still a new phenomenon, we are unable to identify 
offender-offense patterns comparable to those for real-world crime; as a result, law enforcement 
cannot effectively allocate its resources to deal with real-world crime.  Several factors account 
for our inability to identify cybercrime patterns.65  First, they are not accurately documented.  
Countries do not track cybercrime the way they track real-world crime, perhaps because of a lack 
of standardized definitions of cybercrime.66  While law enforcement agencies record 
cybercrimes, they tend not to break them out into a separate category; cyberfraud, for example, is 
recorded as “fraud.”67  Additionally, it can be difficult to parse cybercrime into discrete offenses:  
Was the “Love Bug” virus that caused billions of dollars of damage in more than twenty 
countries one crime or thousands of crimes?  Clearly, though, the most important reasons for our 
63See, e.g., David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited 
Liability in Cyberspace, 11 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 149-51 (1996).   
64See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Joseph Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence-Gathering and Local Prosecution of 
International Cybercrime, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. Law 347, 375-377 (2002).  
65It may be that cybercrime, unlike real-world crime, does not fall into identifiable patterns. See Brenner, Distributed 
Security, supra note 3.       
66See, e.g., Barbara Etter, Critical Issues in High-Tech Crime, Australasian Centre for Policing Research 9 (2002), 
http://www.acpr.gov.au/pdf/Presentations/CIinHi-tech.pdf. 
67See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 2002, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/02prelimannual.pdf.  But see Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, Prosecutors in 
State Courts 2001 5 (May 2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc01.pdf (reporting number and type of 
cybercrime prosecutors by state prosecutors).  Cybercrime statistics are complied in a few specialized areas.  See, 
e.g., Internet Fraud Complaint Center, IFCC Annual Internet Fraud Report 2002, 
http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/statistics.asp.   
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lack of accurate statistics about cybercrime are that (i) many cybercrimes go undetected and 
(ii) many detected cybercrimes go unreported.  As to the first issue, cybercrime often goes 
undetected either because security systems cannot detect outside penetrations or because they are 
carried out by trusted insiders, who know how to hide their tracks.68  As to the second issue, 
commercial victims are notorious for not reporting that they have been victimized by a 
cybercriminal.  These companies do not want to advertise their vulnerability, either to customers 
or to their shareholders.69
4.  Cybercrime Model 
The current model of law enforcement was in place by the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, a period when technology was in its infancy.  The traditional model of law enforcement 
is in many respects analogous to the traditional model of military order: Both are concerned with 
organizing and concentrating human and other forces to respond to physical activity, or the 
prospect of such activity, by human beings who are situated in an identifiable physical 
environment.  Both models therefore feature a hierarchical structure that uses a chain of 
command to concentrate personnel and other resources on those to whom a response is 
necessary; this is an appropriate approach to concentrating human and other resources to achieve 
an objective in the real-world, which is why both models survived for so long.70   
68See, e.g., Andrew P. Snow & Mark Longworth, The Greatest Information Survivability Threat:  The Undetected 
Barbarian at the Gates, CERT:  Fourth Information Survivability Workshop (2001), at 
http://www.cert.org/research/isw/isw2001/papers/Snow-31-08.pdf 
69See, e.g., Art Jahnke, The GAO Assessment of the Fed’s Cybercrime Unit: Hard to Tell, Darwin Magazine (May 
29, 2001), at http://www.darwinmag.com/connect/opinion/column.html?ArticleID=107. 
70See, e.g., Brian Nichiporuk & Carl H. Builder, Societal Implications in Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in 
the Information Age 297 (1997), available at  http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/ MR880/MR880.ch13.pdf  
(“Hierarchical organizations have been a salient characteristic of human civilization; they are the basis upon which 
most authority, power, and command and control have been exercised for millennia”).        
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Technology eliminates the need, and indeed the ability, to focus on specific, 
localized activity.  Communication technologies free us from the constraints of the empirical 
world; we can communicate instantaneously with anyone from anywhere.71  This produces a new 
type of social organization: the network.72  The emergence of the network is not without 
precedent; the development of new technologies has historically produced new forms of social 
organization.73  Networks are displacing hierarchies in every sector of society, including the 
military, because hierarchical organization is not an effective means of organizing 
technologically-mediated activities.74
 Networks are lateral, fluid systems;75  they decentralize power and authority, thereby 
empowering individuals.76  While networks have the capacity to usher in a new era of 
cooperation among peoples and among social systems,77 they can also be exploited for 
destructive purposes: 
[T]he rise of hierarchical forms of organization . . .was . . . attended . . . by the 
appearance of ferocious chieftains bent on military conquest . . . .  [T]he early 
spread of the market form . . . was accompanied by a spawn of . . . pirates, 
smugglers, and monopolists. . . .  There appears to be a subtle . . . interplay 
between the bright and dark sides in the rise of a new form of organization.  The 
bright-side actors may be so deeply embedded in and constrained by a society’s 
established forms of organization that many have difficulty becoming the . . . 
71See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Organized Cybercrime?  How Cyberspace May Affect the Structure of Criminal 
Relationships, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2002), at http://www.jolt.unc.edu/. 
72See, e.g., David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars and the Fight for the Future, 6 First Monday, 
(October 2001), at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html. 
73See, e.g., David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks:  A Framework About Social Evolution 5-17 
RAND (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/P/P7967/P7967.pdf. 
74See Nichiporuk & Builder, supra note 70, at 298-299. See also John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Swarming & The 
Future of Conflict 1-10 (2000), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/ DB311/DB311.pdf. 
75See id.  
76See id.  
77See, e.g., HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION 208-251 (2002) (“cooperation 
amplification”). 
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adopters of a new form.  In contrast, nimble bad guys may have a freer, easier time 
acting as the cutting edge. . . .78  
 
This is precisely what is occurring as to cybercrime.  Law enforcement, which is for the most 
part still “embedded in and constrained by” traditional hierarchy, lags behind the “bad guys” 
who have learned how to exploit the distributed, non-territorially-based realities of cyberspace.  
Thus, the question becomes: How do we bring law enforcement up to speed and how can law 
enforcement adapt to the new realities of cybercrime?  
 The core problem is evident in law enforcement’s reactive approach.  As Part II(A)(3) 
demonstrated, the reactive approach does not effectively deal with cybercrime, since cybercrime 
is not territorially based and tends therefore to be elusive.  There is no necessary nexus between 
the situs of a cybercrime and the perpetrator’s physical location, either at the time the crime is 
committed or afterward; no one observes the perpetrator casing the crime scene, “traveling” to it, 
committing the crime or “fleeing” the scene.  Cybercriminals can shield their identities and do 
not leave traditional physical evidence at the crime scene; whatever evidence they leave can 
easily be lost, destroyed or altered.  Cybercrimes do not fall into identifiable patterns and the 
scale of their commission means law enforcement officers simply cannot react to all of them.   
 One solution would be to improve law enforcement’s ability to react to cybercrimes.  
This could involve taking any of several actions.  First, the number of officers who are available 
to react to cybercrime could be significantly expanded.  As Part II(A)(3) noted, cybercrime is 
problematic for law enforcement because it constitutes an incremental addition to the quantum of 
crime to which law enforcement must react;  thus, it seems logical that increasing the number of 
officers available to react should offset this effect and restore the efficacy of the reactive 
78David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, What Next for Networks and Netwars? In Networks and Netwars:  The Future of 
Terror, Crime and Militancy 313 (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds. 2001), available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/MR1382.ch10.pdf .    
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strategy.  There are, unfortunately, two problems with this solution.  First, societies already 
find it difficult to allocate the resources necessary to support existing law enforcement agencies; 
therefore, it is highly improbable that they will be able to summon the resources required to 
recruit, train and equip enough officers to make the reactive strategy a viable approach to 
cybercrime.  Additionally, since cybercrime is, and will continue to be, increasingly automated, 
there is no guarantee that increasing the number of officers will improve the efficacy with which 
law enforcement agencies can react to cybercrime.  It is no longer a matter of fielding officers to 
track down and apprehend a perpetrator before he can re-offend; while officers are searching for 
the perpetrator of one cybercrime, the same perpetrator can use his automated systems to commit 
hundreds or even thousands of other crimes79 to which officers will also have to react.  
Furthermore, as was illustrated in Part II(A)(3) , it is difficult for officers to react effectively 
even when they are available to do so; they may never find the perpetrator and, if they do, they 
may not be able to arrest, prosecute, or convict him.  
 Another alternative would be to fight fire with fire: to automate policing in cyberspace.  
This would presumably involve using automated agents to react to completed cybercrime and to 
“patrol” public areas of cyberspace in an effort to apprehend cybercriminals in much the same 
way state troopers patrol interstate highways and apprehend speeders.  While automated 
cyberpolicing is a logical alternative, its adoption and implementation would be fraught with 
difficulties, technical and legal, 80 that make it an unrealistic option for the foreseeable future.   
79See, e.g., Testimony of Alan Paller, Director of Research – The SANS Institute, Before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on “Securing Our Infrastructure: Private/Public Information Sharing” (May 8, 
2002),  at  http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/050802paller.pdf  (“The fight against cybercrime resembles an arms 
race where each time the defenders build a new wall, the attackers create new tools to scale the wall”).     
80See, e.g., Kevin Manson, Robots, Wanderers, Spiders and Avatars:  The Virtual Investigator and Community 
Policing behind the Thin Digital Blue Line, Office of International Criminal Justice (1997), at 
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 Yet another possible solution is to authorize civilian use of defensive technologies 
which would let cybercrime victims use “strike-back” or ”counterstrike tools”.81  Victims could 
react when they become the targets of cybercrime and would supplement the reactive capabilities 
of law enforcement personnel.82  Like the automated cyberpolicing strategy, this alternative 
raises difficult legal questions.83  The risks involved in authorizing victim self-help, however, 
would ultimately cause this approach to founder.  Tracing a cyberattack to the perpetrator’s 
computer may be impossible for victims with limited technical skills;84 consequently, they may 
“retaliate” against the wrong computer system.  Since many systems are “operated by hospitals, 
governmental units, and telecommunications entities . . . that provide connectivity to millions of 
people,” counterstrikes such as these “could easily create a remedy worse than the disease.”85
 These alternatives exhaust the options for improving the reactive approach, so it seems 
we must devise a new approach.  There are two ways of logically dealing with crime: reacting to 
completed crimes and preventing crimes before they are committed.  The reactive model 
incorporates the concept of crime prevention insofar as it is predicated on incapacitating and 
deterring offenders, but this is not its primary concern.86  Preventing crime is the primary 
concern of another model: “community policing.”  Community policing emphasizes “putting 
 
http://www.dougmoran.com/tatzlwyrm/CACHE/Digital_Officer_Safety/Attachments/Robots_Wanderers_Spiders_a
nd_Avatars.PDF  (“Matters of comity, sovereignty and legal jurisdiction will . . . have to be resolved before 
intelligent agents begin coursing through servers in foreign universities, banks and government agencies”). 
81Curtis E.A. Karnow, Strike and Counterstrike: The Law on Automated Intrusions and Striking Back, Black Hat 
Windows Security (February 27, 2003), at http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-03/bh-win-03-karnow-
notes.pdf. 
82See id.   
83See id. (“A host of statutes . . . make it illegal to attack or disable computers, including those connected to the 
Internet”).   
84See id.  
85Id.      
86See supra Part II(A)(2).  See also supra Part I.  
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officers back on the streets,” where they become “part of the fabric of the neighborhood, as 
a . . . dependable presence, instead of racing around the city in patrol cars, reacting to crimes that 
have already happened.”87  It also emphasizes cooperation between police and citizens to create a 
climate where crime is not tolerated.88  Community policing has had notable successes in the 
real-world, but it is difficult to implement, since it is labor-intensive, requires organizational 
restructuring, and can raise ethical issues about the allocation of scarce resources.89   
 Community policing, as such, is not a viable option for the cyber-world for two reasons.  
First, it would require assigning police officers to “patrol” cyberspace; it would therefore be 
necessary to staff these patrols either by hiring new officers or re-assigning officers who deal 
with real-world crime to cyberspace.90  The first option would require funds that, as was 
explained earlier, are simply not available.  The second would erode the law enforcement 
presence in the real-world in order to concentrate on cybercrime; since real-world crime poses its 
87Lancaster (Pa.) Crime Commission, Crime Commission Report 2003 § II (“Community Policing and Law 
Enforcement Organization”), at http://www.lancasteronline.com/crimereport/0302/comm_police.shtm.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence Sherman, Preventing Crime:  What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, A Report to the United 
States Congress for the National Institute of Justice (1997), at http://www.ncjrs.org/works/.     
88See Lancaster Crime Commission, Crime Commission Report 2003, supra note 87. See also Barry N. Leighton, 
Visions of Community Policing: Rhetoric and Reality in Canada, 33 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 485, 487 (1991). 
89See, e.g., Leighton, supra note 88, at 496-498, 503-511; David Thacher, Equity and Community Policing: A New 
View of Community Partnerships, 20 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 1 (2003); Gerasimos A. Gianakis & G. John Davis III, 
Reinventing or Repackaging Public Services?  The Case of Community-Oriented Policing, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1 
(1998). 
90Many agencies have officers who are assigned to cyber crime, and many of them “patrol” areas of cyberspace.  
None, however, maintains a 24/7 presence in cyberspace and it is exceedingly unlikely that any will be able to do so 
in the foreseeable future.  See, e.g., Gary Nurenberg, Cracking Down on Online Predators (Tech TV television 
broadcast, Aug. 27, 2002) available at  
http://www.g4techtv.com/techtvvault/features/28652/Cracking_Down_on_Online_Predators.html (last visited Sept. 
22 2004); Molly Masland, Stalking Child Molesters on the Net (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 4, 1998) at 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3078773/. 
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own compelling dangers, this would not be advisable.  Further, community policing is not a 
viable option for the cyber-world because there really are no “communities” in cyberspace.   
“Communities” in cyberspace tend to be defined by interests, not by territory.91  In the real-
world, community policing succeeds because the civilians who participate want to ensure the 
security of the neighborhood in which they live.  In the cyber-world, the members of these 
interest-based “communities” may not be concerned about cybercrime because they lack the 
central, binding focus that a physical neighborhood provides.  Considering the interests and 
communications that give rise to these communities, many of the participants may prefer the risk 
of cybercrime to the prospect of a law enforcement presence in their midst.   
 While this form of community policing cannot be applied to cyberspace, two aspects of 
the community policing model suggest an approach that could be used for cybercrime: 
proactivity and collaboration.  The reactive model of law enforcement does not deal effectively 
with cybercrime because it is fluid and distributed in nature.  Thus, as a lateral, pervasive 
phenomenon, cybercrime requires a lateral, pervasive solution.  This solution must be proactive; 
that is, it must focus on preventing cybercrime because, as explained above, reacting to 
completed crimes is not a practicable means of dealing with cybercrime.  The solution must also 
involve a collaborative approach that combines the efforts of civilians and law enforcement in 
order to address the fact that it is neither financially nor pragmatically possible to deploy enough 
officers to maintain order in cyberspace.  Clearly, then, a practical way to address cybercrime is 
to utilize the community policing model’s concept of a proactive, collaborative approach to 
preventing crime. 
91See Peter Kollock & Marc A. Smith, Communities in Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 3-28 (Marc A. 
Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1998).  See, e.g., Welcome to Communities.com at http://www.communities.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2004). 
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 How is this to be done?  Does this solution require creating yet another model of law 
enforcement, one specifically directed at cybercrime?  Actually, this solution does not require a 
new model as much as it requires eliminating the assumptions and expectations that are the 
foundation of the traditional model and replacing them with a new set of assumptions and 
expectations.  Under the traditional model, citizens have no responsibility for dealing with crime; 
they have come to think of crime as the exclusive responsibility of the police.92  The community 
policing model seeks to reverse this process, at least in part, and to involve citizens in combating 
crime.93  It achieves this by putting officers in neighborhoods where they patrol the area to 
discourage criminal activity and encourage citizens not to tolerate such activity.  Citizens are 
involved, but only in preventing crime; they are not responsible for reacting to it.94  
 This community policing model is ineffective against cybercrime, however, because 
police cannot patrol “neighborhoods” in cyberspace.  The model relies on an active police 
presence, reinforced by neighborhood support, to control crime in a specific geographical 
location.  It cannot be applied in a context that lacks geography and neighborhoods.  
92See, e.g., William D. Eggers & John O’Leary, The Beat Generation: Community Policing at Its Best, 74 Pol’y 
Rev. 1 (1995), available at http://www.policyreview.org/fall95/thegg.html (“The public began to forget its role in 
controlling crime and grew increasingly dependent on the police . . . . Americans began to think of crime fighting as 
the job of police.”).  See also Richard A. Leo, Some Thoughts about Police and Crime in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM, 
ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121 (George Fisher & Lawrence M. Friedman eds., 1997).    
93Prior to the rise of the traditional model, citizens were involved in law enforcement; indeed, for much of modern 
history, citizens were law enforcement.  In 1285, for example, the English Statute of Winchester established a 
system of patrols in the “large towns of England. Men between the ages of fifteen and sixty were required to 
perform watch service . . . . They were responsible for . . . apprehending anyone who committed a crime.”  CYRIL D. 
ROBINSON, RICHARD SCAGLION &  J. MICHAEL OLIVERO, POLICE IN CONTRADICTION : THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
POLICE FUNCTION IN SOCIETY 20 (1994).  The statute also “required every man between the ages of fifteen and sixty 
to maintain specified weaponry, which varied according to his wealth.”  David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1197 (1999).  For the transition from citizen law enforcement to professional law enforcement 
under the traditional model see Brenner, supra note 3, Distributed Security.  
94See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 3 Distributed Security.      
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Nevertheless, a variation of the model could be used to prevent cybercrime.  This modified 
community policing model relies primarily on active citizen efforts and only secondarily on 
police support.  This is not a community policing model; it is a distributed policing model in 
which citizens assume responsibility for preventing crime.  This modified community policing 
model represents the disassembling of the traditional model of law enforcement insofar as 
citizens assume responsibilities with regard to a particular type of crime, e.g., burglary;95 their 
responsibilities consist primarily of preventing cybercrime, though citizens may also be 
encouraged to report cybercrimes to law enforcement.96  Citizen prevention serves to maintain 
internal order; it also serves to ward off external threats because cyberattacks, unlike real-world 
crimes, can constitute acts of terrorism or war.97    
 Postulating this model raises two questions: Why should citizens assume responsibility 
for preventing cybercrimes when they have no such responsibility as to real-world crimes?  
Assuming citizens should assume such responsibility, how can this be achieved?  Both questions 
are addressed below.  
   (a)  Why? 
The answer to the “why” question lies in the differences between cybercrime and real-
world crime.  We do not require citizens to prevent real-world crimes.  For example, assume that 
I go work and leave my front door unlocked and a rear window wide open.  If a burglar takes 
advantage of the situation and steals my television, my laptop, and my stereo, I can call the 
95As explained above, it also represents a return to an older approach, the approach that anteceded the quasi-military, 
hierarchical model of professional law enforcement that has been the norm for just over a century.  See supra note 
93. 
96As was explained earlier, it is not advisable to hold civilians responsible for reacting to completed cybercrime.  See 
supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
97See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 5-7, 37-41 (February 
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.  See also infra note 108. 
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police, who will make an effort to find the burglar and recover my property.  It is, of course, 
quite possible that the officers may not exert themselves to the fullest in doing so; they may 
make the burglary of my home a lesser priority than other crimes out of their frustration at my 
irresponsibility.  I, however, will never know if this is the case and, indeed, it may not be; the 
officers may well make a sincere effort to recover my property and apprehend the perpetrator.  
My irresponsibility is legally irrelevant; criminal law does not require a blameless victim.  It is a 
crime to inflict a prohibited harm on an individual even though he recklessly exposed himself to 
the risk of such harm or consented to its infliction.98  The doctrinal reason why the criminal law 
disregards my carelessness is that a crime is an offense against the authority of the state and 
therefore must be addressed by the state without regard to the circumstances that contributed to 
its commission.99  This proposition derives from the systemic need to maintain internal order and 
the empirical reality that criminal behavior constitutes a serious threat to such order.100   
 Why should citizen obligations be different with regard to cybercrime?  The primary 
reason is that if I leave my front door unlocked and a rear window open and a burglar takes 
advantage of my carelessness, the only one harmed is me, the architect of my own victimization.  
This is not necessarily true for cybercrime.  Assume that instead of leaving my front door 
unlocked and a rear window open, I access the Internet using an always-on broadband 
connection without installing any security software to prevent my computer from being hijacked 
by a hacker.  I have opened my computer up to attack, which creates a situation analogous to the 
98See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963) (state had an interest in seeing 
that the victim, who died while playing Russian roulette, “should not be killed by the wanton or reckless conduct of 
himself or others”).  See also Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 234-235, 261 A.2d 550, 558 (Pa. 
1970) (`a killing with the victim’s consent is nevertheless murder’”) (quoting Case Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1565 
(1958)). 
99See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra, 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963). 
100See supra Part I.  
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burglary scenario:  I have carelessly exposed myself to “harm” from a criminal.  However, I 
have also created the potential for “harm” to others.  My carelessness has created a situation in 
which a hacker can take over my computer and use it to victimize other individuals and 
entities.101  This scenario results in the infliction of incremental “harms” exceeding those I 
would suffer from a personal attack.  A cybercriminal can use my computer, along with other 
hijacked computers, to launch a denial of service attack on an online business or a government 
website and shut them down; to do this, the perpetrator requires access to a critical mass of 
zombie computers,102 which I have helped to supply.103  The effects of my carelessness will be 
particularly egregious if terrorists or organized criminals use my computer to attack my 
country’s infrastructure;104 it is at this point that victim defaults jeopardize a system’s ability to 
sustain internal and external order.105 Thus, the most compelling answer to the “why” 
question is that responsibility for preventing cybercrimes should be imposed upon citizens 
because their failure to secure their own systems can result in the infliction of “harm” upon 
others, potentially threatening the security of the entire system.106   
Another justification for requiring greater citizen responsibility is that law enforcement is 
less effective in maintaining order in cyberspace than in the real-world.  In the real-world 
101See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Could Your Computer be a Criminal?, MSNBC at http://www.msnbc.com/ 
news/939227.asp (July 15, 2003).  See also OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE 
CYBERSPACE 39 (February 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb /cyberspace_strategy.pdf; Brenner, 
supra note 3 Distributed Security.    
102 A zombie computer is a “computer containing a hidden software program that enables the machine to be 
controlled remotely, usually to perform an attack on another computer”. Word Spy, “Zombie Computer,” 
http://www.wordspy.com/words/zombiecomputer.asp. 
103See, e.g., Xianjun Geng & Andrew B. Whinston, Defeating Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, 
available at http://cism.bus.utexas.edu/works/articles/defeating_ddos.pdf (August 2000).   
104See infra note 383 & accompanying text.    
105See supra Part I.  See also Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3.   
106See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 101, at 5-8.  
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scenario, police may well apprehend the burglar who stole my property; he may have been 
seen by my neighbors, left trace evidence in my house, or brought attention to himself when he 
tried to dispose of the property he took from me.  In the cyber-world example, the 
cyberperpetrator stands an excellent chance of avoiding apprehension because he acts remotely 
and anonymously and does not leave a trail in the physical world.107  Since citizen lapses in 
security can endanger others and since law enforcement cannot itself maintain order in 
cyberspace, it is prudent and reasonable for citizens to assume a measure of responsibility for 
maintaining order.108   
                             (b) How? 
Assuming citizens should undertake such an obligation, we must now consider how 
citizens are to become responsible for preventing cybercrime.  There are two alternatives:  
through voluntary or obligatory conduct.  Voluntary conduct is conduct individuals engage in 
because they believe it is “right” or “appropriate.”109  Individuals’ belief that particular conduct 
is “right” or “appropriate” (and, conversely, that other conduct is “wrong” or “inappropriate”) is 
107See supra Parts II(A)(3)-(4).  
108See supra note 93. This issue is also addressed in Part II(B), infra. Requiring that citizens assume such 
responsibility promotes external order as well as internal order because cyberattacks can represent information 
warfare or cyberterrorism, as well as cyber crime. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 
TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 101, at 7:   
In the last century, geographic isolation helped protect the United States from a direct physical 
invasion. In cyberspace national boundaries have little meaning . . . . Even the infrastructure that 
makes up cyberspace . . . is global in its design and development. Because of the global nature of 
cyberspace, the vulnerabilities that exist are open to the world and available to anyone, anywhere, 
with sufficient capability to exploit them.   
Countries can launch surreptitious yet effective attacks via cyberspace, exploiting security lapses on the part of 
civilians, and terrorists can do precisely the same thing. See id. (“the computers of home users can become part of 
networks of remotely controlled machines . . . used to attack critical infrastructures”).    
109See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340-349 (2000); 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 469-471 (1997).  
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based on norms they have internalized; voluntary conduct is therefore the product of 
internal social control mechanisms.110  Obligatory conduct, on the other hand, is the product of 
external social control mechanisms.111  It is conduct individuals engage in or avoid engaging in 
because they know that their failure to conform to what is externally required can result in their 
being sanctioned by that system.112   
 A voluntary approach to achieving citizen responsibility for preventing cybercrime would 
require establishing a norm to that effect; once the members of a society internalize this norm, 
they would regard preventing cybercrime as the “right” or “appropriate” thing to do, and most 
individuals would endeavor to comply. 113  Creating such a norm would require educating the 
populace in the need to take preventative efforts and in the means of implementing such 
efforts.114  Ideally, a voluntary approach is the preferred option; the most effective means of 
channeling behavior into desired paths is not the “imposition of external sanction, but the 
inculcation of internal obedience.”115  Unfortunately, establishing a norm can take a very long 
time.116  This is likely to be particularly true with regard to cybercrime prevention because the 
norm to be created involves cyberspace, and cyberspace is still an alien environment for most 
110See infra Part II(B). 
111See id.  
112 Obligatory conduct is voluntary in the sense that a member of a social system decides whether she will engage in 
the prescribed conduct; it is not “voluntary” in the sense used above because the decision to behave in particular 
ways is prompted by the awareness of externally-imposed consequences for one’s failure to do so.  See id. 
113See e.g., McAdams, supra note 106, at 340-49; Robinson & Darley, supra note 106, at 453, 469-71. 
114 It might also include appeals to their sense of system loyalty by emphasizing the impact cybercrime can have 
upon a system’s economy and the potential for external threats to system infrastructures.  See supra Part II(A)(4). 
115Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401 (1999); see, 
e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (1990). 
116See generally Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and Enforcing Norms with Special Reference to 
Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 377-80 (1999). 
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people.117  Citizens may believe it is prudent to install alarms and “burglar bars” to ward off 
real-world threats, but most are unlikely to appreciate the dangers that can come from 
cyberspace.  Further, the difficulty of creating such a norm is exacerbated by the fact that it 
would have to at least partially displace a deeply embedded norm, i.e., the idea that dealing with 
crime is the exclusive province of law enforcement.118   For these reasons, and others, a purely 
voluntary approach is unlikely to be effective, at least not in the near future.  
 This leaves the obligatory approach, which requires citizens to behave in certain ways.   
They can be required to act or not to act, 119 and the law is used to establish such an obligation.120  
“Do” laws create an obligation to act and impose sanctions for failing to discharge that 
obligation;121 “do not” laws create an obligation not to act and impose sanctions for committing 
the proscribed act.122  Though civil or criminal laws can be used to implement an obligatory 
approach, this discussion assumes criminal liability is used to impose an obligation to prevent 
cybercrime.  Criminal liability is generally more effective than civil liability in encouraging 
citizens to conform their conduct to a prescribed standard.123  The question, therefore, is whether 
this obligatory approach should utilize “do” laws or “do not” laws.      
117See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3.  
118See supra Part II(A)(2).   
119See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULE: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 7 (1991); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 28 (1975). 
120See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (2003).  
121See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 322 (1965); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3). 
122See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1). 
123See e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 109, at 472 (“criminal law builds and maintains societal norms in 
several…ways”); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of Intangible 
Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 730 (2000); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, how Changes in 
Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1278-79 
(2000). 
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 A strategy utilizing “do” laws would impose an obligation to prevent cybercrime;124 
a failure to discharge that obligation would result in a sanction.125  Seat belt laws provide a 
useful point of comparison.  By 2002, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had enacted 
such laws.126  These “do” laws require the occupants of a motor vehicle to use seat belts when 
the vehicle is in operation and impose sanctions for failure to comply.127  Seat belt laws have 
been effective in increasing seat belt use among American motorists,128 so it might seem that a 
similar approach would be an effective way to impose responsibility for preventing cybercrime.  
 There are, however, important differences between the two types of security measures.  
One differentiating factor is the relative complexity of the duty being imposed.  Federal law 
required that vehicles manufactured after 1968 have seat belts, so they were available when 
states began requiring their use.129  Thus the duty imposed by seat belt laws was not an onerous 
one – citizens are to use a device that is available and requires no technical skill to employ.  The 
duty imposed by the proposed cybercrime prevention laws, however, would be far more 
complex:  Citizens would have to (i) identify and obtain the tools they need to protect their 
124For individuals, this obligation could encompass installing firewalls and other security measures on computers, 
installing, updating and using anti-virus software and keeping software updated.  See, e.g., Office of the President, 
supra note 97, at 39.  For artificial entities, it could include these activities along with addressing insider threats and 
sharing information about known threats.  See id. at 39-41. 
125The sanction would no doubt be a fine; restrictions on computer use might be added for intransigent violators.  
Such laws should be structured to alleviate or eliminate liability for attacks that could not reasonably be prevented 
by the measures available to average citizens.  See infra Part II(C)(1).  
126See e.g., David A. Mobley, Revisiting Alabama’s Seat Belt Defense: Is the Failure to Buckle Up a Defense in 
AEMLD Claims?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 963, 969 n.45 (2002).    
127See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(d)-(i) (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §13A (West 2001). 
128See e.g., Barry L. Huntington, Comment, Welcome to the Mount Rushmore State!  Keep Your Arms and Legs 
Inside the Vehicle at All Times and Buckle Up . . . Not for Safety, but to Protect Your Constitutional Rights, 47 S.D. 
L. REV. 99, 104 (2002). 
129See e.g., Mobley, supra note 126, at 996 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 255.21 (1968)). 
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computers from cybercriminals; (ii) educate themselves about these tools so they could 
install them, use them, keep them updated, and replace them when necessary; and (iii) use these 
tools in an effective manner.  Since computer software, hardware, and the threats in cyberspace 
are all constantly evolving, these tasks would be ongoing and demanding obligations.   
 Another differentiating factor is the likelihood that scofflaws will be sanctioned.  Both 
the seat belt laws and the hypothesized cybercrime prevention laws establish a duty and impose 
sanctions to deter what society regards as dangerous behavior.  The behaviors to be deterred, 
respectively, are not wearing seat belts and thereby exposing oneself to a risk of injury; and not 
utilizing cybercrime preventative measures and thereby exposing oneself, others, and the social 
system to cyberattackers.  The effectiveness of sanctions in deterring behavior is a function of 
the perceived risk of actually being apprehended and sanctioned; the deterrent effect increases as 
the perceived risk of apprehension increases.130  Since compliance with seat belt laws occurs in 
public, it is not difficult for officers to tell if someone is obeying the law.  The perceived risk of 
being apprehended is therefore high; that, coupled with the ease with which one can comply with 
the law, makes the seat belt laws an effective type of “do” law.  The same would not be true for 
cybercrime prevention laws; these “do” laws would primarily address conduct occurring in 
private places – one’s home or office.131  Absent remote monitoring (which raises Fourth 
Amendment issues),132 it would be difficult for those charged with enforcing such laws to 
determine compliance.  The perceived risk of being identified and apprehended would 
130See e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55, 60-61 
(2001). 
131Since these laws would encompass preventative measures taken to secure laptops and other portable computing 
devices, it is conceivable that an officer would observe a failure to implement such measures when a laptop or other 
device was being used in public.      
132See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).  
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consequently be low; coupled with the difficulty of complying, this means that these 
hypothesized “do” laws would not be an effective means of securing citizen collaboration in 
enhancing cybersecurity.133   
 This leaves the final option: “do not” laws.  “Do not” laws may seem a peculiar candidate 
for enlisting citizens in the fight against cybercrime because “do not” laws generally define 
crimes.134  After all, we are not talking about sanctioning citizens for committing cybercrime; we 
are talking about sanctioning them for failing to prevent cybercrime.   
 Actually, “do not” laws should serve quite nicely.  One problem with using “do” laws is 
that such an approach is fundamentally inconsistent with how we approach criminal liability.  
Under the approach outlined above,135 we impose a duty on citizens to prevent their becoming 
victims of cybercrime and we sanction them if they fail to do so.  This is inconsistent with how 
we approach criminal liability because (i) it imposes an unprecedented obligation to prevent 
crime;136 and (ii) it imposes criminal liability for failing to discharge this obligation even though 
133“Do” laws of the type hypothesized might very well be perceived as Draconian, intrusive and, given the public 
lack of awareness of the dangers of cybercrime, unnecessary; such perceptions could result in widespread disregard 
of the obligation to be imposed, just as the alcohol Prohibition laws of the 1920’s  were met with resistance.  See 
Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3; see also Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra, 91 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. at 476.  
134Homicide laws (“do not take another person’s life”) and theft laws (“do not take another person’s property”) are 
examples of “do not” laws.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 223.2.  
135See supra notes 124 - 133 and accompanying text 
136See supra Part II(A)(4).  Seat-belt laws are not concerned with preventing crime; they are generally regarded as 
public health and safety measures.  See, e.g., Ilise Levy Feitshans, Foreshadowing Future Changes: Implications Of 
The Aids Pandemic For International Law And Policy Of Public Health, 15 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 807, 810 (1994).   
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no crime was committed.  We would in effect be holding someone criminally liable for 
failing to  prevent something that did not happen.137     
  The fact that using “do” laws to achieve citizen participation in combating cybercrime is 
inconsistent with how we approach criminal liability is important, not because it goes against the 
way we do things, but because we must use legal principles to create new behavior patterns.  If 
the principles we use are inconsistent with embedded expectations and understandings, they will 
be met with resistance and will not create the desired behavior patterns.138  We need an approach 
that does less violence to societal expectations. Parts II(B) and II(C) outline such an approach.    
              B.  CYBERRULES  
On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.139
The discussion in Part II(A) speaks of establishing “citizen” responsibility for preventing 
cybercrime and, in so doing, suggests we would impose a single, monolithic requirement upon 
all citizens to “prevent cybercrime.”  This is neither feasible nor reasonable. Instead, we should 
change attitudes and assumptions so that “citizens,” i.e., those who are not by profession charged 
with preventing and reacting to criminal activity, come to play an active role in securing 
cyberspace.  However, relying on simplistic, draconian rules that require everyone to “prevent 
cybercrime or face the consequences” would be futile and counterproductive.   
Thus, what we need is a new set of rules for making certain assumptions a part of the 
store of knowledge people use in their everyday life.  We want people’s responsibility for 
137We do impose criminal liability for crimes that are not consummated, but only when some steps have been taken 
toward the commission of an offense.  See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 5.01-5.03 (attempt, conspiracy and 
solicitation). 
138See, e.g., MARTIN ALAN GREENBERG, AUXILIARY POLICE: THE CITIZEN’S APPROACH TO PUBLIC SAFETY 14 
(1984); see also supra note 133. 
139Peter Steiner, Cartoon, 69 The New Yorker 61 (July 5, 1993), http://www.epatric.com/funstuff/dog/.  
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preventing cybercrime to become an embedded assumption that is inherent in their daily 
lives in the same way that, for instance, using smoke detectors or not speeding in school zones is 
part of the general fabric of everyday life.  Not everyone will strive to prevent cybercrime with 
the requisite diligence, but some percentage of those whose conduct falls below the required 
standard of care will be identified and sanctioned for their failures.  If the rules we implement are 
sufficiently discriminating and if the sanctions we impose are appropriately calibrated to reflect 
an offender’s culpability, this adventitious system of enforcement should suffice to ensure an 
adequate level of compliance, just as it does in other areas of criminal law. 
In fashioning this differentiated set of rules, we must begin with a fundamental 
dichotomy that allocates citizens into two categories and derives from the posture individuals 
and entities assume as to cyberspace.140  Most citizens participate in cyberspace for professional 
or personal reasons but play no role in constructing it; they are “users” of cyberspace.  The other 
category consists of individuals and entities that do play roles in constructing cyberspace.  They 
design, create or supply the software and hardware that is employed to create and sustain the 
collective experiential phenomenon we know as cyberspace;141 they are the “architects” of 
cyberspace.   
This dichotomy is essential because the posture one assumes as to cyberspace determines 
the type of preventative measures it is reasonable to require of that person or entity. The 
difference between “users” and “architects” is one of control.  “Users,” whether individuals or 
140See, e.g., Tania Brief & Terrell McSweeny, Corporate Criminal Liability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 337, 337-47 
(2003); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 667-73 (1975). 
141See, e.g., Gordon Fletcher, . . . Towards an Anthropology of Cyberspace, Spaceless.com (1997), 
http://www.spaceless.com/papers/14.htm (“The tools that construct the Internet — the software, the hardware, the 
protocols and the network — which are all material culture items themselves produce . . . cyberspace”).  See also 
Anita Greenhill & Gordon Fletcher, . . . The Social Construction of Electronic Space, Spaceless.com (1997), 
http://www.spaceless.com/papers/12.htm.  For cyberspace as an experiential phenomenon, see infra notes 156-159.   
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entities, can control only their own conduct.142  Their efforts are essentially defensive; 
“users” must defend themselves against those who would victimize them.  As such, “users” are 
on the front lines of the battle between order and cyberdisorder.  They must use their best efforts 
to employ the tools (i.e., hardware, software) made available to them so as to secure their 
systems from attack and otherwise fend off the attentions of cybercriminals.  The rules that target 
“users” would therefore emphasize one’s responsibility not to become a victim and the 
consequences attendant upon defaulting on that obligation.    
Although not all “users” are “architects”, all “architects” are “users” at some time.  When 
“architects” are simply participating in cyberspace, they are “users” and will therefore be subject 
to the “user” rules outlined in Part II(C)(1).  Yet, it is necessary and reasonable to impose 
additional obligations upon “architects” when they are acting in their respective capacities as 
“architects,” i.e., as the devisers and purveyors of the implements “users” employ to participate 
in cyberspace and protect themselves while doing so.  Imposing these additional obligations 
upon “architects” is necessary because “architects” determine the potential for security in 
cyberspace; it is reasonable to impose such obligations upon them because they can exercise 
more control over security in cyberspace than can “users.”   
Cyberspace is often analogized to the American Wild West, but that is an imperfect 
analogy.  As a social and cultural event, the American West was the process of expanding 
nineteenth-century American institutions and culture into the “unsettled” areas of the country; 
guarantees of internal order were concededly intermittent and fragmented in these areas until the 
process was complete.  But this did not lead to the absence of order; rather, the lapses and gaps 
in internal order that characterized this process were irregularities and were recognized as such.  
142As Part II(B)(1) explains, “users” can also be required to exercise some supervision over the conduct of others, 
e.g., parents can be required to supervise the conduct of their children.  
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Internal order prevailed in the eastern half of the country and everyone realized it would 
eventually prevail in the West as well. 143  
Cyberspace is more appropriately compared to Europe during the Dark Ages, i.e., the six 
to eight centuries following the fall of Rome.144  “The decline of Rome, the collapse of structure, 
of law and order . . . left western Europe bereft of political cohesion” and ravaged by natural 
forces.145  Like cyberspace, Europe during these disordered times was a “place” where 
presumptive order simply did not exist.146  Theft, rape, murder and other crimes were rampant,147 
but “given the general indifference of medieval populations to crime in areas other than their 
own, apprehension . . . was very unlikely.”148  Criminals used the primarily rural terrain to avoid 
apprehension; robbers, burglars, kidnappers and “assassins . . . slipped back into the anonymous 
countryside once their deeds were done.”149  The reign of misrule was exacerbated by law-
abiding citizens who had no qualms about using crime as an “intermittent supplement” to their 
regular sources of income.150  The presence of outlaws made commerce difficult; travelers 
carried weapons and banded together, “seeking collective security.”151
143See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, In the Wild West of the Internet, There are Good Guys and Bad Guys, SiliconValley.com 
(September 28, 2003), http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/6881523.htm. 
144See, e.g., WILLIAM MANCHESTER, A WORLD LIT ONLY BY FIRE: THE MEDIEVAL MIND AND THE RENAISSANCE 3-
5 (1992). 
145TERRY L. GORE, NEGLECTED HEROES: LEADERSHIP AND WAR IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD 3 (1995); see also 
MANCHESTER, supra note 144, at 5. 
146See, e.g., CAROLLY ERICKSON, THE MEDIEVAL VISION: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND PERCEPTION 148-80 (1976).  
147Burglary, counterfeiting and other currency offenses were also common.  See id. at 164-66, 171. 
148Id. at 163.  “Because of this, the majority of medieval lawbreakers never came into contact with the law . . . at 
all.”  Id.  
149Id. at 155.  As late as 1500, eighty to ninety percent of the population “lived in villages of fewer than a hundred 
people, fifteen or twenty miles apart, surrounded by endless woodlands.”  MANCHESTER, supra note 144, at 50-51. 
150ERICKSON, supra note 146, at 163. 
151Manchester, A World Lit only by Fire, supra at 64-65  
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How does comparing cyberspace and early medieval Europe advance our effort to 
devise rules that will encourage citizens to assume responsibility for preventing cybercrime?  
The comparison is instructive because it demonstrates the similarities – and dissimilarities – of 
the two.  Like early medieval Europe, cyberspace is a “place” where order is problematic 
because the devices traditionally used to create and sustain order are ineffective.152  Yet, the two 
differ as to the reasons why order is problematic.  Disorder was ultimately a transient 
phenomenon for medieval Europe; it was the product of a number of factors, including Rome’s 
152Real-world systems must establish and maintain internal and external order if they are to survive.  See supra § I. 
This principle cannot be extrapolated to cyberspace because it is not a “place.”  See infra notes  156-159 and 
accompanying text.  Since cyberspace is not a “place” with fixed, identifiable boundaries separating it from other 
“places,” the distinction between internal and external order has no meaning.  One could argue that there is a 
relevant boundary: the boundary between the real-world and cyberspace.  If we were to accept this argument, our 
focus would be on maintaining order “in” cyberspace and order “between” cyberspace and the real-world.  The 
problem is that this argument assumes cyberspace is a “real” place when it is not.  There is no cyberspace without 
the real-world; cyberspace exists only insofar as we humans, creatures of the real-world, engage in the activities and 
employ the technologies that create and sustain the collective experience we know as cyberspace.  See infra notes 
156-159 and accompanying text.  The “border” between the real-world and cyberspace is experiential, not 
geographic; the more precise focus is therefore upon establishing order in the intricate myriad of communicative 
processes we experience as cyberspace.        
Until Rome fell, Europe relied on its institutions establish and maintain internal order; after Rome fell, those 
institutions no longer existed and the rules they implemented were no longer effective.  See, e.g., Norman F. Cantor, 
THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 40-47 (1993); Manchester, A World Lit only by Fire, supra at 3-5. The 
disorganizing effect of Rome’s fall was exacerbated by invasions of tribes  which had their own rules and 
institutions.  See, e.g., Paul Vinogradoff, Foundations of Society (Origins of Feudalism), 2 Cambridge Medieval 
History 630 (1913), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3078827/. (“influx of . . .barbarians was bound to break up the frame 
of Roman civilization” but what made matters worse was that they “had come with social arrangements of their 
own”).   A level of internal order naturally existed in Europe even during the Dark Ages; had it been totally 
lacking, the population would have died out or emigrated in search of more stable environments. See supra note 5 
and accompanying text.  But Europe during the Dark Ages is still the best real-world analogy for cyberspace 
because it is a period when basic institutions and basic social life were in disarray; such widespread, formless 
disarray was never typical of the American West, as it always had an anchor in the “civilized” society east of the 
Mississippi.     
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collapse and the ensuing vacuum into which poured an unstable mix of cultures and 
alliances.153  The demise of disorder and the re-imposition of order in Europe were inevitable 
because real-world systems require internal and external order if they and their constituent 
populations are to survive and endure.154  When a real-world system descends into anarchy, the 
loss of internal order is necessarily a temporary state; the entities populating the system must re-
establish order, migrate to other social systems, or cease to exist, both individually and 
collectively.155   
 The same is not true of cyberspace.  Order is not inevitable in cyberspace because it is 
not a “place”; it is instead, as William Gibson said in Neuromancer, a “consensual 
hallucination”.156  Physical analogies are inapposite because cyberspace is not a locus, it is an 
activity -- a complex type of mediated communication.157  We do not “inhabit” cyberspace, nor 
do we “visit” cyberspace; we “do” cyberspace, i.e., we experience an intricate, multi-layered 
communicative process that is sustained by a series of increasingly complicated technologies.158  
A decade or so ago, we fell into the habit of referring to this experience as a “place” because we 
153See also CANTOR, supra note 152, at 89-121. 
154See supra Part I.  For the establishment of order in medieval Europe, see, e.g., CANTOR, supra note 152, at 483-
528. 
155See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
156WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).     
157See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege:  Law Enforcement, Technology and the Constitution, 7 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 124, 131 (2002), http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol7/2/brenner.pdf:  
Mediated communication is communication that takes place via some artificial medium (such as 
the telephone); it is distinguishable from direct, or face-to-face, communication. Mediated 
communication can be specifically directed at one or more known parties . . . or it can be 
disseminated generally to an unidentified audience, such as in radio or television broadcasts. 
Mediated communication can also be interactive . . . or it can be the unilateral transmission of 
information, such as with radio or television broadcasts. 
For more on mediated communication and cyberspace, see id. at 131-133.    
158See id. 
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are creatures of the real-world and, as such, we have no conceptual referent that accurately 
encompasses this process to which many of us devote a great deal of our time.159   
 We did not confront this issue with earlier types of mediated communication.  Written 
correspondence is not real-time and therefore posed no conceptual difficulties; corresponding 
(i.e. writing) and perusing correspondence (i.e. reading) fell into known, established categories 
of experience.160  Telephonic communication required more of an adjustment because although it 
is real-time, it is not face-to-face discourse; nonetheless, as real-time communication, humans 
159John Perry Barlow claims he first applied Gibson’s “science fiction term Cyberspace to the . . . global electronic 
social space now . . . referred to by that name.  Until his naming it, it had not been considered any sort of place.”  
Barlow@eff.org.  John Perry Barlow, Barlow Home(stead) Page, at http://www.eff.org/~barlow/barlow.html (last 
visited Sep. 26, 2004).  See supra note 156; see also John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last modified Feb. 8, 1996). 
 A “conceptual referent” is a framework we use to “make sense of” experience.  A concept is a schema for 
evaluating objects and events that “serves as a psychological yardstick” for comparing and evaluating stimuli.  O.J. 
Harvey, David E. Hunt & Harold M. Schroder, Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization 10-11 (1961). 
Objects and experiences “have no psychological value” until they are “compared to a conceptual referent.”  Id. at 
13.  New technologies require us to develop conceptual referents so we can fit new experiences into our 
understanding of the world.  See infra notes 157- 158 and accompanying text.  For lack of a better model, we have 
chosen to conceptualize the complex process of computer-mediated communication that has proliferated over the 
last decade or so as a “place,” a variation of the real-world.  See, e.g., Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law 
Enforcement, Technology, and the Constitution, supra note 157, at 160: 
Because of the way cyberspace is . . . configured, it is . . . almost irresistible, to think of it as a 
virtual place, a contrived mirror of the real world. . . .[M]uch of what we experience in the real 
world — streets, buildings, . . . vehicles . . . etc. — is also contrived, the product of human 
intelligence and effort.  In the real world, these contrivances must . . . operate within certain . . . 
constraints. Pool tables . . . must have legs . . . In the virtual world . . . these constraints no longer 
hold true.  Pool tables . . . do not require legs in this place where gravity does not exist.  Logically, 
. . . there is no reason why that place should resemble the real world.  The only reason why 
cyberspace . . . mirrors the . . . real world is because those who originally settled . . . cyberspace . . 
. assumed that this virtual place should operate according to the same constraints that prevail in 
the real world.  
160See id. at 131-133.  
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quickly adapted to the phenomenon of being “on the phone,” i.e., of speaking with one 
whose physical location is more or less remote.161  The complex, computer-mediated 
communicative process we call “cyberspace” is a much more substantial challenge.  Some 
aspects of this process are analogous to an exchange of written correspondence that takes place 
in real-time or almost-real-time, except that we may have no idea as to the identity, location or 
other bona fides of the person with whom we are corresponding.  Other aspects are analogous to 
“publishing” or “broadcasting” content (words, graphics, music, etc.) in the real-world.  This 
intricate network of computer-mediated communication frees us from the commercial constraints 
of publishing houses and movie studios and lets us, for better or worse, share our ideas and 
creativity with the world.  Increasingly, however, aspects of this process bear no relationship 
whatsoever to the objects and events we are familiar with from the real-world.162  In cyberspace, 
for instance, I can experience virtual worlds, participate in multi-player online games of varying 
degrees of violence and unreality, or create an alternate life in a virtual community.163  I can 
161See id.  Other types of mediated communication, including the telegraph, radio, cinema and television, required 
some adjustment but none presented the conceptual challenges posed by cyberspace. The telegraph, which was 
never available for private use and therefore had a limited effect upon the public, was conceptually analogous to the 
telephone; that is, it involved real-time distance communication with one other person.  See id.  Radio, cinema and 
television differ from written, telephonic and telegraphic communication in that they all involve passive 
communication; that is, content generated by one (or several) is disseminated to individuals who merely “receive” it.  
See id; see also supra note 157.  The delivery mechanism used in these technologies was novel, but the 
communicative process was not.    Radio, television and the cinema are functionally analogous to the plays, operas, 
vaudeville shows and other “live” performances humans have enjoyed for millennia; we were accustomed to being 
part of an “audience” and that gave us the conceptual reference we needed to adapt to these technologies.        
162The capacity for un-real-world experience increases as the sophistication of the technologies used in the process 
increases; the early Internet was primarily text-based and therefore offered little in the way of “virtual” experiences.  
See, e.g., James W. Dow, The Early History of Electronic Communication in Applied Anthropology, American 
Anthropological Association (1999),  http://www.aaanet.org/napa/ publications/napa19/three/threea.html.  
163See, e.g., Ultima Online, http://www.uo.com/; Battle.net, http://www.battle.net/intro.shtml; Real Sims Online, 
http://www.realsimsonline.com/index.asp; Theatre des Vampire, http://www.visi.com/~rioghnach/ gothicquarter/.    
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enjoy experiences that are distinctly unreal,164 I can commit crimes, and I can combine the 
two.165  To comprehend these varied experiences and incorporate them into my understanding of 
reality, I need to have an empirical phenomenon to act as a source of analogy, or as a conceptual 
referent, for them.166  We could have developed discrete referents, using different empirical 
analogies for various aspects of this process; however, we have instead chosen to use the concept 
of “place” as our comprehensive referent, perhaps because it seems the experiences we have 
online must “take place” in some unknown “space.” 167   
There is nothing objectionable about using “space” as the conceptual referent for online 
experience as long as we do not come to believe that this “space” is real.  Our experiences 
creating and maintaining order in human social systems have so far been limited to the real-
world, where order is difficult to escape.  In the real-world, conduct, which is at once the source 
of order and disorder, is embodied and situated in physical space; because it is subject to the 
physical constraints of the real-world, conduct is visible, traceable and controllable with the use 
of social and physical force.168  Except for occasional exceptions (e.g. hermits, castaways), 
humans live in societies because they need the physical and emotional support other humans 
provide.169  Most conduct is therefore “visible” to those with whom one shares a social system; 
since it is visible, conduct can be traced to the actor, who can be held accountable for what she 
164See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, I Feel Pretty, in MY TINY LIFE (1998) (describing his experience with “virtual 
womanhood” in a virtual community), http://www.juliandibbell.com/mytinylife/tinyexcerpts_pretty.html. 
165See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, in MY TINY LIFE (1998) (describing multiple-victim rape in a 
virtual community), http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/bungle.html.    
166See supra note 159.  
167See, e.g., Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, supra note 156 (“Cyberspace consists of 
transactions, relationships, and thought . . . arrayed . . . in the web of our communications”). 
168See supra Part II(A)(1)-(2).  
169See, e.g., F.L.K. HSU, CLAN, CASTE AND CLUB 149-158 (1963); TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 251-
256 (1951); GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP 128-192 (1950).     
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did or failed to do.170  Humans are held accountable either formally or informally.171  Most 
of the control exercised in human societies is informal.172  Individuals learn that certain 
behaviors are “right” or “appropriate;” they also learn that they will receive approval and 
rewards if they behave in the “right” or “appropriate” ways, but will suffer disapproval if they 
behave in ways that are “wrong” or “inappropriate.”173  This is an effective way of maintaining 
internal order because people “obey the rules not because they are forced to, but because they 
want to.”174  While this is an effective way of maintaining internal order, it is not perfect.  Since 
not everyone obeys the rules, societies use formal social control against those who violate their 
more important rules, i.e., their proscriptive rules.175  Criminal justice systems impose various 
types of sanctions on those who violate proscriptive rules on the assumptions that (i) sanctions 
will deter the person from re-offending and (ii) sanctioning her will deter others from 
170See id.  
171ALAN S. MILLER & SATOSHI KANAZAWA, ORDER BY ACCIDENT:  THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONFORMITY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 8-9 (2000):  
[A]n important distinction is between informal and formal . . . social control . . . . Informal social 
control has a wide variety of components that run from basic socialization . . . to peer pressure and 
informal group monitoring and sanctioning. The focus is on ways that normative . . . behavior is 
taught and reinforced . . . . Formal social control refers . . . to the criminal justice system, and . . . 
enforcing social norms that are seen as important enough to have been codified into laws. 
172See id. at 9 (the overwhelming percentage of people follow rules “because of informal social control . . . .[P]eople 
have been socialized to follow society's rules, and they interact in social situations where behavioral conformity is 
rewarded”).  See also supra notes 109-112. 
173See MILLER & KANAZAWA, supra note 171, at 9 (“through informal group monitoring, inappropriate behavior is 
quickly detected and punished”).  See also supra notes 168-169. 
174MILLER & KANAZAWA, supra note 171, at 9.  
175See id. at 9, 67; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
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offending.176  In the real-world, internal order, despite being imperfect, is ubiquitous; it is 
appropriately our default assumption.  
That is the real-world, where conduct is embodied and situated in physical space.  In 
cyberspace, the same is not true. This difference is important for our analysis of how order can 
be maintained “in” cyberspace.  Having a defined, delimited population that is situated in 
physical space which is controlled and secured from external threats has been the basis of 
internal order since human societies began.177  Order is ubiquitous because it is inescapable.  
Members of a society learn to obey the rules that sustain internal order; yet, while internalizing 
the rules offers some assurance that individuals will obey them, it is not enough.  The obligation 
to obey the rules must be reinforced.  This reinforcement comes from interacting with others 
whose approval we desire, and whose disapproval we fear, in a spatial context where our 
behavior can easily be observed and assessed.178  This reinforcement process is integral to the 
social control systems outlined above.179  Although it is the raison d’etre of the informal system, 
it is also important for the formal system.  When subject to a formal system, we know that our 
actions in the real-world can be observed, and therefore we realize that there is some risk of 
being caught if we violate a proscriptive rule.180  Our awareness of that risk and our desire to 
176See, e.g.,JACK P. GIBBS, A THEORY ABOUT CONTROL 255-257 (1994); see also supra notes 21-23 and 
accompanying text. 
177It is also the basis for maintaining order in other systems.  See Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
178See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and Enforcing Norms,with Special Reference to 
Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 372-77 (1999); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal 
Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980).  
179See supra notes 169-176 and accompanying text. 
180Research shows that the deterrent effects of sanctioning those who commit crimes “are more strongly associated 
with people’s estimates of the likelihood of being . . . than they are by the anticipated severity of punishment.  See 
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 Crime & Just. 283, 303 (2003).   
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avoid the consequences attendant upon being caught violating such a rule are credible 
disincentives for doing so.181   
While this process is a compelling force in small communities, it is also an essential 
element of modern, urbanized society.182  Its importance is most evident when the bounds of the 
spatially-based real-world system of order begin to fray and people behave in ways other than 
those dictated by their internalized rules.  A good example of this is behavior in motor vehicles.  
“Most of us have . . . observed that driving an automobile can alter a person's behaviour from 
civility to incivility; in some cases, otherwise normal people become violent when they are 
behind the wheel of a car.”183  One explanation for this is that our visibility, or our perception of 
181See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: 
Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 841 (1990) (suggesting three kinds of potential costs 
considered by individuals in deciding whether to obey the law).  Conversely, if we think there is little chance we 
will be observed and “caught”, we are more likely to violate rules, even proscriptive rules, especially if the penalties 
are small; see, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1404 (2002) (stating that 
drivers speed because they believe “they will not be subjected to social disapproval for speeding” and “will suffer 
no sanction for it”). 
182See supra notes 178 and 181.  
183M. E. Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividuation, Incivility and Lawlessness Versus 
Freedom and Privacy, Address Before Annual Conference of the European Institute for Computer Anti-virus 
Research 8 (Mar. 1998), http://www2.norwich.edu/mkabay/overviews/anonpseudo.pdf, (last visited September 28, 
2004); see, e.g., Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 101 (2001): 
Anonymity can . . . operate as the cloak of night – promoting negative behavior and disregard for 
the rules that organize social interaction. Imagine a society of complete anonymity. We already 
have a pretty good proxy: the freeway -- the arena of rudeness, abuse, discourtesy, road rage . . . . 
It is hard to imagine people acting in the grocery store the same way that they behave on the 
freeway – pushing their carts ahead of others in line and making nasty gestures to people in the 
aisles.  The incentives for good behavior grow stronger when you are in your neighborhood, your 
office, or your local store – anywhere you know the other shoppers and they know you. 
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our visibility, is reduced when we operate a vehicle; that perception of reduced visibility, of 
anonymity, erodes our sense of social responsibility.184  
The same is true – but to an even greater extent -- of our participation in cyberspace.  
While we can attain a level of anonymity in the real-world, in the cyber-world we can achieve 
complete anonymity and thereby divest ourselves of the embodied, physically situated life of the 
real-world and the behavioral constraints it imposes.185  This certainly does not mean that 
184See Kabay, supra note 183, at 6-7 (explaining the meaning of identity and summarizing the importance of 
personal identification); see, e.g., Walker, supra note 183 and accompanying text; see also Deborah Lupton, Road 
Rage: Drivers’ Understandings and Experiences, 38 J. OF SOCIOLOGY 275, 280 (2002) (“[D]riving is like a sense of 
freedom….I can feel the car….I can control it, I can go wherever I want….I can do whatever speeds I want. I can 
break the law if I want….”) (interviewing a university student).  According to social psychologists, perceived 
anonymity erodes the influence of internalized norms and contributes to deindividuation and antisocial behavior; see 
Kabay, supra note 183, at 8 (noting that deindividuated people display reduced inhibitions and “reduced reliance on 
internal standards that normally qualify their behaviour”); see, e.g., Dwight A Hennessy & David L. Wiesenthal, 
Gender, Driver Aggression, and Driver Violence: An Applied Evaluation, SEX ROLES: A JOURNAL OF RESEARCH 7 
(June 2001), http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m2294/2001_June/80805131/p1/article.jhtml, (last visited 
September 29, 2004) (“[T]he anonymity of the driving environment and perceptions of deindividuation represent a 
unique opportunity for liberation . . . thus facilitating the expression of aggressive tendencies. . . .  [T]he potential 
for personal repercussions as a result of aggressive behaviors are minimized with anonymity, leading to a 
heightened sense of control . . . .”); see also Cashton B. Spivey & Steven Prentice-Dunn, Assessing the 
Directionality of Deindividuation: Effects of Deindividuation, Modeling, and Private Self-Consciousness on 
Aggressive and Prosocial Responses, 11 BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 387, 398-99 (1990) (explaining 
that subjective deindividuation renders individuals susceptible to environmental influences). 
185See, e.g., Kabay, supra note 183, at 13: 
[A]nonymity and pseudonymity are possible using older means of communication: people have 
thrown rocks through windows, sent anonymous vituperation through the mail, and harassed people 
with anonymous phone calls for millennia, centuries and decades respectively. Such behaviour has 
historically been of relatively minor importance. How is it that anonymity and pseudonymity seem 
so important in cyberspace? . . . One factor is the ease with which one can be untraceably 
anonymous in cyberspace. . . .  
See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.  The partial anonymity we enjoy while operating a motor vehicle 
loosens the social restrictions we otherwise operate under but only for a limited period of time and only for limited 
purposes; however, when we go online, we can be completely anonymous (or pseudonymous) for as long as we like, 
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everyone who ventures into cyberspace cloaks themselves in anonymity and embarks upon 
a career of antisocial or even illegal acts.  In fact, much of what have seen so far, in terms of 
online behavior, has been the transposition of real-world patterns of civility onto the Internet.186  
It is, however, clear that people are taking advantage of the liberation they feel online to engage 
in behaviors they would never have felt free to indulge in the real-world.187  One most dramatic 
example of this involves child pornography; cyberspace has “caused explosive growth in the 
market for child pornography.”188  Much of this growth is due to individuals who would never 
 
we can repeat the experience whenever we choose, and we can put our anonymity to various uses.  See, e.g., 
Brenner, supra note 157, at 138-40.  The facility with which one can become anonymous or pseudonymous in 
cyberspace has given rise to the concept of “nymity”, i.e., the extent to which an online persona is fictitious.  See, 
e.g., Nymity, at http://www.nymity.com/about_us/, (last visited September 29, 2004) (defining the word “nymity” 
as “the degree of anonymity”); see also Lance Detweiler & The Theory of Nymity, GEEK TIMES (2004), at 
http://www.geektimes.com/michael/culture/humor/items/Geekish/theoryOfNymity.html, (last updated September 8, 
2004). 
186See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, The Wild West Meets Cyberspace, THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY (July 1998), at 
2, available at http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=4074, (last visited September 29, 2004) (“[M]illions of users 
have managed to adopt standardized protocols enabling the network to function, social norms have arisen in a wide 
range of contexts, norms that are enforced by communities of users. . . . ”). 
187See, e.g., Gaylen Duncan, CyberCrime, Address Before the International Information Industry Congress 2000 
Millennium Congress 3 (September 19, 2000), available at 
http://www.itac.ca/Library/PolicyandAdvocacy/CyberSecurityandPrivacy/pdf/00Oct23-crime-iiic.pdf, (last visited 
September 29, 2004) (“The level of anonymity conferred by the Internet, combined with the lack of perceived 
consequences for inappropriate behaviour in cyberspace, means that standards of conduct displayed on the Internet 
often fall short of those exhibited offline.”).  
188Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of Michael J. Heimbach, Unit Chief, Crimes Against Children 
Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/79366.PDF, (last visited 
September 29, 2004); see also John Carr, Child Abuse, Child Pornography, and the Internet: Executive Summary 1 
(2004), http://www.nch.org.uk/downloads/children_internet_report_summ.pdf, (last visited September 29, 2004) 
(stating that the internet has created new ways for pedophiles to reach and abuse children, as well as creating new 
ways to distribute images of such sexual abuse).  For example, in 2001, Thomas Reedy was imprisoned for 
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have sought out child pornography in the real-world, where obtaining such material would 
be difficult and dangerous; on the Internet, however, they can obtain it easily and with relatively 
little risk.189  As this is true of child pornography, it is also true, in varying degrees, of other 
types of illegal conduct.190  
Although the focus of this discussion is not on those who commit crimes, the capacity of 
cyberspace to create a climate in which the bonds of social conformity are eased, if not 
eradicated, is relevant to the issues under consideration.  It establishes the need to recruit citizens 
into the process of online law enforcement; as the discussion above demonstrates, the 
experiential “world” of cyberspace erodes the forces which maintain order in the real-world and 
defeats law enforcement efforts to apprehend those who violate the rules that prevent citizens 
 
operating an “online child porn empire” that stretched “across three continents, some 250,000 subscribers and a 
turnover of $1.4m a month.” Operation Avalanche: Tracking Child Porn, BBC NEWS (November 11, 2002), at 1, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2445065.stm, (last visited September 24, 2004).  See also Carr, supra at 1 
(“In 2003 one man in Lincolnshire was found with 450,000 child abuse images and a private individual in New 
York was found with 1,000,000.”). 
189See, e.g., Heather Maher, Online and Out of Line: Why is Cybercrime on the Rise, and Who’s Responsible?, ABC 
NEWS (January 20, 2000), at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/cybercrime_000117.html, (last 
visited ___ ):  
The cloak of anonymity brings these people to the surface. . . . If these individuals, precomputer, 
had wanted to engage in this type of behavior, they’d have to leave their homes and interact with 
someone. [The Internet] is two levels removed from that—they are in the comfort of their home, 
or cubicle at work, they are in their own environment, which lessens the stress. You can pick 
whatever chat room name or e-mail you want, and…that allows people to go where they wouldn’t 
go before. 
Those who acquire and trade child pornography online use pseudonyms and encryption to conceal their identities 
and avoid apprehension; see, e.g., William R. Graham, Jr., Comment, Uncovering and Eliminating Child 
Pornography Rings on the Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement’s Access to 
‘Wonderland’, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 457, 465. The ease with which child pornography can be obtained 
online not only increases the number of those who acquire and possess child pornography, it has led to an increase 
in the size of the rings that create and distribute child pornography; see, e.g., Graham, supra at 461-65. 
190See, e.g., World Federation of Scientists, supra note 4, at 7-9. 
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from preying upon each other.  The reactive, offensive mode of law enforcement is 
ineffective in this context.  We must instead adopt a defensive model in which citizens assume 
responsibility for preventing their victimization and the victimization of those for whom they are 
held accountable.191  While citizens cannot prevent all cybercrime, placing the burden upon them 
to prevent their own victimization will reduce the opportunities available to those who wish to 
commit crimes and thereby improve our ability to maintain order in the experiential environment 
of cyberspace.  Also, requiring citizens to take reasonable efforts to prevent cybercrime may 
overcome cyberspace’s erosive effects and reinforce the influence of the norms and laws that 
maintain internal order in the real-world.  At the very least, it emphasizes our intention to 
maintain a baseline of order in this experiential world comparable to that which prevails in the 
real-world.    
C. “USERS” AND “ARCHITECTS” 
Since “users” of cyberspace only control their own conduct,192 all we can ask of them is a 
reasonable effort to prevent cybercrime using the tools available to them; the rules outlined in 
Part II(C)(1) below define this expectation.  Such a collective effort will, without more, enhance 
the overall security of cyberspace, but it will be more effective if the “architects” of cyberspace 
apply their talents to the effort as well.  Since “architects” create and supply the tools “users” 
191See, e.g., Joris Evers, European Commission to Set Up Pan-European Cybercrime Forum, INFOWORLD 
(December 5, 2000), at 2, http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/00/12/05/001205hncyberforum.xml, (last 
visited September 29, 2004) (“‘We can’t give all responsibility to the police, you [the Internet user] are also 
responsible for keeping a safe virtual environment on the “Net” [sic]) (quoting Antonio Vitorino, European 
Commission Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner).  
192See supra Part II(B).   
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rely upon,193 they are in a position to enhance the efficacy of those tools.  Part II(C)(2) 
considers methods by which “architects” can be recruited into this effort to prevent cybercrime.   
1. “Users” 
Each American who depends on cyberspace . . . must secure the 
part . . . for which they are responsible.194  
The purpose of the “user” rules is to undo assumptions derived from the triumph of the 
professional, reactive model of law enforcement in the real-world.195  The goal is to require 
citizens to assume responsibility for protecting themselves from cybercrime and cybercriminals; 
the result, to some extent, is a return to an older, distributed model of law enforcement. 196    
 The first rule imports assumption of risk into criminal law.  Assumption of risk 
emphasizes the need to protect oneself from the risks in cyberspace; thus, its purpose is to negate 
citizens’ expectations that their victimization will produce an effective law enforcement reaction.  
The second rule uses complicity to impose liability for conduct that contributes to the 
commission of a cybercrime against another; it proscribes not the failure to prevent cybercrime, 
as such, but the act of contributing to the commission of a cybercrime.    
                             (a) Assumption of Risk197
Assumption of risk may seem a peculiar choice for this endeavor since, in tort law, the 
principle of assumed risk negates liability instead of imposing it.198  In fact, assumption of risk, 
193See supra Part II(B).   
194See, e.g., Office of the President, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 11 (February 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf, (last visited September 29, 2004). 
195See supra Part I.  
196See supra Part I.   
197See Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model for Law Enforcement?, supra note 3, at 71-
104, for a more detailed treatment of this alternative.  
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or more appropriately a modified conception of assumed risk, could markedly advance this 
effort.  
In tort, if one is found to have assumed the risk of the danger that caused her injury, she is barred 
from obtaining redress for that injury.199  We cannot import this particular doctrine into the 
criminal law governing cyberspace, since doing so would deny the possibility of justice to those 
who could be deemed to have assumed the risk of their victimization.  Criminals would, in 
effect, be given a “get-out-of-jail-free card” for victims who did not and/or who could not protect 
themselves.  Such a result is clearly unacceptable.  We want citizens to prevent cybercrime to the 
extent they can reasonably be expected to do so; but we certainly do not want to declare open 
season on the civilian populace of modern societies by declaring that no prosecutions can be 
brought if the victim did not take acceptable precautions to prevent being victimized.  We need 
to impose a level of assumed risk and yet still retain the capacity to prosecute even when a 
victim’s precautionary efforts were less than adequate.    
We could do this with a modified assumption-of-risk principle containing two elements:   
(i) a proposition negating the expectation of a law enforcement reaction to victimization; and (ii) 
a statement that the negation of such an expectation does not bar the investigation and 
prosecution of cybercriminals.  The principle might look something like this: 
(1) One who [understanding the risk of harm to self or property] accesses or employs 
cyberspace to engage in activity without having taken all reasonable measures to protect 
herself and her property from being victimized by criminals during the course of and with 
regard to any matters related to that activity shall be deemed to have assumed the risk of 
victimization resulting from that activity.  One who has been victimized should report the 
 
198See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496B-496C (1965). 
199See id. 
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offense(s) to the appropriate law enforcement agency.  The filing of such a report in 
no way obligates the agency to investigate or to otherwise pursue the matter; domestic 
law enforcement agencies have full discretion to determine what, if any, action will be 
taken as the result of their receiving such a report.  Law enforcement agencies are under 
no obligation to take action with regard to offenses targeting those who assumed the risk 
of becoming a victim online, though they may do so.   
(2) The fact that one assumed the risk of being victimized pursuant to paragraph (1) creates 
no enforceable rights in person(s) who contributed to that victimization.  The principles 
set forth in paragraph (1) cannot be used as an affirmative defense in a prosecution for 
offenses committed against one who assumed the risk of being so victimized or in a civil 
action brought for injuries or damages resulting from the commission of such an offense; 
these principles in no way restrain law enforcement’s ability to initiate the investigation 
and prosecution of those responsible for such offenses.   
The bracketed language in the first paragraph creates the option of structuring the 
principle so that one must understand the risk she assumes, which is a traditional component of 
the tort principle.200  If the principle as applied to criminal law is to achieve the desired result, 
however, it must impose strict liability.201  The assumption of risk must arise from the act of 
venturing into cyberspace without having taken adequate precautions; knowledge of the risk 
being assumed should not be required because the purpose is to encourage citizens to educate 
themselves and to take measures to avoid risky behavior.  Incorporating knowledge of the risk 
nullifies the efficacy of the principle without increasing the fairness of the result.  The tort 
200See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(1). 
201See Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model for Law Enforcement?, supra note 3, at 89-
104 (arguing that the criminal principle would operate differently for different classes of potential victims). 
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principle incorporates knowledge of the risk assumed because the consequence of assuming 
a civilly-defined risk is that the victim loses the right to seek financial redress for resulting 
injuries; requiring notice is therefore a matter of simple fairness.202  In the cybercrime context, 
the victim loses the expectation of a law enforcement response; but since such an expectation 
may be unrealistic,203 she actually “loses” nothing.  Her assumption of a criminally-defined risk 
does not preclude her from seeking damages in a civil action against an appropriate party, nor 
does it preclude the apprehension and prosecution of the victimizer.204  It merely negates the 
202See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, cmt. b. 
203 See supra Part II(A)(3). 
204Such a concept has been incorporated into at least some cybercrime statutes. Article 138a of the Dutch Criminal 
Code, for instance, states that one “who intentionally and unlawfully accesses an automated system for the storage 
or processing of data, or part of such a system, shall be liable, as guilty of breach of computer peace, to term of 
imprisonment” if he “[b]reaks through a security system” to gain access or “obtains access by a technical 
intervention, with the help of false signals or a false key or by acting in a false capacity.” The Netherlands, Criminal 
Code, Article 38a, Cybercrime Law: A Global Survey of Cybercrime Legislation, 
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/countries/netherlands.html (n.d.); According to a Dutch cybercrime expert, this 
provision incorporates assumption of risk so it is not a crime to access a Dutch computer system without 
authorization if the computer system was not secured. Conversation with Professor Bert-Jaap Koops, Senior 
Lecturer - Faculty of Law, Tilburg University, Netherlands, 
http://www.uvt.nl/websijs/english/show.html?anr=8225744&lang=en (n.d.); 
A German statute has the same effect: “Any person who obtains without authorization … data which are not meant 
for him and which are specially protected against unauthorized access, shall be liable to imprisonment  . . .  or to a 
fine.”   German Penal Code § 202a, http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/countries/germany.html (n.d.); Assumption of 
risk applies; “simple intrusion . . .  is not punishable.” Christian Schwarzenegger, Computer Crimes in Cyberspace: 
A comparative Analysis of Criminal Law in Germany, Switzerland and Northern Europe (2002), 
http://www.rwi.unizh.ch/schwarzenegger/person/pdf/ ComputerCrimeCyberSpace2002.pdf (n.d.); see also Finnish 
Penal Code Chapter 38 § 8, Cybercrime Law: A Global Survey of Cybercrime Legislation, 
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/countries/finland.html (n.d.). And assumption of risk is not unknown in this country; 
see N.Y. Penal Law § 156.05 (McKinney 2004) (one is guilty of unauthorized use of a computer when he 
knowingly and without authorization causes a computer to be used that “is equipped . . . with any device or coding 
system, a function of which is to prevent the unauthorized use of said computer”). 
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supposition that one’s victimization triggers an entitlement to an instantaneous and effective 
law enforcement response. 
Implementing a principle such as this has both symbolic and pragmatic consequences.    
Symbolically, it emphasizes that citizens must protect themselves in cyberspace and cannot 
expect law enforcement to bring the perpetrator to justice if they are victimized.  This confirms 
the already existing realities of cyberspace; police cannot, for example, seek justice for everyone 
who foolishly sends forty-five dollars for a Beanie Baby that was advertised on eBay but was 
never delivered (and probably never existed).205  This brings us to the pragmatic consequences of 
adopting an online assumption of risk principle:  Police and prosecutors know cases like the 
Beanie Baby example stand no chance of being “solved,” yet they have no viable way to explain 
this to the public.  In a culture that assumes the effectiveness of the reactive model of law 
enforcement, it would not be a wise career move for a county prosecutor to inform his 
constituents that if they are victimized in certain ways while online, his office will not pursue 
those cases.  A modified assumption of risk principle such as the one set out above resolves this 
difficulty.      
(b) Complicity206
 Complicity doctrines are an appropriate choice for imposing responsibility to prevent 
cybercrime because they impute liability for another’s criminal act to a non-actor (i.e. an 
205See e.g., Bidding in an Online Auction? Beware of Scams, BUS. WK., Nov. 3, 1998, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct1998/sr81998/sr81103b.htm (woman paid $1,800 for a fake 
Beanie Baby); see also Bob Sullivan, Con Victims Out $10,000 or More, MSNBC (Dec. 4, 2003), 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3660523/ (dentist who sent $55,000 to a face escrow site as payment for a BMW lost his 
money and never got the car). 
206A more detailed treatment of this issue can be found in Brenner, Distributed Security, supra note 3.  
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accomplice) who facilitated that act.207  Whereas the section above explains how a modified 
assumption of risk principle can be used to impose consequences for one’s becoming a victim, 
this section considers how complicity doctrines can be used to impose liability for consequent 
victimization.  Furthermore, while the previous section is concerned with imposing 
consequences for one’s own victimization, this section is concerned with imposing liability for 
letting oneself become a victim of a cybercrime that is then used to victimize other individuals or 
entities.208   
 Under the theory of complicity, one who facilitates the commission of a crime can be 
held criminally liable for that crime, just as if he committed it himself.209  Complicitous liability 
is usually based upon one’s performing an affirmative act, though it can also be based upon 
inaction.  Under the Model Penal Code, one is an accomplice if, having a legal duty to prevent a 
crime, she fails to do so;210 this doctrine of complicity-by-omission has been used, for example, 
to hold parents liable for not preventing harm to their children.211  Action or inaction alone is not 
enough.  Most criminal codes require that an accomplice has acted with the purpose of 
facilitating the target crime.212  In American law, while there is some authority for the 
proposition that accomplice liability can be imposed upon those who knowingly facilitate a 
207See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1962). 
208See supra notes 198-204 & accompanying text. 
209See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (1962). 
210See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(iii) (1962); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW § 13.2(a) (2003) (“a conductor on a train might become an accomplice in the knowing transportation of liquor 
on his train for his failure to take steps to prevent the offense”). 
211See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 861 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Haw. App. 1993). 
212See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (1962). 
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crime,213 there is a general agreement that it cannot be based on reckless or negligent 
conduct.214  Other codes are less lenient.  For example, the statute governing the proceedings of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia imposes complicity-by-omission 
liability upon commanders who recklessly or negligently failed to prevent their subordinates 
from committing war crimes.215   
 The emphasis on “intention” found in the Model Penal Code and other domestic criminal 
codes is the product of two considerations.  One is a concern that “otherwise everyday lawful 
activities would be made perilous”;216 for example, if negligence sufficed for complicity, selling 
lawful products could result in the imposition of criminal liability if those products were used to 
commit crimes.  The other consideration is “the belief that people's freedom to act within the law 
should not be restrained by considerations of wrongs others might commit.”217  In other words, I 
should not be held liable for the intervening volitional act of one over whom I exercise no 
control.  This is what differentiates the “command complicity” found in the statute governing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from the codes that govern average 
citizens; civilians, unlike military commanders, generally do not have the authority to control the 
actions of others.218      
213See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(d) (2003); Cf. United States v. Peoni, 100 
F.2d 401, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1938). 
214See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(e) (2003). 
215See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 463-467 
(2001); see also Basic Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, art. 7 ¶ 3 (1993), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm. 
216 Stanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, supra 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 382. 
217 Id. at 391.   
218See generally Damaska, supra note 215, at 463-64.  
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 Our goal in this undertaking is to craft rules which hold citizens responsible for 
preventing cybercrime. The assumption of risk principle outlined in the section above essentially 
negates any expectation of redress for one’s own victimization; if I become the victim of a 
cybercriminal, I cannot expect that he will be brought to “justice” and be sanctioned.  Yet, what 
if by allowing myself to be victimized I contributed to another’s victimization?  I have not only 
failed to protect myself, I have contributed to another’s being harmed.  I have, in effect, acted as 
an accomplice by engaging in conduct that facilitated the commission of a crime.  Should we, 
therefore, use complicity-by-omission liability to hold me liable for this consequent 
victimization?219  Such a step appears to be unacceptable because it (i) imposes omission liability 
in the absence of a legal duty to act;220 and (ii) contravenes the two considerations noted in the 
paragraph above.221  Nevertheless, with some modifications, complicity-by-omission liability 
could properly be used to impose liability. 
 The first, most problematic obstacle to recognizing complicity-by-omission liability is 
the conduct upon which liability is to be predicated.  If we use the Model Penal Code’s 
formulation of complicity, an omission cannot support the imposition of complicitous liability 
unless a duty to act is imposed by law. 222  We could, however, impose a legal duty to avoid 
becoming the victim of a cybercriminal.223  In creating such a duty, we must resolve two issues: 
219See supra Part II(C)(1). 
220See supra note 210 and accompanying text.  
221See supra notes 215 - 217 and accompanying text. 
222See supra note 210 and accompanying text.  
223Since such a duty did not exist at common law, it would have to be statutorily imposed. This could be done 
seriatim, by having states adopt laws to this effect; it might be possible to enact such a duty at the federal level, 
given the deleterious effects cybercrime and cyberterrorism have upon interstate commerce. See generally Joseph P. 
Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How A Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1235, 1243 n. 34 (1999); Another possibility, using the Model Penal Code’s approach to complicity, would be to 
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(i) the scope of the duty; and (ii) the extent of the obligation one bears in discharging it.  As 
to the scope of the duty, it is sufficient to limit it to preventing one’s own victimization; letting 
myself be attacked is how I contribute to the victimization of others.224  This limited duty is 
sufficient because if I protect my computer from attack, I prevent its being used to attack others; 
conversely, if I do not protect my computer from attack, I have created at least the possibility 
that it could be used to attack others.225  If a cybercriminal takes advantage of the opportunity I 
have supplied, it is reasonable to hold me liable, at least to some extent, for resulting 
cybercrimes.  As to the obligation one has to discharge this duty, the most reasonable approach is 
to incorporate a negligence standard.226  Strict liability would only undermine the incentive to 
take precautions, since one would be held liable for consequent victimization regardless of the 
efforts he took to avoid being personally victimized.227  Under a negligence standard, liability 
would be imposed for failing to take the precautions a reasonable person would have known 
were necessary to protect the system(s) at issue.228  The determination as to whether particular 
 
declare that the failure to prevent a cybercrime which results in the victimization of others is itself enough to 
establish complicity. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(b) (1962) (one is an accomplice if “his conduct is expressly 
declared by law to establish his complicity”). 
224It is also possible that I can be victimized as the result of my own gullibility, i.e., as the result of succumbing to 
“social engineering” and other tactics.   
225See, e.g., Adrian McCullagh, Management Responsibility in Protecting Information Assets: An Australian 
Perspective, 7 FIRST MONDAY (July 2002), at  
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_7/mccullagh/index.html#m5, (last visited September 25, 2004) (arguing 
that organizations should have a positive duty, enforceable by criminal liability, to prevent their computer systems 
from being used as zombies in a distributed denial of service attack).   
226See, id.  
227See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5(c) (4th ed. 2003).   
228See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).  A negligence standard would encompass reckless, knowing and 
purposeful failures to carry out the duty to prevent personal victimization.  See id. at § 2.02(5).  As to the type of 
precautions it would be “reasonable” to take, see, e.g., McCullagh, supra note 225.   
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measures were necessary would have to include a temporal element, that is, it would have to 
focus on contemporaneously available security measures.229       
 Imposing such a duty is in a sense implementing a “do” rule under the scheme outlined 
above;230 it imposes an affirmative obligation to implement security measures to fend off attacks 
by cybercriminals and imposes liability for not discharging this obligation.  The duty outlined 
here differs from a “do” rule, however, in that liability is not imposed for the mere failure to 
discharge the specified duty.231  If someone becomes the victim of a cybercrime, she will not be 
held liable as an accomplice to her own victimization;232 she will only be deemed to have 
assumed the risk of her victimization.  Criminal liability based upon complicity is only imposed 
if she fails to discharge her duty to protect herself and thereby contributes to the victimization of 
another.  This result is consistent with traditional principles of criminal liability because the 
victim is being sanctioned not for being a victim but for playing a causal role in the commission 
of a crime against someone else.233
 That brings us to the second consideration:  the considerations which dictate that 
accomplice liability must be based on purposeful or at least knowing conduct. 234  We begin with 
the second consideration: if we do not require purpose or at least knowledge, we risk holding 
229It might also be advisable to incorporate the type of user into the standard so that, for instance, corporate entities 
are held to a higher level than individual, home users of computer technology.   
230See supra Part II(A)(4)(b).  
231See supra note 210 and accompanying text.  
232See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(a) (victim is not generally an accomplice).    
233See, e.g., Anick Jesdanun, Digitally informed: Should a license be required to go online?, DETROIT NEWS, 
September 12, 2003, at http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0309/14/technology-268979.htm, (last visited 
September 25, 2004) (Oberlin College threatens students to fine students who inadvertently spread a virus).  See 
also Anne C. Paine, CIT Wages War against Potent Virus and Wins, OBERLIN ONLINE, September 12, 2003, at 
http://www.oberlin.edu/news-info/03sep/computerVirus.html, (last visited September 25, 2004) (“any student whose 
computer was found to be the source of a virus would be fined $25”).      
234See supra notes 216 - 218 and accompanying text. 
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citizens liable for the volitional acts of those over whom they have no control.235  For 
example, liability without a knowledge requirement would encompass the following scenario:  
Cybercriminal (X) victimizes A and then uses his victimization of A to consummate his 
victimization of B (and C and D and so on).236  It may seem unreasonable to hold A liable for 
this cyber-miscreant’s attacks on B (and C and D and so on).237  Assuming the most challenging 
scenario,238 in which A does not know X, A has no control over X, and A was merely negligent 
in not preventing X’s gaining access to his computer, it seems that we would be holding A liable 
for nothing more than failing to prevent a stranger from attacking other strangers.  Arguably, this 
is as unreasonable as holding a liquor store clerk liable as an accomplice if a customer to whom 
she sold a bottle of whiskey uses it to incapacitate a young woman whom he rapes or to enter a 
state of gross intoxication during which he batters his wife to death.239  Nonetheless, these two 
scenarios do in fact differ in at least one important respect.  In the second scenario, the liquor 
store clerk is held liable for the volitional and consequently unforeseeable acts of her customer, 
based on her having sold him a product; her conduct was lawful and she has neither the right nor 
235See supra note 216 and accompanying text.  
236The scenarios discussed above assume that X uses A’s computer as the vector from which to launch attacks on 
others; it is also possible that A contributes to the victimization of others by falling prey to “social engineering” and 
comparable tactics.   
237If we require that A have acted with the purpose of facilitating X’s attacks or that he knew his default would 
facilitate X’s attacks, we establish a connection between the two that makes it reasonable to impute liability for X’s 
actions to A.   
238Other scenarios would involve instances in which A knew that he might be subject to an attack from X or in 
which A exercised some control over X, perhaps as X’s employer where A knows X has a predilection for cyber-
misconduct.      
239Civil liability can be imposed for selling statutorily-controlled products, such as weapons and ammunition, to 
minors.  See Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial Transaction Tort: Imposing Common Law 
Liability On Merchants For Sales And Leases To ‘Defective’ Customers, 1998 DUKE L.J. 755, 758 (1998).  The only 
avenue for imposing criminal liability is simplicity. 
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the ability to control what he does after he leaves the store.  In the first scenario, however, A 
is held liable not for failing to control X (which is impossible given that A does not know X and 
has no authority to control X’s actions) but for failing to prevent equipment and processes that 
are within A’s control from being attacked and compromised to the detriment of others.  We 
cannot hold A liable for what X does on the theory that A should have prevented X from 
attacking others; but we can hold A liable for giving X access to the tools he needed to victimize 
others, thereby defaulting on his legal duty to prevent his computer system from being 
compromised.240  Applying the second theory to this scenario is consistent with traditional 
accomplice liability because A is held liable for contributing to the success of the criminal 
venture. 
 Some may still find this outcome unpalatable because it can result in A’s being held 
liable for a sequence of cybercrimes that X committed against B (and C and D and so on).241 
This undeniably harsh result could be alleviated by only holding A liable as a facilitator of those 
crimes, and not as an accomplice to X’s cybercrimes.242  New York and other states have 
recognized a separate “criminal facilitation” offense, whereby one who provides another with the 
240An imperfect source of analogy, perhaps, are laws that hold a parent liable for not preventing a child from 
obtaining access to a weapon and using it to commit a crime.  In State v. Wilchinski, a father was charged with 
criminally negligent storage of a firearm after his son found his gun and used it to kill another child.  700 A.2d 1, 3 
(Conn. 1997).  He claimed that the negligent storage statute held gun owners liable “for the acts of another without 
requiring the state of prove that the owner was an accessory” under the state complicity statute, which limits 
accomplice liability to affirmative acts taken to facilitate a crime.  Id. at 12.  The Connecticut Supreme Court 
disagreed: “[T]he offense…is not the resulting injury or death but…the improper storage of the weapon that lead to 
the tragedy.”  Id.   
241See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1). 
242See, e.g., Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Breakthrough Cited In War Against Child 
Porn, February 16, 2001 at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/feb/feb16c_01.html (last visited September 25, 
2004) (Buffnet, an Internet Service Provider pled guilty to criminal facilitation of child pornography). 
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means or opportunity to commit a crime can be held liable as a facilitator of that crime.243  
The difference between criminal facilitation and accomplice liability is that the facilitator is not 
held liable for the crimes she promoted; she is, instead, held liable for criminal facilitation, a 
separate and often relatively minor offense.244  A two-tiered system is therefore the best way to 
alleviate the potentially harsh consequences of imputing liability on the basis of negligent 
conduct:  While criminal facilitation liability could be used for those who negligently contribute 
to consequent victimization (with sanctions limited to a fine or perhaps a fine coupled with a 
restriction on computer use), 245  accomplice liability would be reserved for those who 
purposefully or knowingly further the commission of cybercrimes.246   
2. “Architects” 
`The broad issue is, as a matter of policy, do we want suppliers of 
products and systems that are critical to our economy to be able to 
absolve themselves of all liability. . . .’247  
Since the real-world is not a human artifice, the notion of imposing criminal liability on 
the “architects” of cyberspace raises issues we have not yet had occasion to address.248  The first 
issue we need to consider is the posture these “architects” occupy as to cyberspace.  Are they, in 
effect, the “manufacturers” of cyberspace such that it would be logical and reasonable to hold 
243See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 115.00, .01, .05, .08 (2003).  See also note 239. 
244See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 227, § 13.2(d).  See also note 243. 
245See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1004 (2004).   
246See, e.g., Computer Crimes Act, Malaysia Act 563.7 § 7(1) (“abetments . . . punishable as offences”), available at 
http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/9239/comcrime.html (last visited September 16, 2004). 
247Steve Lohr, Product Liability Lawsuits are New Threat to Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, October 6, 2003, at C2. 
(quoting Mark D. Rasch), http://www.lexisone.com/news/n100603a.html,  (last visited September 27, 2004). 
248See supra Part II(B).   
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them liable for security lapses under a product liability theory?249  Are they providers of 
services as to whom such lapses could be considered malpractice?250  Are they both? Neither? 
The resolution of these questions requires re-examining the rationale for imposing 
criminal liability on “architects.”  As explained earlier, the rationale derives from the system of 
distributed security which shifts the focus of maintaining order in cyberspace from reacting to 
cybercrime to preventing cybercrime and assigns responsibility for preventing cybercrime to 
citizens.251  Since we concluded that we cannot rely upon voluntary participation if such a 
system is to be effective,252 we must require preventative efforts.  Part II(C)(1) outlined the 
requirements to be imposed upon “users.”  Similar requirements should be imposed upon 
“architects,” because of the role they play in the collective experience we know as cyberspace.  
“Architects” supply the devices – hardware and software – that “users” employ to participate in 
cyberspace;253 consequently, these “architects” are uniquely equipped to determine the reliability 
and technical adequacy of these devices.  Since the efficacy with which “users” can avoid 
cybercrime is a function of the reliability and technical adequacy of the tools they employ,  
“architects” are in a position to enhance the overall effectiveness of the system of preventative, 
249See e.g., Jody Armour & Watts S. Humphrey, Software Product Liability, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, 
August 1993, available at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/documents/93.reports/pdf/tr13.93.pdf (last visited September 
16, 2004). 
250See e.g., From the Editor, SOFTWARE QUALITY PROFESSIONAL, March 2002, 
http://www.asq.org/pub/sqp/past/vol4_issue2/editor.html (last visited October 20, 2004) (“One sign of the maturing 
of our profession would be a wider acceptance of the concept of ‘software malpractice’.”). 
251See supra Parts II(A)(4) and II(B).  Citizen responsibility is certainly not the only device that will be used to 
prevent cybercrime, but it is very important.  See id. 
252See supra Part II(A)(4)(b).   
253See supra Part II(B).    
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distributed security postulated here by enhancing the reliability and adequacy of these tools. 
254  Unfortunately, they have not taken advantage of this opportunity; software vulnerabilities 
and other defects in the infrastructure of cyberspace continue to be facilitating factors for 
cybercriminals.255
Generally, the prospect of product liability claims creates incentives for manufacturers to 
ensure that products are safe and defect free;256 the same is not true, however, for the “architects” 
of cyberspace: 
254See, e.g., Cyberattacks and Cyberterrorism:  What Private Business Must Know, GARTNER G2, September 25, 
2002, available at http://www.gartnerg2.com/qu/qu-0902-0091.asp (“[S]oftware manufacturers have to improve the 
security and reliability of their products” if businesses an other users of cyberspace are to avoid cybercrime.).   
255See, e.g., William Yurcik & David Doss, CyberInsurance:  A Market Solution to the Internet Security Market 
Failure, WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SECURITY, 2002, at 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/affiliates/workshops/econsecurity/econws/53.pdf. (last visited September 
16, 2004):  
The poor state of security on the Internet is the direct result of a market failure.  Software companies have been 
able to institute a framework denying them liability for faulty products.  In addition, time-to-market . . . 
pressures compel software companies to release software as early as possible with lower levels of testing, if any 
testing at all.  This combined with the increasing complexity of software virtually ensures the software flaws 
will exist that will be exploited as security vulnerabilities . . . .[T]here is little or no incentive for a software 
manufacturer to be responsive in developing . . . and distributing    patches for software vulnerabilities in their 
products.  
See also Madeline Bennet, Interview:  Microsoft Wages War on Flaws, VNUNET, December 5, 2002, at 
http://www.vnunet.com/Features/1137383 (last visited September 29, 2004) (“`if you do a degree in computer 
science, you are not taught how to write secure code . . . . [T]esters simply look at whether  product does what it is 
supposed to do’”); Dinah Greek, The Real Impact of Viruses: Part 1, VNUNET, January 6, 2004, at 
http://www.vnunet.com/Features/1151775 (last visited September 29, 2004)(“Over 1,400 new software 
vulnerabilities are discovered every week. . . .”).   
256See e.g. Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making:  Greater 
Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (1993) (“Courts and commentators . . . agree that 
. . . products liability creates incentives for manufacturers to ensure greater product safety.”); see also AMERICAN 
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d § 1:1 (2004): 
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Software manufacturers are the favored sons of contract, product liability and tort 
law: the economic loss doctrine limits damages against software vendors to the 
terms of the license, usually to the price of the software itself.  The underlying 
rationale . . . is the `concern that product liability claims could circumvent the 
objectives of the [Uniform Commercial Code].’257    
 
Products liability law . . . refers to the legal responsibility for injury resulting from the use of a 
product.  The paradigmatic products liability action is one in which a product causes bodily harm 
and the manufacturer is held liable . . . because of public policy which demands that responsibility 
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in 
defective products. . . .  [T]he term . . . typically covers any liability of a manufacturer or other 
distributer of a product where personal injury or damage to some other property is caused by a 
defect in the product. 
257Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer Security Publications:  Information Economics, Shifting Liability and 
The First Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71, 134 (2002) (quoting Steven C. Tourek, et al., Bucking the “Trend”:  
The Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and 
Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L. REV. 875, 887 (1999)).  See e.g. Declan McCullagh, A Legal Fix for Software 
Flaws?, ZDNET, August 26, 2003, at http://www.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5067873.html (last visited September 
16, 2004); Charles C. Mann, Why Software Is So Bad, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, 33, 38 (July/August 2002), at 
http://www.thesmallworlds.com/pres/WhySoftwareIsSoBad.pdf; see also Steve Lohr, Product Liability Lawsuits 
are New Threat to Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, October 6, 2003, at C2, http://www.lexisone.com/news/n100603a.html,  
(last visited September 27, 2004)(‘[S]oftware companies have sidestepped liability . . . by selling customers a 
license to use their programs . . . with a lengthy list of caveats and disclaimers”).  The economic loss doctrine is  
a judicially created doctrine under which a purchaser of a product cannot recover from a manufacturer on a 
tort theory for damages that are solely economic . . . It is based on an understanding that contract law . . . is 
better suited than tort law for dealing with purely economic loss in the commercial arena . . . Therefore, 
when . . . the only damages are economic losses, the exclusive remedy lies in contract. . . .   
In contract law, the parties’ duties arise from the terms of their . . . agreement; the goal is to hold parties to 
that agreement so that each receives the benefit of his or her bargain.  The aim of tort law . . is to protect 
people from misfortunes which are unexpected and overwhelming.  The law imposes tort duties upon 
manufacturers to protect society’s interest in safety from the physical harm or personal injury which may 
result from defective products.  Thus, where a product fails in its intended use and injures only itself, 
thereby causing only economic damages to the purchaser, ‘the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak 
and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong.’ 
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Many find this apparent bias to be intolerable.  As a National Academy of Sciences Report 
noted, software companies “use customers as implicit beta testers to shake out security flaws” in 
their products.258  In response, software industry executives argue that the imposition of such 
liability is inappropriate because “software is a highly complex product, often misused or 
modified by consumers” and because the software industry is “a fast-changing global business . . 
. led by United States companies. Opening the industry up to product liability lawsuits . . . would 
chill innovation and undermine the competitiveness of American companies.”259  Other obstacles 
to using product liability or similar civil doctrines to improve the reliability of software include 
the lack of standards of reliability for software; the fact that companies tend not to want to pay 
the higher costs associated with more reliable software; and that consumers often fail to 
recognize the potential security flaws inherent to the software.260
 These issues and arguments, however, all deal with civil product liability.  The focus of 
this article is on using criminal liability to implement a system of distributed security to prevent 
cybercrime.  Could a doctrine of criminal product liability be used for this purpose?  Could 
criminal liability be used to hold the “architects” of cyberspace liable for defects in software and 
hardware that contribute to the commission of cybercrimes?  While such an approach is 
 
Bay Breeze Condo. Ass’n v. Norco Windows, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 738, 741-42 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)(quoting Wausau 
Tile Co. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445, 451-52 (Wis. 1999)). 
258NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, CYBERSECURITY 
TODAY AND TOMORROW 13 (2002), http://books.nap.edu/html/cybersecurity/ch1.html (last visited September 29, 
2004). 
259Lohr, supra note 257. 
260See, e.g., Brian Robinson, Making Software NASA-Tough, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK (July 1, 2002), 
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2002/0701/tec-nasa-07-01-02.asp (last visited September 16, 2004); Spread of 
Buggy Software Raises New Questions,  ACCORDSQA, http://www.accordsqa.com/news/030427-
buggysoftware.html (last visited October 20, 2004); see also Gregory Tassey, The Economic Impacts of Inadequate 
Infrastructure for Software Testing, 2002 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY E1-E5, 
http://www.nist.gov/director/prog-ofc/report02-3.pdf. 
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consistent with holding “users” criminally liable for failing to prevent cybercrime, it is 
inconsistent with both the reluctance to apply civil product liability to software and the United 
States’ lack of general criminal product liability.261  The sections below consider the advisability 
and implications of such a measure. 
(a) Civil Products 
 In the United States, the doctrine of product liability evolved in the context of civil tort 
litigation between consumers and manufacturers:  “[P]roducts liability doctrines . . . developed to 
give manufacturers incentives to design safer products by providing a cause of action to injured 
consumers.”262  The law and doctrines of product liability therefore assume “civil” products; that 
is, they assume product liability litigation involves a private plaintiff, whether individual or 
corporate, seeking redress for injuries and/or damages resulting from defects in a product that is 
used solely in a “private” capacity.263  In one sense, this is true of the software and hardware that 
are used to constitute and sustain cyberspace; in another, it is not. 
 The previous arguments as to why product liability law should not be applied to 
computer hardware and software implicitly assume that both represent “civil” products that are 
used in a purely “private” capacity by individuals and commercial entities.  This assumption is 
not in dispute.  I am writing this article on my personal laptop using Microsoft software.  If my 
261As to the latter, see infra note 269. 
262Mark D. Oshinskie, Tanks for Nothing: Oil Company Liability for Discharges of Gasoline from Underground 
Storage Tanks Divested to Station Owners, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23 (1999).  See also Victor E. Schwartz & 
Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-Emergence of “Super Strict” Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
917, 926 (2003) (“Product liability . . . developed . . . in response to the deficiencies in the rights of action available 
to consumers’ negligence and warranty”) (quoting George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2305 (1989).    
263Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220, 223 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (“This case does not involve issues of ‘gun 
control.’  This is a civil damage suit between private parties to be decided . . . under products liability law.”). 
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laptop suffered a catastrophic system failure and shocked me with high-voltage electricity, 
or if the software had a meltdown and deleted this article and the files I have compiled over the 
last decade, I could try suing the laptop manufacturer for my physical injuries or Microsoft for 
the loss of my data.  Under current law, I might be able to recover for my physical injuries, but I 
could not recover for the loss of my data; product liability law would probably apply to the 
defective laptop that caused physical injury, but it certainly would not apply to the software and 
its failure.264  As explained earlier, 265   the software industry has successfully argued that (i) 
product liability is inadvisable for a “product”/”service” as complex and subject to misuse as 
software; and (ii) imposing product liability would stifle innovation and thereby undermine 
America’s superiority in this area.  As a result, product liability law today remains inapplicable 
to the software itself and any damages it causes.   
 Although the software industry’s two main arguments are objectionable on various 
grounds, their merits are irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this article because both 
assume civil product liability.  That is, both arguments assume that the imposition of product 
liability would have a deleterious effect upon the software industry’s ability to conduct business 
because it would have to deal with thousands of civil lawsuits brought by dissatisfied “private” 
users of its products.  This deleterious effect would presumably derive from various factors, such 
as the time, effort and expense required to defend these actions or the difficulties attendant upon 
accommodating inconsistent legal standards imposed by different states or nations.  Under 
consideration here, however, is the use of a doctrine of criminal product liability; criminal 
actions are brought not by any consumer who happens to be dissatisfied with a product, but by 
264See Part II(C)(2), supra; Laurel M. Cohn, Products Liability: Computer Hardware and Software, 59 A.L.R. 461 
(1998).  See also supra note 257. 
265See Part II(C)(2), supra. 
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the state, which must have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.  
Requiring probable cause, without more, limits the number of cases that are filed and tends to 
avoid frivolous litigation.  It is also possible, as Part II(C)(2)(b) explains, to control the 
imposition of such liability by structuring the mechanisms used to initiate cases so that they 
restrict the number of prosecutions filed, e.g., by providing opportunities for case review, 
diversion and settlement.   
 The first argument the software industry advances as to why product liability law should 
not be applied to software actually supports the converse proposition that criminal product 
liability should be imposed.  The software industry’s arguments not only assume civil product 
liability, but also that software is a “civil” product.  As such, software is functionally 
indistinguishable in an important respect from other products that are used in a purely “private” 
capacity by individuals and entities and as to which product liability is imposed.  This argument, 
as applied to my laptop’s data loss scenario described above, assumes that my laptop and the 
software I use are discrete products indistinguishable from other household goods, such as my 
toaster or my stereo.  In other words, the industry’s argument assumes that the laptop and the 
software are items that have distinct functions and that I employ them for purely “private” use.  
It also assumes that any defect which causes the laptop or the software to fail is purely a private 
matter to be resolved between the manufacturer and myself.  These assumptions are incorrect 
because software, in particular, is no longer a “civil” product.  Due to its role in creating and 
sustaining the complex communicative experience we know as cyberspace, software has become 
an essential component of our national infrastructure266 and its importance will only increase as 
266See, e.g.,  Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 32-33 (February 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf: 
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more and more activities (private, government, commercial, educational, scientific, etc.) 
move into cyberspace. 267  As an increasingly important component of our national (and 
international) infrastructure, software is too important to be left to the vagaries of “private” civil 
litigation.  We must devise some system for ensuring that the software providers upon whom we 
rely are taking adequate measures to ensure that the software we use is reliable and technically 
adequate.268
 
A . . . critical area . . . is the many flaws . . . in critical infrastructure due to software vulnerabilities. . . .   
[A]pproximately 3,500 vulnerabilities are reported annually . . . . Unpatched software in critical 
infrastructures makes those infrastructures vulnerable to penetration and exploitation.  Software flaws are 
exploited to propagate ‘worms’ that can result in denial of service, disruption, or other serious damage.  
Such flaws can be used to gain access to and control over physical infrastructure . . . . 
See also id. at 1: 
Our Nation’s critical infrastructures consist of the physical and cyber assets of public and private 
institutions in several sectors:  agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, 
transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping.  
Cyberspace is the nervous system of these infrastructures. . . .  [T]he healthy functioning of 
cyberspace is essential to our economy and our national security. 
267See, e.g., id. at 6: 
By 2003, our economy and national security became fully dependent upon information technology and the 
information infrastructure.  A network of networks directly supports the operation of all sectors of our 
economy—energy (electric power, oil and gas), transportation (rail, air, merchant marine), finance and 
banking, information and telecommunications, public health, emergency services, water, chemical, defense 
industrial base, food, agriculture, and postal and shipping . . . . 
See also Charles C. Mann, Why Software Is So Bad, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, 33, 38 (July/August 2002), at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/purchase/pdf_dl.asp?70juh=115185&hy6f0=4998. 
268See, e.g., Rich Mogull & Richard Hunter, Cyberattacks and Cyberterrorism:  What Private Business Must Know 
(2002), at http://www.gartnerg2.com/qa/qa-0902-0091.asp (“Software is currently exempt from product liability 
laws, removing any possible legal recourse for unacceptable quality. Software manufacturers must be held to an 
appropriate standard of quality, like all other commercial products.”) (on file with the author); Computer Science 
and Telecommunications Board - National Academy of Sciences, Computer Security:  Today and Tomorrow 14 
(2002), at http://books.nap.edu/html/cybersecurity/ch1.html (“Policy makers should . . . [c]onsider legislative 
responses to the failure of existing incentives to cause the market to respond adequately . . . .Possible options 
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  Employing criminal liability for this purpose is not without precedent in this 
country.269  In certain respects, it is analogous to the imposition of liability for antitrust 
violations.270  Antitrust enforcement can consist of either civil or criminal proceedings.271  Since 
the focus of this article is on criminal liability, we will restrict our consideration of antitrust to 
criminal enforcement proceedings.272  Criminal antitrust proceedings differ from traditional 
crimes in a notable respect:  Criminal antitrust proceedings are predicated on the infliction of a 
systemic “harm,” whereas traditional criminal proceedings are predicated on the infliction of 
“harm” to individual victims, whether humans or artificial entities.273  In a traditional criminal 
proceeding, the state acts to vindicate its obligation to protect the individual members of the 
 
include steps that would increase the exposure of software and system vendors . . . to liability for system breaches 
and mandated reporting of security breaches . . . . ”) (on file with the author).   
269While criminal product liability, as such, is not an element of American law, other countries do hold the 
manufacturers and distributors of defective products criminally liable for their actions. See, e.g., People’s Republic 
of China - Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress, Decision of the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress on Punishing the Crimes of Production and Sale of Fake or Substandard 
Commodities ¶ 5 (July 2, 1993) at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/lib/library/Laws_regulations/consumer/decision.htm 
(criminal offense to produce or sell “products that do not conform to the national or trade standards safeguarding the 
safety of person or property”) (on file with the author).   See also Commonwealth of Australia, Trade Practices Act 
of 1974 § 75AZS (1974) at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/tpa1974149/s75azs.html (on file with 
the author); United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry, Country Report:  Italy, at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/pdf1/benchitaly.pdf (on file with the author). 
270The software industry has, of course, been the target of antitrust proceedings.  See U.S. Department of Justice – 
Antitrust Division, United States v. Microsoft, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm (on file with the 
author). 
271See, e.g., Raymond Krauze & John Mulcahy, Antitrust Violations, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 241, 241-243 (2003).   
272See id. at 269-279.  See also U.S. Dept. of Justice:  United States Attorneys’ Manual § 7-5.000 (1997) at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/5mant.htm (on file with the author). 
273For the proposition that laws defining “crimes” target the infliction of discrete types of “harm,” see, e.g., Part 
II(A)(1), supra.  See also Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, 4 Cal. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2001) 
at http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm (on file with the author).    
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social system it represents;274 in a criminal antitrust enforcement proceeding, however, the 
state acts to vindicate its obligation to ensure the viability of an essential component of a social 
system.  The “harm” caused by an antitrust “crime” is an erosion of the principle of competition:  
“[F]ree and competitive markets result in maximum economic development, wealth creation, and 
consumer welfare, but . . . markets will not always remain free and competitive in the absence of 
effective government oversight.”275  Criminal antitrust proceedings therefore target “systemic” 
crimes, i.e., crimes that impact upon a nation’s infrastructure instead of upon its individual 
citizens,276 and are in that regard precisely analogous to the type of criminal liability postulated 
here.  Like criminal antitrust laws, criminal product liability laws would authorize the imposition 
of liability upon those whose conduct undermines the security of the national infrastructure.277
 Though criminal antitrust proceedings are analogous insofar as they target systemic 
injury, they differ in another respect:  They require affirmative “criminal” conduct. 278  The 
context-specific criminal product liability postulated here, on the other hand, would be imposed 
274See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-2.1, Commentary (1994). 
275Joel I. Klein, Rethinking Antitrust Policies for the New Economy, Address at the Haas/Berkeley New Economic 
Forum, University of California at Berkeley (May 9, 2000) at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4707.htm 
(on file with the author).  See also U.S. Dept. of Justice:  United States Attorneys’ Manual § 7-1.100 (1997) at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/1mant.htm (“The U.S. antitrust laws represent . . . 
our nation's commitment to a free market economy in which the competitive process of the market ensures the most 
efficient allocation of our scarce resources and the maximization of consumer welfare.”) (On file with the author).  
276Charles S. Stark, International Cooperation in the Pursuit of Cartels, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 533, 533 (1998) 
(“antitrust . . . enforcement . . . is very much a part of the global economic infrastructure”). 
277See supra notes 266 - 268 and accompanying text.  
278See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice:  United States Attorneys’ Manual § 7-1.100 (1997) at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/1mant.htm (antitrust laws target “private restraints 
of trade (such as price fixing, bid rigging and other collusive arrangements among competitors) that unreasonably 
impede the free forces of the market”).   
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for inaction, i.e., for not ensuring the reliability of software or hardware.279  The imposition 
of such liability is not unknown in American law; there are sources of analogy for holding one 
criminally liable for failing to prevent “harm,” including systemic “harm.”280  In United States v. 
Park,281 for instance, a corporate officer was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 331(k), which 
makes it a federal crime to let food shipped in interstate commerce and held for sale to become 
adulterated.282  Park was the president of a “national retail food chain” that used a Baltimore 
warehouse to store food which had been shipped in interstate commerce and was being held for 
sale to consumers.283  Federal inspectors determined that the warehouse was “accessible to 
rodents” and that the rodents were contaminating the food stored there; this contamination 
279See supra Part II(C)(2).  We do not need criminal product liability to address the conduct of one who intentionally 
or knowingly distributes a defective product that can cause “harm” to citizens or to a social system.  See, e.g., 
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Historical Continuity Of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming The Tort 
Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269, 1329 n. 296 (1993) (“first American prosecution of a manufacturer for 
manslaughter arose from three deaths caused by the . . . defective Ford Pinto.  . . . The prosecutor based the case on 
the company's failure to recall a potentially deadly vehicle when the company had knowledge of a defect in the 
vehicle”).  See also Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, 
and Prospects, 73 Geo. L.J. 1, 3 (1984). 
280See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (corporation convicted of failing to prevent 
the deaths of migratory birds under 16 U.S.C. § 703).  The imposition of criminal liability for one’s failure to 
prevent a particular type of generalized, systemic “harm” dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century and 
the invention of “public welfare” offenses.  See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 
67-68 (1933). The development of “public welfare,” or regulatory, offenses resulted from a “shift in emphasis from 
the protection of individual interests which marked nineteenth century criminal administration to the protection of 
public and social interests.”  M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration Of Scienter Under Environmental 
Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 105, 110 (1992).  See also Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, supra, 33 
Colum. L. Rev. at 67-68. 
281421 U.S. 658 (1975).  
282See 421 U.S. at 660. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 331(k).  See also U.S. Department of Justice:  United States Attorneys’ 
Manual Title 4 § 104 (1998) at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ usam/title4/civ00104.htm 
(elements of an offense under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) (on file with the author).   
283See 421 U.S. at 660.  
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constituted adulteration under 21 U.S.C. § 331(k).284  Park and the company were charged 
with violating § 331(k), and the company pled guilty.  Park, however, pled not guilty.285  Park 
claimed that he was not “personally responsible” for the contamination at the Baltimore 
warehouse.286  He conceded that while all of the company’s employees “were in a sense under 
his general direction,” the responsibility for ensuring sanitary conditions at the warehouse 
belonged to the Baltimore division vice president.  Park further claimed that he had checked and 
was told the vice president was taking “corrective action.”287  Notwithstanding that claim, Park 
was convicted; he subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  The Court upheld 
his conviction, concluding that Park’s “responsible” position in the company’s corporate 
structure justified holding him liable for failing to prevent the contamination.288   
 The Park case highlights an issue that is of central importance in crafting a doctrine of 
criminal product liability encompassing software and hardware used to access cyberspace:  
What, if any, mens rea should be required for the imposition of liability?  As seen in the Park 
case and in other areas of real-world criminal law, strict liability is sufficient.289  Note, however, 
that in crafting the “user” complicity rule, we rejected strict liability in favor of a negligence 
standard.290  The resolution of this issue depends upon how we characterize the type of liability 
that is being imposed: Is it liability for committing a traditional “crime” or is it the less onerous 
liability imposed for committing a regulatory offense?  
284See id.  
285See id. at 661-62.  
286See id. at 662-63. 
287See id. at 663-64. 
288See id. at 668-70. 
289See id.  See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).  See also Wayne R. LaFave, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.5 (2003).   
290See supra Part II(C)(1)(b).  
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 Strict liability suffices in cases like Park because the corporation or the corporate 
employee is being held liable not for a traditional crime, but for a regulatory offense, i.e., for 
violating a statute that “impose[s] a duty upon the corporation not to act in such a way as to 
endanger the health, safety or welfare of the general public.”291  Strict liability is used because it 
can be difficult, if not impossible, to prove personal moral fault on the part of specific corporate 
employees; further, as the advocates of strict liability note, the penalties associated with 
regulatory offenses are usually small, often consisting of only a fine.292  
 We rejected strict liability for the “user” complicity rule because we concluded that it 
would be ineffective and because it would impose liability for the commission of a traditional 
“crime.”293  Under the complicity rule, a “user” who fails to prevent his computer from being 
compromised and used to victimize another is held liable either as an accomplice to the crimes 
committed or for the separate offense of facilitation.294  The penalties imposed upon an 
accomplice can be severe.  While the penalties for facilitation are generally less severe, a 
conviction still represents a conviction for a traditional “crime,” not for a regulatory offense.295  
 Thus, the most reasonable strategy for crafting a criminal product liability principle 
applicable to the “architects” of cyberspace is to define a regulatory offense based on strict 
291LAFAVE, supra note 23, at § 13.5 (C). 
292See, e.g,, id. at § 5.5 (C). See also Park, 421 U.S. at 661-62.   
293See supra notes 225 - 229 and accompanying text.   
294See supra Part II(C)(1)(b).  
295See supra Part II(C)(1)(b).  See also LAFAVE, supra note 23, at § 5.5(C) (“conviction for strict-liability offenses 
should be insulated ‘from the type of moral condemnation that is…implicit when a sentence of imprisonment may 
be imposed.’”) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
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liability.296  We are not, after all, addressing conduct which is in any way analogous to a 
traditional “crime.”  The premise for imposing criminal liability upon “architects” is not that 
they have actively committed criminal acts, but that they have defaulted on a duty “not to act in 
such a way as to endanger the . . . general public.”297  If an “architect” were to intentionally 
incorporate a defect into software so it could be exploited by cyberterrorists or cybercriminals, 
we would use traditional principles of criminal law, i.e., complicity, conspiracy and substantive 
offenses, to hold him liable for what he had done.  The rationale for imposing criminal product 
liability upon “architects” is functionally indistinguishable from the rationale used to craft other 
regulatory offenses;298 the ultimate goal is to use a version of criminal liability to reinforce the 
duty to ensure that the products and/or services that are supplied do not harm the public directly 
or, in this instance, indirectly, by eroding the security of cyberspace.299  Since criminal liability 
is being utilized for a regulatory purpose, the basic penalties imposed for criminal product 
liability offenses should be minor, most likely limited to fines.300    
296Cf. Metzger, supra note 279, at 81 (“Prudence. . .  seems to dictate that individual criminal liability for defective 
products be premised upon the defendant’s reckless or knowing behavior which directly contributed to the 
proscribed harm”). 
297See supra note 291 and accompanying text.  
298But see infra note 300.   
299For yet another source of analogy, see e.g., Kevin M. McDonald, Don't Tread On Me: Faster Than A Tire 
Blowout, Congress Passes Wide- Sweeping Legislation That Treads On The Thirty-Five Year Old Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1200 (2001) (“TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to provide for 
criminal liability where a person violated reporting requirements . . . with respect to safety-related defects in motor 
vehicles or motor vehicle equipment”).  
300If we decide criminal product liability doctrines are more properly analogized to antitrust law than to the 
regulatory offenses discussed in the text above, then our approach should eliminate strict liability in favor of 
demonstrated culpability, presumably purposeful or knowing conduct, and should entail more severe penalties.  As 
to culpability, we could employ a variant of the standard the Supreme Court set out in United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 (1978): 
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(b) Civil Liability 
 The software industry’ main arguments against subjecting it to civil product liability rests 
upon the assumption that adopting such liability would subject the industry to potentially 
hundreds of thousands of civil suits, a large percentage of which would be frivolous or would be 
seeking damages for de minimis injuries.301  Further, it is assumed that dealing with all these 
civil suits would impose significant time, resource and incentive burdens on an industry that 
needs to be nimble, creative and focused if it is to design and supply the ever evolving tools 
needed to maximize the advantages that cyberspace offers to essentially every aspect of the 
human endeavor.302   Critics of the software industry’s arguments find these assumptions to be 
flawed.  While they concede that extending civil product liability to software would produce “a 
 
The business behavior which is likely to give rise to criminal antitrust charges is conscious 
behavior . . . undertaken only after a full consideration of the desired results and a weighing of the 
costs, benefits, and risks. A requirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but 
also of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the law would seem . . .  both 
unnecessarily cumulative and unduly burdensome. Where carefully planned and calculated 
conduct is being scrutinized in the context of a criminal prosecution, the perpetrator's knowledge 
of the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent. 
As to penalties, see e.g., Raymond Krauze & John Mulcahy, Antitrust Violations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 241, 280 
(2003) (“corporations convicted of antitrust felonies may receive fines equal to the greater of twice the corporation's 
pecuniary gain or twice the victim's pecuniary loss” and “[i]ndividuals may be fined up to a maximum of $350,000, 
sentenced to up to three years in prison, or both”).      
301See supra Parts II(C)(2) & II(C)(2)(a).  
302See, e.g., Dollars and Lives:  The Cost of Shoddy Software, USA TODAY, at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-04-28-software-bugs_x.htm, (April 28, 2003) (last visited October 21, 
2004); Harris Miller, Penalizing Vendors Brings Consequences, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, at 
http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/2002/0422faceoffno.html. (April 22, 2002) (last visited October 21, 2004).  
See also supra note 258 and accompanying text.  The burdensome effects of such suits could be exacerbated if the 
various states (and nations) adopted varying legal standards governing product defects.  
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blizzard of lawsuits,” 303 they argue that the eventual effect of this litigation would be to 
improve software, not to degrade it.304   
Both sides of the debate demonstrate valid points.  Software is an admittedly complex 
product, far more difficult to design, maintain and upgrade than the real-world items to which 
product liability has traditionally been applied.305  Thus, software product liability suits would be 
expensive, time-consuming and burdensome for both parties,306 and their impact on software 
quality would nevertheless remain uncertain.307  Set against this uncertainty, however, is the 
demonstrable fact that the current strategy of relying on market forces does not ensure that 
software is minimally reliable, let alone sufficiently secure to protect the national 
infrastructure.308  Clearly, some other approach is required.309
303Mann, supra note 257, at 33, 38.  
304See, e.g., id. at 38 (“the lawsuits will . . . come. And when the costs of litigation go up enough, companies will be 
motivated to bulletproof their code”).     
305See, e.g., id. at 36.  
306See, e.g., id. at 38 (“lawsuits would be highly technical, which means that plaintiffs would need to hire costly 
experts to build their cases”).  See also Jody Armour & Watts S. Humphrey, Software Product Liability, SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/documents/93.reports/pdf/tr13.93.pdf  (August 1993) (last 
visited October 21, 2004).   For many of the same reasons, civil tort suits have proven an ineffective device for 
enforcing environmental standards.  See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving 
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1197-98 (1998) (“Private lawsuits alleging 
environmental harm . . . are very difficult to win . . . The cases are lengthy and expensive, requiring a great deal of 
expert testimony”).
307See supra notes 302 - 304 and accompanying text.  
308See, e.g., Greg Cooper, ACM Fellow Profile:  Eugene H. Spafford, SOFTWARE ENGINEERS NOTES, at  
http://www.acm.org/sigsoft/SEN/spafford.html (last updated July 31, 2001) (last visited October 21, 2004) (“It's 
about cost. If you make software better, you may be slower to market. Even if your product is more reliable and 
more secure . .  .you may go out of business while the makers of inferior products continue to prosper”).  See also 
Mann, supra note 254, at 34 (“many software engineers believe that software quality is not improving . . . . it’s 
getting worse. It’s as if the cars Detroit produced in 2002 were less reliable than those built in 1982”).  For the 
annual increases in reported software vulnerabilities, see, e.g., CERT/CC STATISTICS 1988-2003, CARNEGIE 
MELLON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, at  http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html#incidents (last updated 
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The judicious use of criminal product liability is such an approach, one that could 
resolve the issues that arise with regard either to relying on market forces or to implementing 
civil product liability.  Unlike civil product liability suits, criminal product liability prosecutions 
are brought by the state, which limits the number of actions brought and tends to filter out 
frivolous suits.310  Further, unlike market forces, criminal product liability can be employed to 
create incentives to provide reliable, technically adequate software (or, perhaps more accurately, 
to create disincentives for producing software that is unreliable and technically inadequate).311
 While such criminal product liability has been analyzed above;312 this discussion is 
concerned with how it should be enforced.  Enforcement becomes an issue for criminal product 
 
Aug. 3, 2004) (last visited October 21, 2004).  But see Rich Mogull & Richard Hunter, Cyberattacks and 
Cyberterrorism:  What Private Business Must Know, GARTNERG2, at http://www.gartnerg2.com/qa/qa-0902-
0091.asp (September 25, 2002) (last visited October 21, 2004) (“Bush Administration . . . will rely on market forces 
to improve security” of software).   For another area in which reliance on market forces has proven insufficient to 
induce compliance with a desired standard, see Rechtschaffen, supra note 306, at 1196.   
309See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, A Legal Fix for Software Flaws?, ZDNET, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-
5067873.html (August 26, 2003) (last visited October 21, 2004) 
([R]epeated failures are leading . . . security experts to press for changes in software liability law 
to better motivate companies to fix . . . insecure code. `If the laws . . . forced software makers to 
be held liable – criminally, civilly, financially – for their products, we'd see a marked increase in 
product quality, security and stability,’ said Richard Forno, an author and security consultant). 
310Prosecutions must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed by the person being 
charged; this is a higher standard than that required for the initiation of civil suits and it serves to reduce, if not 
eliminate, baseless actions.  See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS fOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) (“A 
prosecutor should not institute . . . criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by 
probable cause”).  See generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-114 (1975).  The filtering effect resulting from 
the probable cause standard is enhanced by the fact that prosecutions are initiated by prosecutors who are trained in 
the law and, unlike civil litigants, have no personal stake in the initiation of a particular proceeding. See, e.g., ABA 
STANDARDS fOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3-3.9(d) (“In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no 
weight to the personal or political advantages . . . which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her record 
of convictions”).  
311See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).   
312See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).   
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liability because it is not a traditional use of criminal liability.  Criminal liability has 
traditionally been used to sanction individuals who affirmatively inflict harm by committing 
crimes; the goal is to denounce and punish offenders whose behavior threatens internal order.313  
Since traditional miscreants actively and contumaciously engage in conduct that threatens the 
social order, the default assumption is that each of them (or as many as possible) should be 
apprehended, prosecuted and punished;314 their conduct represents behavior which, to varying 
degrees, society simply will not tolerate.315  The criminal product liability principles postulated 
here are not concerned with this type of traditional, active criminal behavior.  The goal of a 
criminal product liability law would be to enforce a duty to supply reliable, technically adequate 
software by identifying and sanctioning those who fail to discharge this obligation.316  The 
question then becomes: How much enforcement is appropriate?  Should the traditional criminal 
law assumption that every offender should (ideally) be prosecuted and punished apply here?317
 One could argue that given the gravity of the potential consequences of failing to 
discharge the duty to supply reliable, technically adequate software,318 the default assumption of 
313See supra Part I.  See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 280 at 68 (“… original objective of the criminal law was to keep the 
peace . . . . ”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 23, §1.2(e). 
314See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (“A prosecutor 
ordinarily should prosecute if, after full investigation, he or she finds that a crime has been committed, the 
perpetrator can be identified, and there is sufficient admissible evidence available to support a verdict of guilty.”).    
315See supra Part I.  See also Goodman & Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 
supra, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. at 56.   
316See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).   
317The strategy is an ideal because, of course, “there are not enough enforcement agencies to investigate and 
prosecute every criminal act that occurs.”  AMERICAN BAR ASS’N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9 cmt. (3d 
ed. 1993). 
318See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).  Under certain circumstances, traditional criminal liability is imposed for not acting; 
see, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 6.2.  Such liability is generally restricted to instances in which someone who had 
a legal duty to another failed to perform a relatively straightforward act which he or she was physically capable of 
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prosecuting every offender should apply.  This assumes that the “harm” caused by criminal 
product liability offenses should dictate the enforcement strategy; but while that assumption 
holds for traditional criminal behavior,319 there are compelling reasons why it should not apply 
to criminal product liability offenses.  One is that unlike traditional criminal liability, criminal 
product liability is based on inaction; one is not held liable for actively sabotaging software, but 
for failing to ensure it is of acceptable quality.320  Another reason is culpability.  Traditional 
criminal liability is based on a truly “bad mind;”321 that is, it requires a specific level of 
culpability (i.e. intention) relative to the course of conduct carried out by one or more persons, 
e.g., robbing a convenience store, stabbing another person, or executing a Ponzi scheme.322  The 
defining characteristic of traditional criminal liability is the perpetrator’s intention to cause some 
type of “harm.”323  The intent to cause “harm” makes traditional offenders “dangerous” and that 
accounts for the default enforcement strategy, i.e., that every offender should be apprehended 
 
performing; see id.   The relative simplicity of the conduct at issue differentiates this type of omission liability from 
criminal product liability.   
319See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9(b)(ii) (3d ed. 1993).   
320See supra Part II(C)(2)(a). 
321See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (Professional Books Limited 
1982) (1808).  (“to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will . . . ). 
322A Ponzi scheme is a type of fraud in which investors are paid “exceptional dividends” based on funds deposited 
by new investors.  Mark Fleming, Bubble and Ponzi Schemes used in Investment Fraud Scams (May 2002), 
http://www.crimes-of-persuasion.com/Crimes/InPerson/MajorPerson/ponzi.htm.  As to culpability, see, e.g., 
LAFAVE, supra note 23 at § 5.1; For the proposition that traditional criminal liability assumes relatively simple 
conduct and one or only a few offenders, see, e.g., Brenner, supra note 69; Traditional criminal liability can be 
imposed on those who participate in complex real-world criminal activity, such as large-scale drug-dealing.  See, 
e.g., United States v. High, 117 F.3d 464, 466-467 (11th Cir. 1997); But even in a complex drug operation involving 
many participants, the essential conduct is simple and straightforward -- i.e., procuring drugs, distributing drugs and 
taking care of related matters such as security -- compared to what is involved designing and manufacturing the 
software (and hardware) used to participate in cyberspace.  See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).   
323See supra note 321.  
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and sanctioned.324  Criminal product liability, on the other hand, requires no culpability, and 
thus has a strict liability standard; it applies this standards to extraordinarily complex, 
collaborative activity carried out by hundreds or even thousands of individuals.325  The 
complexity of this activity can undermine an individual’s or an entity’s ability to control the 
conduct at issue.326  Producing reliable software is, after all, a far more complicated process than 
keeping rodents out of a Baltimore warehouse.327    
 The use of strict liability coupled with the complexity of the activity at issue requires a 
different enforcement strategy for criminal product liability, at least as it is applied to software.  
It would have to filter out cases when prosecution would be technically permissible but is 
inapposite for other reasons.328  The enforcement strategy used for environmental crimes (which 
can also involve complex, collaborative activity) could be adapted for this purpose. 
324See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 213-22 (2d ed. 1960); see also supra note 317, 
3-3.9 cmt. 
325See supra notes 291 - 296 and accompanying text; see generally LAFAVE, supra note 23, §5.5.   
326See supra note 325 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II(C)(2)(a); see, e.g., Mann, supra note 257 at 35 
(“…coders make 100 to 150 errors in every thousand lines of code they write . . . ”).  Individual versus corporate 
liability is discussed at the end of this section.  
327See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).   
328As noted above, relying on criminal liability introduces an initial filtering mechanism:  Fewer criminal than civil 
product liability cases would be filed because (a) prosecutions are brought by the state, not by discrete, aggrieved 
individuals and (b) each prosecution would be based on the infliction of a collective “harm.” See supra Part 
II(C)(2)(a); This is consistent with the concept of regulatory, or “public welfare” offenses:  The development of 
regulatory offenses was based in part on “on the notion that it was more convenient for the state to bring an action 
affecting a group of persons in a criminal proceeding rather than place the burden of proof of direct harm on certain 
individuals in a civil suit.” Barber, supra note 280 at 112; The Park case, for example, involved one prosecution for 
the adulteration of the food in the Baltimore warehouse, not thousands of civil suits brought by individuals who 
were harmed by the adulterated food.  See supra Part II(C)(2)(a). 
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 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) cooperate in enforcing the criminal provisions of most federal environmental statutes.329  
The EPA investigates potential violations and can request prosecution in appropriate cases;330 its 
policy is to seek criminal sanctions only if “both significant environmental harm and culpable 
conduct are present.”331  The EPA will not make a criminal referral to the DOJ if a violator in 
good faith identifies, discloses and corrects violations, unless they “(i) involve criminal acts of 
individual managers or employees; (ii) there exists a management philosophy condoning 
environmental violations; or (iii) there is conscious participation in, or willful blindness to, the 
violations by high-level corporate employees.”332  The DOJ has a similar policy that articulates 
factors federal prosecutors are to consider “in determining whether and how to prosecute” when 
“the law and evidence would otherwise be sufficient for prosecution.”333  Essentially, they are to 
consider “(i) voluntary disclosure [of violations]; (ii) the degree and timeliness of cooperation; 
(iii) preventive measures and compliance programs; (iv) pervasive non-compliance; (v) 
disciplinary systems to punish employees who violate compliance policies; and (vi) subsequent 
329See Rachel Glickman, et al., Environmental Crimes, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 413, 416 (2003); see also id. at 427-
428; see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE 
VIOLATOR § I (July 1, 1991), http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/factors.htm (DOJ policy “to encourage self-auditing, self-
policing and voluntary disclosure of environmental violations by . . . indicating that these activities are viewed as 
mitigating factors in the Department's exercise of criminal environmental enforcement discretion.”). 
330See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)(B), (c) (2000). 
331Glickman, et al., supra note 329 at 416; Levels of culpability in federal environmental statutes range from 
“knowingly” to negligently.  See, e.g., id. at 445-46, 449.  
332Id. at 428; see also David A. Barker, Note, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1406 (2003) (“From 1996 to 1998, EPA averaged just 269 referrals to 
DOJ for criminal prosecution, or about one criminal referral for every fifty administrative enforcement actions.”).   
333U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 329 § II. 
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compliance efforts.”334  The overall goal is to encourage self-policing and voluntary 
compliance.335
 The DOJ’s policy of using criminal liability selectively while encouraging self-policing 
and voluntary compliance as ways to avoid prosecution is an effective approach to the 
enforcement of criminal laws that target sophisticated, complex activity which typically occurs 
in a corporate context.  It combines deterrence- and compliance-based enforcement.336  While the 
theoretical underpinning of the . . . system relies . . . on deterrence, in practice the 
process is much more flexible.  Most enforcers use a hybrid strategy that includes 
elements of both coercion and cooperation. . . .  Most enforcement . . . is aimed at 
bringing violators back into compliance rather than punishing or deterring.  Most 
334Glickman, et al., supra note 329 at 417; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 326 § II.   
335See Glickman, supra note 329, at 416.  A similar process is used to initiate the type of criminal proceeding at 
issue in the Park case, discussed in Part II(C)(2)(a): 
1. An inspection is conducted by an FDA investigator and a report is prepared. 
2. Where inspection reveals violative conditions, the inspection report is referred to the Compliance 
Branch of the field office for review. 
3. The field office may then recommend appropriate regulatory action … to the pertinent FDA Bureau. 
4. Where the possible legal action is criminal prosecution, the field office provides potential defendants 
with an Opportunity to Present Views, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 335, and 21 CFR 7.84 et seq . . . The 
record from the hearing is then reviewed by the field office in determining appropriate legal action, if 
any. 
5. The field [office’s] recommended course of action is reviewed by the Bureau.  If the Bureau concurs . . 
. the matter is then referred . . . to [the] Enforcement Policy Staff.   
6. Recommendations for regulatory action, if approved by [that] office, are referred to the Office of 
General Counsel of FDA for review and approval. 
7. If approved by FDA’s Chief Counsel, then and only then, is a matter formally referred to Justice 
(through the appropriate U.S. Attorney) for the institution of legal proceedings. 
United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 428 (2d Cir. 1985); see 733 F.2d at 428-432; see also U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 4-8.010 (2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov.usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/civ00104.htm, (last visited September 23, 2004).  
336See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 306, at 1186-90.   For the ineffectiveness of a compliance-based enforcement, 
see id. at 1191-1201. 
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instances of noncompliance are met with either no sanctions or only minor, informal 
ones.337
 
 A similar approach could be used to implement criminal product liability for software.  
The use of criminal liability combined with the internal review and filtering processes described 
above (i) resolves the “litigation overload” objections the software industry raises to civil 
product liability; (ii) resolves similar objections that would no doubt be raised to the 
implementation of an unfiltered criminal product liability; and (iii) fills the vacuum that results 
from relying on market forces to improve software.338  The resolution of (ii) requires parsing 
enforcement authority out within jurisdictions; that is, it would be necessary to specify which 
entities were authorized to initiate criminal product liability proceedings at the state and federal 
levels.   
 Prosecution authority at the federal level would certainly reside with the DOJ.  The 
authority to initiate criminal product liability prosecutions could be given to the Criminal 
Division of the DOJ339 or to a special enforcement unit analogous to the Antitrust or 
Environmental and Natural Resources Divisions.340  It would be necessary to decide whether 
local U.S. Attorney offices could also initiate such prosecutions; given the technical complexity 
of the issues and the need for consistency in such prosecutions, it seems advisable to reserve 
prosecution for the Criminal Division or for a special enforcement unit created for this 
337Id. at 1189 (note omitted).  
338See supra notes 305 – 309 and accompanying text. 
339See U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual tit. 9, available at 
http://wwwusdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/title9.htm, (last visited September 23, 2004). 
340See U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual tit. 5 & 7, available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title5/title5.htm, (last visited September 23, 2004); 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/title7.htm, (last visited September 23, 2004). 
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purpose.341  A similar system should govern prosecution at the state level; that is, 
prosecutions should be handled by a central, specialized unit and not by local prosecutors.  
Allowing criminal product liability prosecutions to be initiated by local prosecutors would 
undermine the efficacy of the enforcement strategy outlined above.342  For one thing, local 
enforcement would effectively eliminate the filtering process that can be achieved by reserving 
these cases for a special unit which encourages compliance and uses prosecution selectively.343  
It would also, without doubt, produce failed prosecutions, as local prosecutor offices generally 
do not have the resources needed to litigate such complex cases effectively.344  Failed 
prosecutions would undermine the strategy outlined above by introducing elements of 
inconsistency into the enforcement process; and consistency in enforcement is essential for a 
strategy targeting activity that is national – indeed, international – in scope.345  Therefore, 
341Most antitrust prosecutions are handled by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division; local U.S. Attorney’s offices can initiate 
certain types of antitrust prosecutions, but they are subject to review by the Antitrust Division.  See U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 7-1.100 (1997), available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/1mant.htm, (last visited September 23, 2004) 
(review “ensures a consistent national policy on antitrust questions”).  Local U.S. Attorney’s offices can initiate 
environmental prosecutions except in cases of “national interest.”  See U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 
§ 7-1.100 (2001), available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title5/11menv.htm#5-11.105, (last visited September 23, 
2004)…and [the Environmental Crimes Section of the DOJ] will participate jointly as co-counsel from the initiation 
of the investigation through prosecution.”  Id. 
342See supra notes 329 – 337 and accompanying text. 
343See id.  Selective prosecution, in this context, means that prosecutions are not brought automatically but are 
subject to a screening process analogous to that which the DOJ uses for environmental cases. See supra notes 329 – 
337 and accompanying text. 
344See supra note 306 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 279, at 2 (Ford Motor company, which 
was prosecuted for manslaughter based on its distributing a dangerously defective vehicle, was acquitted). 
345See e.g., supra note 341.  See also National Association of Attorneys General, NAAG Projects: Antitrust: 
Multistate Task Force, at http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-antitrust-multi.php, (last visited September 23, 2004) 
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prosecution authority at the state level, as at the federal level, should be allocated to a 
centralized unit.  One approach, which is consistent with practice in other areas, is to assign 
exclusive authority for bringing criminal product liability prosecutions against software 
manufacturers to a unit in the state Attorney General’s office.346
 We must address a final enforcement issue:  Should prosecutions target the entity that 
distributes flawed software, the individuals whose actions proximately cause the flaws, or 
both?347  The best approach is to allow prosecution for both; in the Park case, after all, the 
corporation and its president were prosecuted for allowing food to become adulterated.348  The 
rationale for prosecuting offending entities is that it advances specific and general deterrence by 
encouraging the offenders, and similarly-situated entities, to institute policies to prevent the 
recurrence of such an event.349  The rationale for prosecuting individual employees who are to 
 
(“For over twenty years, State Attorneys General have worked together to bring multistate cases to protect . . . 
consumers.  These joint actions ensure consistent enforcement of state antitrust . . . laws). 
346See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §7106(5) (West Supp. 2003). 
347The statement of this issue assumes, as it seems likely, that software design and manufacture will take place in an 
organizational context. 
348See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).   
349See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Philip Urofsky, United States Department of Justice 
Memorandum Regarding Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (January 20, 2003) in Practicing Law 
Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. B0-01NM 
813 (April-June, 2003) (“Although non-criminal alternatives to prosecution often exist, prosecutors may consider 
whether such sanctions would adequately deter . . . a corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct”).  See also 
id.:   
Non-criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate response to an egregious violation, a pattern of 
wrongdoing, or a history of non-criminal sanctions without proper remediation.  . . . In 
determining whether federal criminal charges are appropriate, the prosecutor should consider the 
same factors . . . considered when determining whether to leave prosecution of a natural person to 
another jurisdiction or to seek non-criminal alternatives to prosecution. These factors include: the 
strength of the regulatory authority's interest; the regulatory authority's ability and willingness to 
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some degree personally responsible for an entity’s defaulting on its duty to provide 
satisfactory software is that it reinforces the entity-deterrent effect by giving employees a 
“personal stake” in their employer’s compliance with the law;350 indeed, according to one view, 
holding individual employees liable can “provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate 
wrongdoing.”351   Authorizing prosecution for both does not mean, of course, that both should be 
prosecuted in every case; the decision to prosecute one, both or neither necessarily depends on 
the facts of each case, but a decision to prosecute an entity should not bar prosecution of 
employees.352
III.  TOKUGAWA CYBERSPACE 
. . . control without authority.353
 To drastically oversimplify, there are two approaches to maintaining internal order in a 
human social system.354  One approach is to rely on formally promulgated, objective rules – 
 
take effective enforcement action; the probable sanction if the regulatory authority's enforcement 
action is upheld; and the effect of a non-criminal disposition on Federal law enforcement interests.   
This memorandum notes the need to consider specific and general deterrence in deciding whether to charge a 
corporation.  See id. at 814. 
350See, e.g., David G. Dickman, Recent Developments in the Criminal Enforcement of Maritime Environmental 
Laws, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 2 (1999) (“Whenever possible, federal and state law enforcement officials will… 
prosecute corporate officers and other individuals … because prosecution of individuals is viewed by the 
Department of Justice … as the strongest deterrent to environmental crime”).   
351Mary Jo White, Criminal Enforcement of the Securities Laws, Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order Number B0-01PG 1145 (November, 2003).    
352See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 5-11.114 (2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title5/11menv.htm#5 -11.114, (last visited September 
23, 2004) (“In any case against both a corporation and any of its individual employees the willingness of the 
offending corporation to enter a guilty plea is not a basis for dismissal as against the individual”). 
353See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
354See supra Part I.  
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“laws” – that are enforced by a specific social structure or institution;355 this approach has 
been used for centuries in the Western world.356  It relies upon legal codes to articulate the rules 
that govern conduct in a society and upon police, lawyers and courts to enforce these rules.357  In 
such a social system, “law” is an external, hierarchically enforced constraint on behavior; it is an 
externality one ignores at the peril of suffering sanctions.358  This is the system to which those of 
us raised and educated in Western cultures are accustomed, and it is the system we seek to 
impose upon the experiential reality known as cyberspace. 
 The other approach, practiced in parts of the historic Eastern world, relies on customary 
(i.e., not formally promulgated) rules that are embedded in the culture and enforced informally 
through one’s relationships and interactions with others in the society.359  This system prevailed 
355See, e.g., John Owen Haley, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 7 (1991) (“An 
institutionalized system is one in which . . . the making and enforcing of rules occur through established procedures 
and institutions – functions exercised by established political authority”).  
356See, e.g., Dan Fenno Henderson, Comparative Law in Perspective, 1 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 5 (1992) 
(“Tokugawa . . . governance . . . did not involve official application of legal rules … as in Western adjudication.  
Westerners, from the Greeks and the Biblical era onward, have seen ‘law’ as based on principle – universal, given, 
and external to those bound”). 
357As explained earlier, this type of system also uses informal rules – norms – to structure much of a society’s 
behavior in predictable, acceptable ways.  See supra notes 171 – 176 and accompanying text.  The behaviors 
controlled by norms tend to be behaviors that do not significantly intrude upon others’ rights or interests; in 
legalistic systems, norms generally guide behavior into channels that promote social acceptance.  In modern 
Western societies, for example, norms guide interactions with others so that we know, for instance, to go to the end 
of a queue instead of to the front or to defer to our boss, our teacher, our minister or others in a position of authority.  
In these systems, the consequences of violating informal rules tends to be limited to a loss of social acceptance 
which, while it can have detrimental personal and professional consequences, does not rise to the level of formal 
social sanctioning.   
358See supra note 356.  See also supra Part I.   
359See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 355, at 7 (“A…customary order…is one in which rules are either made or enforced 
or both by means of consensus and habitual community behavior.”).  See also Henderson, supra note 356, at 4 
(Western societies depend “on a legal system and courts” for “dispute resolution and for maintenance of order in 
society” but “China had no such things in its culture as law, courts or adjudication”).  
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in Japan, notably during the Tokugawa era, until Westerners rather insistently introduced 
their formal, legalistic approach to maintaining order in society.360  This system does not require 
a formal institutional structure to enforce a set of external “laws;” instead of being an external, 
hierarchically enforced constraint on behavior, the rules that sustain internal order are part of the 
fabric of everyday life. 
 To understand how this system – which is so very different from modern Western 
systems with their laws and law enforcers – works, it is helpful to consider Japan during the 
Tokugawa period.361  “In 1603, after generations of turmoil Tokugawa Ieyasu was appointed 
360See infra note 361.  Japan’s system, like that of China, relied on Confucianism as the philosophical basis for 
maintaining internal order.  See, e.g., Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in 
China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1108-11 (1996).  See generally 
HALEY, supra note 355, at 29-32; 55; 62-63.  See also Dean J. Gibbons, Law and the Group Ethos in Japan, 3-FALL 
INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 98 (1990).   
361See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 355, at 51-65 (“The Tokugawa regime endured until the forcible opening of Japan 
by the West in the mid-nineteenth century.”).  See also id. at 67-80.  Victor Koschmann uses the contrasting 
concepts of “hard rule” and “soft rule” to explain the dramatic differences between Tokugawa society and modern 
Western legal systems.  He argues that the 
Western past – subjugation, conflict, and violence – engendered rule by force, or `hard rule.’ In 
these conditions, looking around at conflicts and open brutality, the individual sees himself `as 
prior to social forms, as their creator.’ The state becomes abstract and remote. This . . . supports 
the development of transcendent norms; when groups and individuals are frank about their 
interests and pursue them at the expense of others, they testify to the existence of a higher truth – 
principles that are constant in every setting. In Japan, . . . this open competition never flourished, 
and consequently authority could maintain an ideal of unity between citizen and ruler, a soft 
rejection of duality and individuation. 
Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, “Weightier Than a Mountain”: Duty, Hierarchy, and the Consumer in Japan, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 62-63 (1996) (quoting J. Victor Koschmann, Introduction: Soft Rule and Expressive 
Protest, in AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN: CITIZEN PROTEST IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1, 18-19 (J. 
Victor Koschmann ed. 1978).   
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Shogun” and for “nearly three centuries Japan enjoyed . . . political peace and social 
stability.”362  The “pivotal element of the Tokugawa legal order” was the village, or mura;363 a 
mura was one of the three basic administrative units of the Tokugawa system.364  The mura was 
essential to maintaining internal order because by the end of the eighteenth century, Japan had a 
population of about 26.5 million but the Tokugawa regime had only forty daikan, or deputies, to 
implement its edicts.365  While the Tokugawa shogunate issued edicts directed at the villages, it 
could not enforce them.  Control over behavior therefore fell to the local administrative unit, 
which for most people was the mura.366    
 For all intents and purposes, a mura was an autonomous entity.   However, to remain 
autonomous it had to maintain order: “So long as peace prevailed . . . there was little to draw 
official attention. . . . [A]ny open conflict or breach of peace threatened that autonomy and 
invited . . . more stringent controls.” 367  A mura was a tightly-knit social, economic and political 
362Gibbons, supra note 360, at 100. “Prior to Tokugawa rule, civil war continued intermittently from the 12th 
Century to the…17th Century.” Id. at 100 n.6. For the unrest in the earlier period, see, e.g., HALEY, supra note 355, 
at 58.   
363HALEY, supra note 355, at 58. 
364Id. at 58-59. The three basic units were the province, the district and the village. Id. at 58. 
365Id.  The daikan were responsible for overseeing activity outside Edo, where the shogunate was located.  Id. at 55.  
As such, they were “the only official link between the . . . shogunate . . . and the vast majority of Japanese who 
resided in rural villages.”  Id. at 55-56.    
366Id. at 60.  See also MIKISO HANE, PREMODERN JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 148 (1991).  The essential 
irrelevance of shogunate regulation is demonstrated by the fact that the “Tokugawa tradition held that knowledge 
about the law was an elite preserve; even the criminal law was unpublished, and statesmen kept the correspondence 
between offenses and penalties secret.” Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 361, at 64 (quoting HIDEO TANAKA, THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 164 (1976)).   
367 HALEY, supra note 355, at 61.  
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entity in which survival depended upon villagers’ cooperating with one another.368  
Tokugawa villages consequently used social cohesion to maintain internal order,369 with a 
villager’s primary goal being to maintain harmony in his or her community.370  Like other social 
systems, Tokugawa villages used rules to structure behavior and reduce conflict;371 mura rules 
were parochial, informal and pragmatic, designed to maintain life as it had existed for 
centuries.372 They were enforced by the villagers, who imposed sanctions for rule violations.  
The most common sanction was “community displeasure,” but the Tokugawa villages also used 
“more severe forms of community coercion, such as ostracism and expulsion.”373   
 Life in Tokugawa Japan is relevant to this article because the first step in developing a 
truly new approach to security in cyberspace is understanding how we conceptualize our 
368See, e.g., HITOMI TONOMURA, COMMUNITY AND COMMERCE IN LATE MEDIEVAL JAPAN: THE CORPORATE 
VILLAGES OF TOKUCHIN-HO 184 (1992). (Survival depended on exchanging labor “or the sharing of common 
resources, such as water for irrigation or forestland for fertilizer and building materials”).  
369See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 355, at 61 (“[C]ommunity sanctions . . . were the real deterrents to wrongdoing in 
Tokugawa Japan.”). 
370See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Lavine, Foreign Investment in Japan: Understanding the Japanese System and its Legal and 
Cultural Barriers to Entry, 9 B.U. INT’L L.J. 149, 151 (1991).  The emphasis on harmony in Tokugawa Japan 
derived from Confucianism, which emphasized that the “proper role of the individual was to establish and maintain 
harmonious relationships rather than assert individual interests.”  Gibbons, supra note 360, at 103-04.  See generally 
supra note 360.  Indeed, in Tokugawa Japan, there was no conception of “law” in the Western sense.  See, e.g., 
Henderson, supra note 356, at 5.  (In Tokugawa Japan, there was nothing “comparable to our ideas, concepts and 
institutions of ‘law.’”).   
371 See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 355, at 62.  Mura rule were not formally adopted nor were they regarded as “law.”  
Tokugawa Japan did not differentiate between “law” and “morality,” or ethics.  See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, The 
Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 3, 14 (1996). 
372See, e.g., HANE, supra note 366, at 141-42: 
There was a village code that dealt with such basic concerns . . . as taxation, agriculture, and 
community activities. Those who violated the code of conduct . . . that regulated village affairs 
and the relationship between villagers were punished by the community. The punishments 
included . . . apologies, fines, ostracism, and banishment . . . .  
373HALEY, supra note 355, at 61.  See, e.g., TONOMURA, supra note 368, at 184-85.  See also supra note 372. 
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participation “in” cyberspace.  We participate in cyberspace as individuals; we each “go it 
alone” when we are surfing the web or are otherwise engaging in online experiences.  Much of 
the attraction of cyberspace is that it is a solitary, individual pursuit.  “Individual pursuit” does 
not mean we do not engage or interact with others when we are online.  It means we venture 
“into” cyberspace alone and unaccompanied; we structure our own experiences, we choose what 
we will or will not do, and we decide for how long we will do it.374  Being “on our own” and 
unobserved, we do things – not necessarily criminal things – that we would probably never do 
“in public” out in the real-world.  We can indulge our imagination and we can explore interests 
that may not be shared by anyone within hundreds or thousands of miles of our physical 
location.  We can interact with others from far away, and in doing so, we can be no one 
(anonymous) or we can be someone else (pseudonymous).  This freedom from the constraints we 
deal with in the real-world is an essential aspect of the experience; it is part of the attraction of 
cyberspace.   
 This model, a conceptualization of our participation in cyberspace, is an extrapolation of 
the way we experience real-space.  In modern Western cultures, our participation in real-space 
tends to be atomized.  We enjoy emotional (and financial) support from family and friends, but 
each of us is primarily responsible for structuring and implementing our participation in the real-
world.   We are responsible for successfully completing some level of education; for getting, 
keeping and discharging the obligations of employment; for securing transportation to and from 
work, school, recreation, etc.; for securing and maintaining housing; and for securing such basic 
necessities as food, clothing, and medical care.  Ultimately, we are responsible for the various 
374Families, for example, do not go “into” cyberspace together; family members go “into” cyberspace to engage in 
the respective activities each finds enjoyable.  Venturing “into” cyberspace is an individual, not a shared, 
experience. 
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aspects of our personal lives (relationships, family, interests, etc.).  The support we receive 
from others helps us in discharging these responsibilities, but we are ultimately and inevitably 
responsible for the success or failure of our various efforts.   
 This “individual” model of real-world experience is the evolved product of Western 
history.  Over the last several centuries, Western societies have moved away from systems in 
which the family or community was responsible for structuring human endeavor to one in which 
responsibility is placed on the individual.375  This shift is an unavoidable consequence of 
evolving from a rural, primarily agrarian society into an urbanized, mobile, technological 
society.  In the former, people live their lives in stable collectives and stable environments 
(barring manmade or other disasters); one’s life experience is routine, predictable and generally 
unproblematic, structured by an inherited fabric of customary rules and relationships.  In the 
latter, people participate in life through a series of collectives, few of which are stable; even if 
one remains in the same job for years, he/she will almost certainly work with many different 
people as projects come and go and/or as other employees leave and new ones are hired.  The 
same is true of contemporary, Western-style family and “community” life:  People marry, have 
children, divorce, marry again, have children again, and perhaps divorce again.  As a result, 
one’s “immediate” and extended family becomes a series of shifting collectives.  The concept of 
a localized community that shapes one’s preferences and behaviors has little or no meaning for 
most people in contemporary Western-style societies.  While there is a generalized, pervasive 
culture in these societies, it is far from homogeneous; it tends to be much more superficial in 
375In Tokugawa Japan, for example, “individuals” did not exist – the “smallest legal unit was the family”.  Gibbons, 
supra note 360, at 101-02 n.11.  A similar, though perhaps not quite so pronounced, emphasis on family and 
community was for centuries an essential element of Western cultures.   
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content and in effect than the stable, consistent culture found in more traditional societies.376  
Instead of engaging in behaviors and life patterns that are structured for us by family or 
community, we make our own choices and bear responsibility for those choices.  By not having 
lives shaped and circumscribed by family or community, we rely more on formal rules and 
institutional rule-enforcers to sustain internal order.  Laws and sanctions, instead of customary 
rules and “community displeasure,” are used to define acceptable behaviors and discourage 
deviance.377   
 This adventitious model suits life in the contemporary, Western-influenced real-world.  It 
is consistent with our ingrained assumptions about individual rights and responsibilities and the 
demarcation of authority between our individual selves and the agencies of the nation-state.  We 
take no responsibility for ensuring internal order, aside from controlling our own behavior or 
taking minor actions such as installing alarm systems to discourage assaults on our safety and 
376One has only to consider the complexity of the GRAMMY Awards, GRAMMY Awards Process: Frequently 
Asked Questions, GRAMMY.com, at http://www.grammy.com/awards/grammy/process.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 
2004) (“The GRAMMY Awards have 28 fields…and 105 categories within those fields.”), or the amazing variety of 
publications available on Amazon.com to appreciate this.  Amazon.com, at 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/283155/103-3834352-0389454 (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).   
377See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (rev.ed. 1998) 
(“Homogeneity…retards the use of law…”).  A good example of this is the reaction to the baring of Janet Jackson’s 
breast during the halftime show at the 2004 Super Bowl.  The incident produced an outpouring of outrage on the 
part of Americans, most of which took the form of complaints to the Federal Communications Commission and 
other calls for “official” action to prevent further such incidents of broadcast “indecency.”  See, e.g., Jonathan D. 
Salant, Lawmakers Cite Super Bowl Halftime Show in Demands to Stop Indecency, SAN DIEGO UNION-TIMES, 
February 11, 2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20040211-1546-indecentprogramming.html, (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2004).  See also Reuters, Congress Focuses on Television Indecency: Fallout from Super Bowl 
Halftime Show, CNN.com, February 11, 2004, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/11/house.decency.reut/index.html, (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).  As 
explained earlier, we also rely on the internalization of informal rules – norms – to sustain internal order.  See supra 
note 357.  Indeed, it is internalizing a variety of informal rules that equips us to “take care of ourselves” out there in 
the real-world.   
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property.  Unlike the villagers in a Tokugawa mura, we have divorced ourselves from the 
“policing” function, i.e., from the process of maintaining order in our collectivity.  This is 
inevitable in complex, Westernized societies where the repertoire of behavior is far more 
convoluted and gradated than in rural, homogeneous societies like Tokugawa Japan. 
 This real-world model may not, however, be the appropriate default conceptualization for 
cyberspace. That does not mean that we should not experience cyberspace individually; on the 
contrary, individualism in cyberspace is an essential aspect of this quintessentially experiential 
reality.  Nevertheless, it is already apparent that the devices we require in the real-world to 
maintain the baseline of internal order are not effective in cyberspace; and it is reasonable to 
assume that they will become increasingly ineffective as technology, and the experiential reality 
it sustains, become ever more sophisticated.  Since the reactive model is not effective, we must 
find a new model; one founded on prevention is the only viable alternative.378  The rules outlined 
in Part II(C) are designed to incorporate preventative components into the reactive model by 
holding “users” and “architects” liable, to different degrees and for different reasons, for failing 
to prevent cybercrime.   
  The problem relevant to “users” is that these rules are highly demanding, provided we are 
operating under our current conceptualization of cyberspace.  “Users” are made responsible for 
securing their experience in cyberspace and the online experience of those for whom they are 
held responsible.379  The goal is to alter assumptions and expectations and thereby create a 
climate of prevention; this requires a move from a reactive to a proactive strategy. The “user” 
rules outlined above are intended to initiate this process, 380 and they will undoubtedly have an 
378See supra Part II(A)-(B).  
379See supra Part II(C)(1).  
380See supra Part II(C)(1).  
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impact on “user” behavior.  Nonetheless, since their concern is with modifying individual 
behavior, the “user” rules fail to address another essential component of a preventative strategy.  
Currently, the greatest obstacle to achieving prevention and security at the “user” level is the 
difficulty of securing systems; and the difficulty of securing systems is a function of the 
complexity and the evolving nature of computer technology. 
We need only to compare real-world and cyber-world security to understand why this is 
true.  Burglar alarm technology is simple and quite stable.  I can have a home security alarm 
system installed and can easily learn how to use it, at least until I need to learn a new system 
because the old one failed or because I move.381  Computer technology, on the other hand, is 
neither simple nor stable.  The laptop I recently purchased has anti-virus and other security 
software installed on it, but the software was out of date when I got it; indeed, it was probably 
out of date when my laptop left the manufacturer. Since I cannot rely on this technology, it is 
now up to me to update the software and to do whatever else is necessary to secure my online 
activities and prevent my becoming the victim of and/or a conduit for cybercrime.382  This, 
however, is no easy task.  The ever-evolving nature of computer technology coupled with the 
ingenuity of those who populate the “dark side” of cyberspace mean that anyone who goes 
online is effectively engaged in an “arms race” with cybercriminals (and cyberterrorists).383  
381See, e.g., Tom Davidson, Lorna Gentry & Steve McVey, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Home Security 159-159 
(2001).  
382See supra Part II(C).  
383See e.g., Cyber Attacks:  Removing Roadblocks to Investigation and Information Sharing, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of 
Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation),  http://www.mipt.org/pdf/cyberattacks03282001.pdf, (last 
visited September 27, 2003) (battle against cybercrime involves the “cyber equivalent of an arms race”).  See also 
Jeanne Sahadi, Cybercrime: Living With It, CNN Money, Feb. 27, 2003, at 
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Computer security professionals and law enforcement officers find it difficult to compete 
successfully in this “arms race.”  How can we expect “users,” who tend to be self-taught 
amateurs, to anticipate and withstand assaults from sophisticated attackers?384     
 This brings us to the possibility of re-conceptualizing how we participate in cyberspace.  
We could create “licenses” and otherwise regulate participation in cyberspace, and perhaps even 
limit it to those who are able to demonstrate that they possess the expertise and ability to fend off 
cyberattackers.385 This approach is analogous to the way we have dealt with motor vehicles, the 
operation of which is also fraught with substantial perils.386  For the cyber-world, however, this 
approach is neither desirable nor one that is likely to prove workable.  Its undesirability lies in its 
 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/02/20/commentary/everyday/sahadi/, (last visited September 27, 2004) (competition 
between online criminals and those responsible for computer security is an “arms race”).   
384See, e.g., Joris Evers, Security Suit Against Microsoft Could Turn Huge, Info World, October 2, 2003, at 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/10/02/HNmssecsuit_1.html?security, (last visited September 27, 2004) (victim 
of identity theft suing Microsoft claims “Microsoft makes it too hard for consumers . . . to secure their systems”).  
385See, e.g., Anick Jesdanun, Digitally Informed: Should A License Be Required to Go Online?, Detroit News, 
September 12, 2003, at http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0309/14/technology-268979.htm, (last visited 
September 27, 2004):  
Barely a day goes by without someone, somewhere getting stung or stinging others through 
careless Internet use.  
Though many of these threats are preventable, relatively few of us take the necessary precautions.  
So why not institute mandatory education before people can go online? After all, motorists must 
obtain licenses before they can legally hit the road, and computers are much more complicated. . . 
. 
Minimum competency requirements could include . . . how to update anti-virus programs, install 
firewalls and obtain security fixes for your computer's operating system . . . . 
Users . . . could become smarter about creating passwords and more cautious about using them at 
public terminals, where criminals have been known to harvest them with keystroke-logging 
software. . . . 
Dan Updegrove . . . is considering even more onerous requirements.  
`A car has to pass an inspection, and a driver has to pass a test,’ he said. ‘We need to be moving in 
the direction that machines are certified in some ways and users are certified in some ways.’  
386Id.    
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overbreadth: It would, at least initially, deny the benefits and utilities of participating in 
cyberspace to a majority of the world’s population as the price for markedly reducing the 
incidence of cybercrime.387  It would transform cyberspace into an experience reserved for the 
techno-cognoscenti.388  Reducing the incidence of cybercrime is certainly a desirable goal, but it 
is not worth this cost.  We could markedly reduce the incidence of real-world crime by requiring 
everyone to wear government-issued identification badges, imposing curfews and otherwise 
restricting activity, but the costs, in terms of individual freedom and creativity, would far 
outweigh the benefits.  A “licensing” approach would also be difficult to implement.389  Who 
would issue the licenses?  Who would monitor cyberspace to ensure only licensed participants 
were online?  How often would licenses have to be renewed?  Scofflaws pose another problem.  
I necessarily operate a motor vehicle in public, where I can be observed and can have my license 
checked; however, when I go online in private, it is far more difficult to detect my flouting of the 
law.390  Thus, all the “licensing” approach would do is increase the burden on law enforcement 
by adding another layer of regulations and enforcement.391
 Is there a way to preserve the “individual experience” of cyberspace while reducing the 
burden “users” currently labor under to secure that experience?  One possibility is to introduce 
collectivities into the online experience.  Instead of taking sole responsibility for protecting 
387See, e.g., id. ( A chief technology officer for computer security company noted that a “`downside is everybody 
you know won't be able to have a computer anymore, and I like being able to send e-mail to friends’”).   
388See, e.g., id. (“[W]hat do we do about the illiterate and the disabled, about people vexed by standardized tests? 
Bar them from the online world?”). 
389See, e.g., id. (“[W]ho's going to create and enforce the rules? A Federal Computing Commission or a United 
Nations for Computing?”).  See also id. (“[T]echnology advances too quickly. Lessons become outdated. Repeat 
certifications would be necessary”).     
390See supra Part II(A)(4)(b).  
391See supra Part II(A)(4)(b).  
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myself online, I could join with others in a collective – a twenty-first century version of a 
mura – the function of which would be to provide mutual support and thereby enhance the 
security of our online activities.  Historically, when humans confronted disorder, they resorted to 
the premise that there is safety in numbers;392 for the real-world, this denotes the combined 
physical force a group can muster to fend off attacks.393  This has often meant meeting force with 
force; as noted earlier, however, strike-back techniques are not a desirable way to maintain order 
in cyberspace.394  For the online world, the premise that safety lies in numbers should be 
construed as denoting a collective’s ability to provide expertise, resources, moral support and the 
motivation to prevent and withstand attacks.  Medieval Europe, for example, responded to 
attacks from Vikings and other outliers with a wave of urbanization.395  Populations organized 
392See, e.g., NORMAN DAVIES, THE ISLES: A HISTORY 711, 963 (1999); ORLANDO FIGES, A PEOPLE’S TRAGEDY:  
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1891-1924 395, 644 (1998); WAR AND SOCIETY IN THE GREEK WORLD 92 (John Rich & 
Graham Shipley eds. 1995) (1993).   
393See, e.g., Azar Gat, Why City-States Existed: Riddles and Clues of Urbanization and Fortifications, in A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIX CITY-STATE CULTURES 125-38 (M. Hansen, ed. 2002), at 
http://cniss.wustl.edu/workshoppapers/gatpres2a.pdf (last visited September 27, 2004): 
[B]y coalescing around a central stronghold, people . . . ceased to present small, isolated, and 
highly vulnerable targets for raiders. . . .  [T]here was increased safety in numbers . . . .[C]ities-
towns were protected by size. Substantial settlements could not be quickly eliminated in a surprise 
night raid. Their inhabitants . . . comprised a considerable force and would have had time to wake 
up and resist. . . .  [T]aking on a city meant direct fighting of the most severe, sustained, and 
dangerous sort: from house to house, with every building top potentially serving as a minor 
stronghold.  
See also Urs A. Cipolat & Noah B. Novogrodsky, Safety in Numbers:  Bush Needs A Global Approach to Homeland 
Security, Cal Law, January 23, 2002, at http://www.law.com/regionals/ca/opinions/stories/edt0123_cipolat.shtml 
(last visited September 27, 2004).  
394See supra Part II(A)(4).  
395DAVID NICHOLAS, THE GROWTH OF THE MEDIEVAL CITY:  FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE EARLY FOURTEENTH 
CENTURY 58-63 (Robert Tittler ed., 1997) ([U]rbanization increased in tenth century England because the “fortified 
centers offered more chance of survival…. Virtually all major English cities originated as fortifications that later 
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into collectives protected by walls and other fortifications were much more challenging 
targets than isolated farms or manors.396    
 The notion of importing collectivity into the online experience should not be interpreted 
as abandoning individuality or embarking upon some forced cyber-collective-farm experiment.  
It is simply a way to bring the essence of Tokugawa Japan’s distributed, communal approach to 
maintaining internal order into the cyber-world.  The purpose is to provide an alternative for 
those who do not feel they can protect themselves online; these “users” can participate in 
cyberspace via a collective that provides them with enhanced protection and mutual support.    
 How should this collective-participation alternative be implemented?  It must, first of all, 
be an option; collective participation cannot be mandatory.  Those who feel quite capable of 
protecting themselves online should not be forced into this option; all else aside, forcing 
competent “users” into collectives is inconsistent with our philosophy of individualism.397  Since 
the strategy is to be purely voluntary, implementation should focus on encouraging those who 
are insecure about their ability to protect themselves online to participate in cyberspace via 
 
developed commercial functions.”).  For a discussion of urbanization in other medieval European countries, see id. 
at 64-84. See generally Part II(B). 
396See supra note 393.  See generally JOHANNES BRONDSTED, THE VIKINGS 32-341 (1965); THE ANGLO-SAXON 
CHRONICLE 55, 70-72 (Trans. G.N. Garmonsway 1986) (1953).   
397It would also require adopting and implementing a set of “do” rules which, as was explained earlier, is inadvisable 
in and of itself. See supra Part II(A)(4).  The consequences of proceeding on one's own and falling prey to 
cybercriminals should help to encourage all but the most sophisticated “users” (along, no doubt, with those who 
perceive themselves as sophisticated “users”)  to take advantage of the relative security provided by collective 
access.  See supra Part II(C)(1).  Prosecutions of those who heedlessly eschew the collective alternative to become 
not only victims, but vectors for the victimization of others can reinforce the advisability of collective access for all 
but the most adept “users.”  See supra Part II(C)(1).   
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portals offering secure access.398  American Online (“AOL”) anticipates, to some extent, 
what such a portal might be like.  AOL’s stated goal is to provide a “safe and secure 
environment” for its subscribers;399 to that end, it offers “powerful security safeguards,”400 
parental controls and other “family-focused solutions” to shield children from unfiltered Internet 
content401 and to provide a “cash card” which teenagers can use for online purchases under their 
parents’ supervision.402   
 The critical difference between a contemporary access service like AOL and the secure 
access portals being hypothesized here is that secure access is only a small part of what AOL 
offers its subscribers.403  Secure access would be the defining characteristic of the collective 
access portals envisioned here; some portals might, as is explained below, also offer other 
services to their subscribers, but their universal raison d’etre would be security.  These portals 
would be in the business of providing security online, just as companies like Pinkerton’s or 
398We already have web portals, in the form of websites that provide links to other sites.  See e.g., “portal,” 
NetLingo, http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?term=portal (last visited September 27, 2004) (portal is a “web site 
that serves as a starting point to other destinations or activities on the web”). 
399See e.g., AOL.com, Privacy Policy, available at http://www.aol.com/info/privacy.adp; AOL City Guide: Privacy 
Policy, AOL.com, available at  http://www.digitalcity.com/aboutus/privacy.adp?change_city=1(last visited 
September 30, 2004). 
400See Why Choose AOL?, Powerful Security Safeguards, available at http://www.aol.com/ why_choose_aol.adp.  
See also Optimized Security, AOL.com, http://www.aol.com/optimized/security.adp (last visited September 30, 
2004). 
401See AOL.com, Optimized for Families, available at http://www.aol.com/optimized/family.adp (last visited 
September 30, 2004).   
402See id.  
403AOL, for example, gives seven reasons why someone should choose AOL: (1) security; (2) a “family-friendly” 
environment; (3) enhanced communication; (4) a seamless experience with fast, reliable connections; (5) an 
“optimized broadband” experience; (6) “exclusive and on-demand programming”; and (7) “24/7 member services.”  
AOL.com, Why Chose AOL?, available at http://www.aol.com/ why_choose_aol.adp (last visited September 30, 
2004).   
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Brink’s have traditionally provided security in the real-world.404  This brings up yet another 
difference between these hypothesized portals and contemporary services like AOL:  While 
AOL (and other Internet service providers) market themselves as providing security to their 
subscribers, what this really means is that they take responsibility for securing their own systems 
but leave subscribers responsible for protecting themselves online.  AOL (and many other 
Internet service providers) do support subscribers’ efforts in this regard by making available – 
either as part of the basic subscription service or as options that can be purchased separately – 
security devices (“tools”) such as firewalls and antivirus software.405  It is up to the individual 
subscriber to learn how to use these tools and to deploy them to protect himself when he is 
online.  The portals hypothesized here, on the other hand, would guarantee their subscribers 
some level of secure online access that could (and no doubt should) extend to alerts about social 
engineering and other non-technologically based threats.406
 While secure access portals styled after AOL would no doubt be an attractive choice for 
many “users,” they could not be the only option; they would be perceived as too restrictive and 
too “safe” by many, and would consequently not be seen as an acceptable means of accessing 
404See, e.g. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., available at http://www.pinkertons.com/ (last visited September 
30, 2004) (noting that Securitas, which is in the business of “protecting homes, work places and community”, 
acquired Pinkerton’s in 1999); The Brink’s Company, available at http:/brinkscompany.com/ (last visited 
September 30, 2004) (noting that Brink’s is “focused on protecting people and property”). 
405AOL, for example, provides “e-mail anti-virus protection,” a firewall, pop-up blockers and a spam filter; 
subscribers can also purchase a “premium service” which supplies McAfee VirusScan Online.  See Optimized 
Security, available at http://www.aol.com/optimized/security.adp (last visited September 30, 2004).  EarthLink 
provides a similar set of alternatives, though its firewall must be purchased separately.  See EarthLink Tools, 
available at http://www.earthlink.net/home/tools/ (last visited September 30, 2004); EarthLink Extras, available at 
http://store.earthlink.net/cgibin/wsisa.dll/store/main.html?type=extras (last visited September 30, 2004). 
406See, e.g., KEVIN D. MITNICK ET AL., THE ART OF DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 
3-12 (2002).   
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cyberspace.407  The best approach would be to have an array of portals that vary in the level 
of protection they provide and in the “culture” they offer.  As to the former, portals could, as is 
explained below, offer different levels of secure access (correlating with different subscription 
costs); to encourage “users” to patronize portals, subscribing to portals with the highest levels of 
security could relieve them of criminal liability under the rules enunciated in Part II(C)(1).     
 AOL-style clones would offer not only access secure enough to negate potential criminal 
liability, but also a sanitized online experience; these portals would truly be gated communities, 
analogues of the current AOL system with its emphasis on filtered, host-generated content and 
experiences.  Like AOL, these portals would presumably be attractive to families; they might 
also attract elderly “users” or other “users” who find unfiltered online content offensive because 
of their cultural or religious values or simply want to avoid unfiltered cyberspace.  The portals 
might also offer some, though likely restricted, access to the “outside” world of cyberspace. 
 Another type of portal would only offer varying degrees of secure access.  Like the AOL 
clones, some of the portals in this category would offer access that is secure enough to avoid the 
possibility of criminal liability for their subscribers; but unlike the AOL clones, these portals 
407See, e.g., Why Greek Hate AOL, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 12, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/efinance/article/0,2763,195777,00.html (last visited September 30, 2004):   
[N]etties don't like AOL. Search for `aol sucks’ on the internet, and you'll find more than 4,000 
web pages. But why? AOL is the world's most successful online service . . . .[O]n many hate lists 
the company rates up there alongside Microsoft and the government. All three are feared for the 
same reason: netizens worry that they are out to curb the . . . freedom of the internet, freedom to 
say things and choose particular technology to get around - or even dictate how they get online in 
the first place. . . . 
See also Why AOL Sucks, available at http://www.ebtx.com/business/aolsucks.htm (last visited September 30, 
2004) (“I’ve been trying to find a one word adjective that best fits AOL. The best I can come up with at present is 
"cloying”); Another AOL Sucks Commercial, available at http://www.jillsjokeline.com/aolsucks2.html (last visited 
September 30, 2004) (“American Online: The Choice of morons . . . everywhere”). 
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 would leave their subscribers free to enjoy an unfiltered online experience.  Still other 
portals in this category could offer less secure access, on the premise that those ostensibly more 
sophisticated “users” would be attracted by the lower subscription costs and the cachet 
associated with assuming a risk of victimization and criminal liability.  Finally, those confident 
in their own ability to “take care of themselves” online would be free to ignore the portals and 
access cyberspace on their own.  
 A level of secure access would be common to all portals; secure access is, after all, the 
primary reason for patronizing a portal.  Portals could differ in other respects, though, including 
the basis upon which they were made available.  The paragraphs above assume portals are 
commercial services:  future analogues of AOL, EarthLink or other Internet Service Providers, 
all of which offer certain services in return for subscription fees.  Many, if not most, portals 
would no doubt be commercial operations; subscription fees would be priced according to the 
level of secure access provided and whether a portal offered additional services, such as filtered 
online experiences.  There could also be non-commercial portals.  For example, companies could 
host portals as a new type of benefit, requiring employees to pay a fee for using their employer’s 
secure systems to go online.  Portals could be provided by colleges and universities (most of 
which already provide similar services for their students), by churches and by other 
organizations.  Portals could be established by groups of like-minded people who choose to join 
together to establish a secure point of access; this access point could become a focal point of 
their activities and an emblem of their collective interests and identity.   
 In a sense, this concept of portals represents the implementation of a real-world strategy 
in the cyber-world.  If we analogize cyberspace to a frontier territory in the real-world, the 
portals become outposts where people come together for security.  They become, as noted above, 
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an online manifestation of the premise that there is strength in numbers; when faced with 
threats, they find it advisable to join with others to confront the danger.   
 This strength in numbers aspect of the portals would certainly contribute to their 
attractiveness to “users” and would be key in enhancing the security of cyberspace.  There 
would, however, be another aspect of portals like those hypothesized above:  They can help to 
alter expectations and assumptions and to create a climate in which “users” take some level of 
responsibility for online security.  This last statement may seem contradictory, given that the 
primary purpose of portals is to relieve their patrons of at least some measure of responsibility 
for protecting themselves online.  However, online threats are not constant; they evolve as 
technology and the resources, ingenuity and expertise of online criminals evolve.  An important 
aspect of portals, therefore, is fostering a climate in which “users,” at least those who do not 
limit their online activities to AOL-derived gated communities, are concerned about and are 
aware of new threats.  The goal is to foster a sense of community which compels me to take 
responsibility for alerting the members of my community (e.g., the staff of the portal I patronize 
and its other subscribers) to any dangers I observe.  Communication among community members 
regarding potential risks is not only an effective means of identifying such risks, but is also a 
means of reinforcing the need to be aware of them, to report any dangers one encounters, and to 
help other members of one’s community become aware of risks that exist online and avoid 
them.408  However effective portals of the type hypothesized above may become, risks will 
408Portal members’ communicating with each other about online dangers – including completed online victimization 
– will “personalize” cybercrime and bring home the need to avoid it.  To understand why this is true, it is only 
necessary to consider a hypothetical:  Assume that tonight, on ABC World News, I watch a story about a horrific 
homicide that takes place in Los Angeles, which is thousands of miles away from where I live.  While I will be 
appalled at the crime and sympathetic to the victim and the victim’s family, the crime will have no immediate 
significance to me; I do not see myself as running any conceivable risk of being victimized by the person who 
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always exist online, just as they will always exist in the real-world.  In the online world, as 
in the real-world, the sense of commitment and moral support we derive from collective 
experience would prove to be an essential element in a strategy for preventing these dangers 
from being realized.409   
 IV.     CONCLUSION 
 Tokugawa cyberspace will never really exist, but it is a useful metaphor for a new law 
enforcement strategy.  As Part II explained, the reactive model of law enforcement we use to 
keep order in the real-world is not suitable for dealing with crime in the online world.  This does 
not mean that we should discard that model; the concept of apprehending and sanctioning those 
who harm others should continue to be part of an online enforcement strategy, just as it will 
continue to be part of our real-world enforcement strategy.  Nonetheless, it cannot be our sole, or 
even our primary, approach to cybercrime; the inherent impossibility of successfully reacting to 
 
committed this crime.  It becomes, therefore, a generalized threat, a reminder that dangers lurk even in the stable, 
safe real-world of the United States, but it not anything to which I need to take any particular cognizance.  Now, 
assume that I see the same story but this time it is broadcast on a local news station in Dayton, Ohio, which is where 
I live; to make the hypothetical even more compelling, assume the murder was committed on the campus of the 
University where I teach.  Now the homicide has “personal” significance – it has happened in a place I know, a place 
I frequent, and may even have happened to someone I know or know of.  I now see this crime, the same crime at 
issue in the original version of this hypothetical, as something of which I need to take cognizance by taking certain 
precautions, changing my routine, buying Mace, etc.   
 One problem with raising “user” consciousness about cybercrime is that it tends to be perceived as a 
generalized threat, the online analogue of the Los Angeles homicide in the hypothetical presented above.  
Cybercrime “happens,” but not to anyone I know; consequently, it has no personal significance for me.  It is not a 
“real” threat.  However, if information about cybercrime and reports of particular cybercrimes circulated through a 
portal such as that described above, the “fact” of cybercrime would be perceived as something “real,” as something 
that could happen to me or to those whom I care about.  Perceiving a threat as “real” is an essential first step in 
taking measures to avoid becoming the victim of such a threat.  
409This aspect of the portals essentially provides an empirical predicate for the implementation of a variant of the 
community policing discussed earlier.  See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.   
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most cybercrime undermines the reactive model’s credibility as a way to address 
victimization in the cyber-world.  
 This article is, as was explained at its outset, a speculation.  It is a conjecture on how 
principles of criminal law might be used to develop an alternative strategy that is based not on 
reacting to cybercrime, but on preventing it.  It is exceedingly difficult to forecast how law may 
evolve.  It is even more difficult to do so when the forecast involves the evolving assimilation of 
technologies which defy basic premises – e.g., identity, spatial constraints, or territorial authority 
– that have shaped criminal law as we know it.  Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is 
imperative that we not content ourselves with “what has been,” but endeavor, as best we can, to 
articulate strategies that are suitable for a phenomenon which has only recently emerged, but 
which, it is already clear, has the capacity to overwhelm law enforcement.   
 In the summer of 2003, a bank in Kearney, Nebraska was victimized by Malaysian 
hackers who stole debit card account access numbers.410  The bank responded quickly and 
prevented major losses; according to a bank officer, the only effect its customers felt was “the 
inconvenience of getting new debit cards issued to them.”411  When asked if the bank intended to 
report the matter to law enforcement, the bank officer said it would not, since the matter would 
be handled internally.412  The Kearney bank was very fortunate that its losses were so small; 
other U.S. banks and businesses have not been so fortunate.  Assume, for the sake of analysis, 
that the Kearney bank had suffered substantial losses and that it identified the attacks as coming 
from Malaysia.  In this scenario, such substantial losses would warrant calling in law 
410See, e.g., Counterfeit Ring Hacks Nebraska Bank’s Computer, USA TODAY, July 23, 2003, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2003-07-23-ne-hack_x.htm (last visited September 30, 
2004). 
411See id.    
412See id.    
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enforcement to apprehend the perpetrators.  Assume, then, that in this hypothetical scenario, 
the President of the Kearney bank contacts local law enforcement.  Kearney is a town of 
approximately 30,000 with a police force that has forty-eight regular officers.413  Like most small 
police departments, the Kearney Police Department most likely does not have a cybercrime unit; 
if true, this would mean it would lack the expertise and resources needed to deal with the 
investigation of a crime of this type.414   
 Let us assume, however, that the Kearney Police Department can conduct a basic 
cybercrime investigation.  The investigation indicates that the attack came from Malaysia, but 
that Malaysia may not be the actual source.  To identify the actual source of the attack, the local 
police would have to be able to track the “path” taken by the attack, perhaps through a number of 
intervening computers, which is not an easy task.  We will be generous, though, and assume they 
are able to do this and that they finally identify the attack as having come from Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil.  Although they have discovered the source of the attack, this information may not 
identify the attackers.  To identify the attackers, they would likely need assistance from Brazilian 
authorities and Brazilian citizens, such as an Internet Service Provider; most local U.S. law 
enforcement officers are not familiar with the intricate processes required to obtain such 
assistance through formal channels.415  Until recently, banks in Nebraska, Texas, and other U.S. 
states did not have to worry about off-shore attackers; now they do. 
413See, e.g., About Kearney, Living in Kearney, available at http://www.ci.kearney.ne.us/kearney.asp (last visited 
September 30, 2004); Police: Kearney/ Buffalo Law Enforcement Center, available at 
http://www.cityofkearney.org/index.asp?ID=7 (last visited September 30, 2004). 
414See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Joseph IV, Transactional Evidence Gathering and Local Prosecution of 
International Cybercrime, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 347, 375-77 (2002). 
415See id. 
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 Even if our hypothetical Kearney Cybercrime Squad is able to identify the 
appropriate processes and successfully initiate them, obtaining the evidence can take months, if 
not years; the attackers may well have left Brazil by then, putting them out of the reach of even 
the Brazilian authorities.  Even if we continue our generosity and assume that the Kearney 
Cybercrime Squad obtains the assistance and evidence it needs to identify the attackers and has 
them extradited and brought to Kearney for trial, the police and the prosecutor(s) handling the 
case still face significant obstacles.  They may need to bring witnesses in to authenticate 
evidence or to otherwise establish the case against the accused perpetrators, which can be an 
expensive task.416  Indeed, the whole process of investigating a case such as this and preparing it 
for trial is expensive; the resources needed to pursue a case such as this are often far beyond 
what a small city or county can afford.417  Even if a small city or county can somehow afford to 
fund the investigation and prosecution of one set of cyberattackers, it most certainly will not be 
able to repeat the process as attacks from off-shore perpetrators continue.  Without a doubt, these 
attacks will continue; the United States is the richest country in the world and, as such, is an 
attractive victim for those who have learned how to use cyberspace to extort, steal and defraud 
(among other nefarious activities). 
 As this cautionary tale demonstrates, we cannot defend ourselves and our assets by 
reacting to attacks launched against us from cyberspace; despite what resources we have, we 
may never identify the architect of such an attack or the location from which it was launched. 
The traditional, reactive model of law enforcement is based on an assumed division of 
responsibility for maintaining order:  The military maintains external order by discouraging and 
responding to hostile action by other nation-states, while law enforcement maintains internal 
416Id.      
417Id.    
111 
 order by reacting to instances in which our citizens prey upon one another.  This division of 
labor assumes a perimeter; that is, it assumes civilian law enforcement deals only with internal 
threats.  Perimeters do not exist in cyberspace; cyberspace is permeable, and geography is 
irrelevant.  The assumptions that shaped the reactive model do not hold in cyberspace, and we 
are well on our way to becoming defenseless unless we can devise an alternative model, one that 
can deal with the realities of cybercrime. 
 The model outlined in this article may well not be the appropriate alternative.  It is 
offered as a step in the process of conceptualizing how we can defend ourselves against 
cybercrime without losing the benefits that this new experiential reality can confer.    
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